Tim Bayne
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 468546 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Tim Bayne |
| PRENOMES | Tim |
| SOBRENOME | Bayne |
| ASSINATURA | BAYNE T |
| AFILIAÇÕES | St. Catherine University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8591-7907 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 24 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 53 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 23 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 2 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2001 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Chatting with bots
This paper addresses the question of whether large language model-powered chatbots are capable of assertion. According to what we call the Thesis of Chatbot Assertion (TCA), chatbots are the kinds of things that can assert, and at least some of the output produced by current-generation chatbots qualifies as assertion. We provide some motivation for TCA, arguing that it ought to be taken seriously and not simply dismissed. We also review recent ob…
How To Think About the Functions of Consciousness
A foundational issue for the science and philosophy of consciousness concerns the function(s) of consciousness—what consciousness does for any particular aspect of psychological or neural processing. In spite of progress in consciousness science, false assumptions and a lack of clarity regarding how best to approach the functions of consciousness represent an ongoing and serious roadblock to progress. Misguided approaches to the function(s) of co…
Deference, development, and large language models
This article is a commentary on Jonathan Birch's The edge of sentience . It considers the role of deference to consciousness experts in the citizens' assemblies that he calls for; evaluates his claim that the human fetus is a sentience candidate from 12 weeks' gestation; and explores some of the issues raised by his approach to sentience in large language models and other AI systems
In search of the beat
Beat perception has received very little attention from either philosophers of mind or philosophers of music. This neglect is unfortunate, for the topic is rich with philosophical interest. This article addresses two questions. The first concerns the nature of our experience of musical beat. Here, we argue that experiences of beat are forms of auditory perception. The second question concerns the nature of musical beat itself: what are beats? We …
The Turing test is not a good benchmark for thought in LLMs
Theories of consciousness
Consciousness, Concepts and Natural Kinds
We have various everyday measures for identifying the presence of consciousness, such as the capacity for verbal report and the intentional control of behavior. However, there are many contexts in which these measures are difficult (if not impossible) to apply, and even when they can be applied one might have doubts as to their validity in determining the presence/absence of consciousness. Everyday measures for identifying consciousness are parti…
Consciousness and Agency
Response to Commentators
Précis of The Unity of Consciousness
Unity of Consciousness
Cognitive Phenomenology
The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology,' that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology.
Cognitive phenomenology
The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness
Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call thi…
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content
The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high‐level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ‘No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ‘Yes’. I clarify the debate between conser…
The Phenomenology of Agency
This paper provides an overview of recent discussions of the phenomenology of agency. By 'the phenomenology of agency' I mean those phenomenal states that are associated with first-person agency. I call such states 'agentive experiences'. After briefly defending the claim that there is a phenomenology distinctive of first-person agency, I focus on two questions: (i) What is the structure of agentive experience? (ii) What is the representational c…
The grounds of worship again
In this paper we respond to Benjamin Crowe's criticisms in this issue of our discussion of the grounds of worship. We clarify our previous position, and examine Crowe's account of what it is about God's nature that might ground our obligation to worship Him. We find Crowe's proposals no more persuasive than the accounts that we examined in our previous paper, and conclude that theists still owe us an account of what it is in virtue of which we ha…
Conscious States and Conscious Creatures
Narrators and comparators
The grounds of worship
Although worship has a pivotal place in religious thought and practice, philosophers of religion have had remarkably little to say about it. In this paper we examine some of the many questions surrounding the notion of worship, focusing on the claim that human beings have obligations to worship God. We explore a number of attempts to ground our supposed duty to worship God, and argue that each is problematic. We conclude by examining the implicat…
Phenomenology and delusions
In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions
In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that t…
Inclusion and Incarnation
I make three points in response to Richard Sturch's comments on my paper: I defend my interpretation of the Morris–Swinburne (M–S) account of the Incarnation; I argue that the M–S model appears to undercut the view that the unity of consciousness can be explained in terms of the self; and third, I argue that M–S model seems to entail that God has false beliefs
The inclusion model of the Incarnation
Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne have recently defended what they call the ‘two-minds’ model of the Incarnation. This model, which I refer to as the ‘inclusion model’ or ‘inclusionism’, claims that Christ had two consciousnesses, a human and a divine consciousness, with the former consciousness contained within the latter one. I begin by exploring the motivation for, and structure of, inclusionism. I then develop a variety of objections to it:…
Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments
We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM) , David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully‐justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, becaus…
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content
The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high‐level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ‘No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ‘Yes’. I clarify the debate between conser…
The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness
Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call thi…
The Phenomenology of Agency
This paper provides an overview of recent discussions of the phenomenology of agency. By 'the phenomenology of agency' I mean those phenomenal states that are associated with first-person agency. I call such states 'agentive experiences'. After briefly defending the claim that there is a phenomenology distinctive of first-person agency, I focus on two questions: (i) What is the structure of agentive experience? (ii) What is the representational c…
Narrators and comparators
The Turing test is not a good benchmark for thought in LLMs
Conscious States and Conscious Creatures
The inclusion model of the Incarnation
Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne have recently defended what they call the ‘two-minds’ model of the Incarnation. This model, which I refer to as the ‘inclusion model’ or ‘inclusionism’, claims that Christ had two consciousnesses, a human and a divine consciousness, with the former consciousness contained within the latter one. I begin by exploring the motivation for, and structure of, inclusionism. I then develop a variety of objections to it:…
Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments
We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM) , David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully‐justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, becaus…
Inclusion and Incarnation
I make three points in response to Richard Sturch's comments on my paper: I defend my interpretation of the Morris–Swinburne (M–S) account of the Incarnation; I argue that the M–S model appears to undercut the view that the unity of consciousness can be explained in terms of the self; and third, I argue that M–S model seems to entail that God has false beliefs
In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions
In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that t…
The grounds of worship
Although worship has a pivotal place in religious thought and practice, philosophers of religion have had remarkably little to say about it. In this paper we examine some of the many questions surrounding the notion of worship, focusing on the claim that human beings have obligations to worship God. We explore a number of attempts to ground our supposed duty to worship God, and argue that each is problematic. We conclude by examining the implicat…
Phenomenology and delusions
The grounds of worship again
In this paper we respond to Benjamin Crowe's criticisms in this issue of our discussion of the grounds of worship. We clarify our previous position, and examine Crowe's account of what it is about God's nature that might ground our obligation to worship Him. We find Crowe's proposals no more persuasive than the accounts that we examined in our previous paper, and conclude that theists still owe us an account of what it is in virtue of which we ha…
Conscious States and Conscious Creatures
Narrators and comparators
The Phenomenology of Agency
This paper provides an overview of recent discussions of the phenomenology of agency. By 'the phenomenology of agency' I mean those phenomenal states that are associated with first-person agency. I call such states 'agentive experiences'. After briefly defending the claim that there is a phenomenology distinctive of first-person agency, I focus on two questions: (i) What is the structure of agentive experience? (ii) What is the representational c…
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content
The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high‐level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ‘No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ‘Yes’. I clarify the debate between conser…
The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness
Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call thi…
Cognitive Phenomenology
The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology,' that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology.
Cognitive phenomenology
Unity of Consciousness
Response to Commentators
Précis of The Unity of Consciousness
Consciousness and Agency
Consciousness, Concepts and Natural Kinds
We have various everyday measures for identifying the presence of consciousness, such as the capacity for verbal report and the intentional control of behavior. However, there are many contexts in which these measures are difficult (if not impossible) to apply, and even when they can be applied one might have doubts as to their validity in determining the presence/absence of consciousness. Everyday measures for identifying consciousness are parti…
Theories of consciousness
In search of the beat
Beat perception has received very little attention from either philosophers of mind or philosophers of music. This neglect is unfortunate, for the topic is rich with philosophical interest. This article addresses two questions. The first concerns the nature of our experience of musical beat. Here, we argue that experiences of beat are forms of auditory perception. The second question concerns the nature of musical beat itself: what are beats? We …
The Turing test is not a good benchmark for thought in LLMs
Deference, development, and large language models
This article is a commentary on Jonathan Birch's The edge of sentience . It considers the role of deference to consciousness experts in the citizens' assemblies that he calls for; evaluates his claim that the human fetus is a sentience candidate from 12 weeks' gestation; and explores some of the issues raised by his approach to sentience in large language models and other AI systems
Chatting with bots
This paper addresses the question of whether large language model-powered chatbots are capable of assertion. According to what we call the Thesis of Chatbot Assertion (TCA), chatbots are the kinds of things that can assert, and at least some of the output produced by current-generation chatbots qualifies as assertion. We provide some motivation for TCA, arguing that it ought to be taken seriously and not simply dismissed. We also review recent ob…
How To Think About the Functions of Consciousness
A foundational issue for the science and philosophy of consciousness concerns the function(s) of consciousness—what consciousness does for any particular aspect of psychological or neural processing. In spite of progress in consciousness science, false assumptions and a lack of clarity regarding how best to approach the functions of consciousness represent an ongoing and serious roadblock to progress. Misguided approaches to the function(s) of co…
Philosophy (22 obras) · Epistemology (21 obras) · Psychology (18 obras) · Consciousness (10 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 obras) · Cognitive psychology (8 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (8 obras) · Cognitive science (6 obras) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (5 obras)