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J A Jenkins

Dados Biográficos

ID48516
NOMEJ A Jenkins
PRENOMESJ A
SOBRENOMEJenkins
ASSINATURAJENKINS J A
AFILIAÇÕESUniversity of Southern California
ORCID0000-0001-7426-3370
VERIFICADOSim
TOTAL DE OBRAS70
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES690
TOTAL COMO AUTOR70
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1948
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2025
ÍNDICE H15
  • Presidential Particularism and Mayoral Elections

    Open Access•Heonuk Ha, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•State Politics & Policy Quarterly•2025•Referências: 13

    Amid the growing trend of political polarization and nationalization of US politics, the link between federal and local governments has become increasingly significant in the American public policy process. Consequently, the president, as party leader, has increasingly supported co-partisan candidates, not only in federal elections but also in subnational ones. Incorporating 1,124 contested partisan local elections for 399 cities with populations…

  • The Collapse of the Civil Rights Coalition

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Justin Peck•ARTICLE•Law and History Review•2025•Referências: 1

    The legislative coalition responsible for passing the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not set out to use busing as a means to end school segregation. When it came time to implement relevant portions of the law, however, busing became the primary method for reversing “separate but equal” education. In this paper, we provide a legislative policy history detailing the unanticipated, but nearly two-decade long, congressional battle over busing. Through a d…

  • Do presidents favor co-partisan mayors in the allocation of federal grants

    Open Access•Heonuk Ha, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Political Science Research and…•2025•Citada por: 3•Referências: 17

    With the increasing nationalization of politics, federal politicians have interacted more and more with subnational actors. In particular, the president and governing party have provided selective policy and spending benefits to same-party jurisdictions in order to increase their influence in subnational politics. As a significant amount of federal grants is allocated directly to city governments, we analyze the effects of the federal-city relati…

  • Do presidents favor co-partisan mayors in the allocation of federal grants? – Addendum

    Open Access•Heonuk Ha, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Political Science Research and…•2025•Referências: 1

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  • Estimating Disenfranchisement in US Elections, 1870–1970

    Open Access•Thomas Gray, Thomas R Gray et al.•ARTICLE•Perspectives on Politics•2025•Citada por: 1•Referências: 21

    While it is commonly understood that the poll tax and literacy tests, among other measures, were used effectively in the South to disenfranchise Black voters from the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, what is not well known is how much those disenfranchising laws mattered. Specifically, how much did the enactment of poll taxes or literacy tests affect turnout in federal and state elections? And how much did those disenfranchising…

  • Race, Corruption, and Southern Republicanism

    Open Access•Boris Heersink, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Du Bois Review Social Science…•2024•Referências: 6

    While Republicans enjoyed unified control of the national government during the 1920s, scandals involving executive patronage and GOP state bosses in the South dogged the national party throughout the decade. The Republican Party in the South had been a set of "rotten boroughs" for decades, used by national politicians-especially presidents-for the sole purpose of controlling delegates at the Republican National Convention. This patronage-for-del…

  • Toward a theory of minority-party influence in the U.S. Congress

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Nathan W Monroe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2023•Referências: 28

    The literature on congressional decision-making has largely ignored the influence of the minority party in the legislative process. This follows from the widely held belief that the majority party dominates the agenda-setting process. Though the minority party rarely achieves major policy success in Congress, we argue that the minority has significantly more influence over the legislative agenda than is commonly believed. We posit that, under som…

  • Natural Disasters, ‘Partisan Retrospection,’ and U.S. Presidential Elections

    Open Access•Boris Heersink, J A Jenkins et al.•ARTICLE•Political Behavior•2022

  • Foreshadowing the Civil Rights Counter-Revolution

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Justin Peck•ARTICLE•Du Bois Review Social Science…•2022

    After overseeing the adoption of two landmark civil rights proposals in 1964 and 1965, the Johnson administration and its allies in Congress sought to implement the third item of its broader agenda: a legal prohibition on racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing. Enacting fair housing legislation, however, proved to be a vexing process. Advocates had to win support from northern White Democrats skeptical of the policy, as well as R…

  • Southern Republicans in Congress during the pre-Reagan era

    Open Access•Boris Heersink, J A Jenkins et al.•ARTICLE•Party Politics•2022•Referências: 10

    We examine the composition, background, and voting behavior of Republican members of Congress from the ex-Confederate states in the 1952–1980 period—a time during which Southern GOP membership in Congress began to increase steadily. We find that this new generation of Southern Republicans were often born in the South, came from the private sector—where they previously worked in business like much of the non-Southern wing of the Republican Party—a…

  • Conflict over Congressional Reapportionment

    Open Access•Nicholas G Napolio, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy History•2022•Citada por: 1•Referências: 13

    In 1929, Congress passed a law capping the US House of Representatives at 435 seats, delegating the power to reapportion to the Executive Branch, and empowering state legislatures to redistrict with few federal limitations. The 1929 law was a compromise after nearly ten years of squabbling over how to apportion pursuant to the 1920 Census. In this article, we consider the apportionment debates of the 1920s both to better understand the politics o…

  • The direct election of senators and the emergence of the modern presidency

    Open Access•Thomas Gray, Thomas R Gray et al.•ARTICLE•Political Science Research and…•2022•Referências: 19

    Research on presidential power delineates between a modern era of relative autonomy and an earlier period of congressional dominance. What drove this change? Unlike prior arguments about presidential entrepreneurship and the rise of the United States as a global power, we attribute the emergence of the modern presidency partially to an institutional change—the adoption of direct election of senators that culminated in the 17th Amendment. With dir…

  • Messaging, policy and “credible” votes

    Open Access•Thomas Gray, Thomas R Gray et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2022•Citada por: 2•Referências: 15

    Many recorded roll calls in Congress each year are votes on bills that have no chance of becoming law, or are purely symbolic, or are procedural without policy content. Yet models of voting and measurement models of member preferences make assumptions that vote choices are largely about utility derived from policies. We consider the possibility that votes plausibly connected to policy and votes not plausibly connected to policy may have different…

  • Congress and the Political Economy of the National Endowment for the Arts

    Open Access•Thomas Gray, Thomas R Gray et al.•ARTICLE•Social Science Quarterly•2021•Referências: 5

    Objective We examine the relationship between the Congress and the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), from the agency's inception in the mid‐1960s to the present. The NEA has seen its fortunes rise and fall over time, as congressional appropriations and scrutiny have fluctuated with ideological and partisan change in the House and Senate. Methods We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and logistic regression models to examine the politics of the…

  • The Blair Education Bill

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Justin Peck•ARTICLE•Studies in American Political…•2020•Citada por: 1•Referências: 15

    Through the 1880s, Senator Henry Blair (R-NH) spearheaded an effort to erode local control of education by turning Congress into a source of funds and oversight for state-level primary and secondary schools. The Blair Bill won support from an interregional, interracial, bipartisan coalition. It passed in the Senate on three separate occasions, was endorsed by presidents, and was a frequent topic of discussion among party elites. Yet in 1890 the b…

  • Whiteness and the Emergence of the Republican Party in the Early Twentieth-Century South

    Open Access•Boris Heersink, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Studies in American Political…•2020•Referências: 8

    In the post-Reconstruction South, two Republican factions vied for control of state party organizations. The Black-and-Tans sought to keep the party inclusive and integrated, while the Lily-Whites worked to turn the GOP into a whites-only party. The Lily-Whites ultimately emerged victorious, as they took over most state parties by the early twentieth century. Yet no comprehensive data exist to measure how the conflict played out in each state. To…

  • Learning from each other

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Nolan Mccarty et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2020•Referências: 26

  • Causal inference and American political development

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Charles Stewart•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2020•Citada por: 3•Referências: 27

  • A Bridge Too Far? Examining Bridging Assumptions in Common‐Space Estimations

    Open Access•Thomas Gray, Thomas R Gray et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2020•Citada por: 2•Referências: 15

    While most common‐space estimations rely upon members who served in both the House and Senate as “bridges” to scale the remaining members, this assumes that these “bridge members” do not change their preferences when they change chambers. Such an assumption conflicts with standard notions of representation, that is, that legislators’ votes reflect (at least to some degree) the wishes of their constituents. We examine the constancy of this common‐…

  • Congress and the Political Economy of Daylight Saving Time, 1918–1985

    Open Access•Thomas Gray, Thomas R Gray et al.•ARTICLE•Social Science Quarterly•2019•Referências: 12

    Objective Daylight Saving Time (DST) is a government policy regulating the timing of daylight during the summer months. While DST's existence is taken for granted in modern American life, the adoption and expansion of the policy was heavily debated, with strong opposition that persists to the present day—a full century after its inception as a World War I energy‐efficiency program. After reviewing the history of DST, we analyze the political econ…

  • Pivotal Politics and the ideological content of Landmark Laws

    Open Access•Thomas Gray, Thomas R Gray et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2019•Citada por: 7•Referências: 34

    The Pivotal Politics model (Krehbiel) has significantly influenced the study of American politics, but its core empirical prediction – that the size of the gridlock interval is negatively related to legislative productivity – has not found strong empirical support. We argue that previous research featured a disconnect between the exclusively ideological theory and tests that relied on outcome variables that were not purely ideological. We remedy …

  • The Deinstitutionalization (?) of the House of Representatives

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Charles Stewart•ARTICLE•Studies in American Political…•2018•Citada por: 1•Referências: 33

    This article revisits Nelson Polsby's classic article “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives” fifty years after its publication, to examine whether the empirical trends that Polsby identified have continued. This empirical exploration allows us to place Polsby's findings in broader historical context and to assess whether the House has continued along the “institutionalization course”—using metrics that quantify the degree…

  • Distributive politics and congressional voting

    Open Access•Sean Gailmard, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2018•Citada por: 2•Referências: 23

  • Presidential Particularism and US Trade Politics

    Open Access•Kenneth Lowande, Kenneth S Lowande et al.•ARTICLE•Political Science Research and…•2018•Citada por: 12•Referências: 25

    Research on presidential distributive politics focuses almost exclusively on federal domestic spending. Yet, presidential influence on public policy extends well-beyond grant allocation. Since the early 20th Century, for example, the president has had substantial discretion to adjust tariff schedules and non-tariff barriers “with the stroke of a pen.” These trade adjustments via presidential directive allow us to test the logic of presidential pa…

  • Who are President Trump’s Allies in the House of Representatives

    Open Access•Andrew J Clarke, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•The Forum•2017•Referências: 3

    We conduct a preliminary analysis of the first 200 days of the Donald Trump presidency, to determine who his principal allies in the US House have been. We build our analysis around three groups of Republicans, based on caucus affiliations: members of the Republican Main Street Partnership (RMSP), the Republican Study Committee (RSC), and the House Freedom Caucus (HFC). We find that House Republicans, regardless off caucus membership, broadly sup…

Próximo
  • Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House

    Sean Gailmard, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2007•Citada por: 71•Referências: 12

    We present evidence suggesting that the majority party in the U.S. Senate exercises significant negative agenda control. Furthermore, this majority party negative agenda control in the Senate is very similar, in empirical terms, to negative agenda control exercised by the majority party in the U.S. House of Representatives. This evidence comes from comparisons of majority party roll rates across legislative vehicles (S bills, confirmation votes, …

  • Buying Negative Agenda Control in the U.S. House

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Nathan W Monroe•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2012•Citada por: 54•Referências: 30

    We explore the foundations of the legislative party cartel, as theorized by Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) , to determine how majority‐party moderates who suffer net policy losses from the majority leadership's use of negative agenda control are kept from defecting from the cartel arrangement. First, we identify formally the group of majority‐party members who are net policy losers. We find that those members occupying the initial 30% of the spac…

  • Examining the Bonding Effects of Party

    J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1999•Citada por: 48•Referências: 7

    This paper examines whether political parties influence Congressional roll-call voting. Rather than focusing on contemporary evidence, my approach is historical: analyzing voting behavior in the U.S. and Confederate Houses during the Civil War. The U.S. and Confederate cases provide a unique opportunity for a comparative analysis because the two legislative systems were nearly identical in all facets, except that a strong two-party system was in …

  • The Impact of National Tides and District-Level Effects on Electoral Outcomes

    Jamie L Carson, J A Jenkins et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2001•Citada por: 43•Referências: 18

    We examine the U.S. Congressional elections of 1862-63, which resulted in a stunning setback for President Abraham Lincoln and the incumbent Republican Party. After the electoral dust had cleared, the Republicans lost control of the House, as their share of seats declined from 59 percent to just over 46 percent. While historians contend that the national electorate's general unhappiness with the war effort produced a largely systematic backlash a…

  • Disasters and Elections

    Open Access•Boris Heersink, Brenton D Peterson et al.•ARTICLE•Political Analysis•2017•Citada por: 33•Referências: 14

    Do natural disasters help or hurt politicians’ electoral fortunes? Research on this question has produced conflicting results. Achen and Bartels (2002, 2016) find that voters punish incumbent politicians indiscriminately after such disasters. Other studies find that voters incorporate the quality of relief efforts by elected officials. We argue that results in this literature may be driven, in part, by a focus on contemporary cases of disaster an…

  • Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate

    Open Access•Sean Gailmard, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2009•Citada por: 32•Referências: 36

    A prominent change in American electoral institutions occurred when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution established direct election of U.S. Senators as of 1914. How did this change the political agency relationship between the mass electorate and U.S. Senators? We develop theoretical expectations about the representational effects of direct election by a relatively inexpert mass electorate and indirect election by a relatively expert political…

  • Examining the Robustness of Ideological Voting

    J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2000•Citada por: 30•Referências: 17

    A majority of work on Congressional voting behavior finds that members of Congress establish ideological positions and maintain them throughout the entirety of their careers, regardless of how their career aspirations, political positions, or underlying constituencies change. Based on this evidence, Poole (1998) concludes that members of Congress die in their ideological boots. I examine the robustness of the thesis more closely, using vote-scali…

  • Examining the Electoral Connection Across Time

    Jamie L Carson, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Political Science•2011•Citada por: 26•Referências: 45

    Mayhew's (1974) thesis regarding the “electoral connection” and its impact on legislative behavior has become the theoretical foundation for much of the research on the contemporary U.S. Congress. Recently, scholars have begun to suggest that the Mayhewian electoral incentive may apply to politics in earlier congressional eras as well. To assess these claims more systematically, we consider four conditions that serve as the building blocks of the…

  • Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Michael H Crespin et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2005•Citada por: 26•Referências: 42

    We examine the degree to which parties act as procedural coalitions in Congress by testing predictions from the party cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 2002). We gain leverage on the question of party influence in Congress by focusing on three types of House members: reelection seekers, higher-office seekers, and retiring members. We argue that retiring House members are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect …

  • The Supreme Court and American Political Development

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Perspectives on Politics•2007•Citada por: 24

    The Supreme Court and American Political Development. Edited by Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 400p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.In this book, Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch bring together an impressive group of scholars to present essays on how the theoretical tenets of the American political development (or APD) research agenda can help illuminate the behavior and institutional trajectory of the U.S. Su…

  • On Measuring Legislative Agenda‐Setting Power

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Nathan W Monroe•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2016•Citada por: 21•Referências: 35

    We propose a typology for measuring agenda‐setting success and failure in a legislative context. Our typology goes beyond the most commonly used measure (“rolls”) and includes the full range of agenda‐setting outcomes—rolls (opposing a proposal that subsequently passes), as well as “blocks” (opposing a proposal that is subsequently defeated), “successes” (supporting a proposal that subsequently passes), and “disappointments” (supporting a proposa…

  • Shirking in the Contemporary Congress

    Open Access•Jamie L Carson, Michael H Crespin et al.•ARTICLE•Political Analysis•2004•Citada por: 21•Referências: 8

    This paper replicates the findings that appeared in the article “Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress,” published in theAmerican Journal of Political Science(44:316–325), in which Lawrence Rothenberg and Mitchell Sanders incorporated a new research design and, contrary to all previous studies, found evidence of ideological shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives. We investigate the robustness of their res…

  • Partisanship, the Electoral Connection, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress, 1877–2006

    J A Jenkins, Timothy P Nokken•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2008•Citada por: 19•Referências: 14

    We disentangle constituent and partisan influences in Congress by taking advantage of a largely unexamined institutional setting—lame-duck sessions. Lame-duck sessions of Congress are comprised of exiting members, who are freed from both constituency and party constraints, and returning members, who face a significantly reduced constituency constraint but a still strong party constraint. Comparing exiting and returning House members thus provides…

  • Property Rights and the Emergence of Standing Committee Dominance in the Nineteenth-Century House

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1998•Citada por: 18

  • Investigating the Incidence of Killer Amendments in Congress

    J A Jenkins, Michael C Munger•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2003•Citada por: 17•Referências: 22

    While much empirical research has been devoted to the study of “killer amendments” in recent years, few studies have explicitly examined the theoretical foundations of the phenomenon. The goal of this paper is to investigate why some killer amendment attempts are successful, when theory suggests that they should always fail. More specifically, we examine the practical political constraints on legislators’ abilities to neutralize the imminent thre…

  • Race and the Representation of Blacks' Interests During Reconstruction

    Michael D Cobb, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2001•Citada por: 15•Referências: 23

    A majority of recent studies finds that black members of Congress are more supportive of blacks' interests than are white members of Congress, even white Democrats. These results are limited, however, exclusively to the contemporary period as scholars have not studied how black members of Congress behaved during Reconstruction, the first era of blacks' descriptive representation. Although black representatives from this era are typically portraye…

  • Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives, 1789–2002

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Studies in American Political…•2004•Citada por: 14

    Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution states: “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members. . . .” With this simple statement, each chamber of Congress is granted complete authority over how its membership will be comprised. Thus, when a given election is contested, that is, when there is a dispute over who is the rightful occupant of a given seat after the ballots have…

  • Legislative Shirking in the Pre-Twentieth Amendment Era

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Timothy P Nokken•ARTICLE•Studies in American Political…•2008•Citada por: 13•Referências: 17

    In 1933, the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted. Otherwise known as the Lame Duck Amendment, it reorganized the congressional terms of office and dates of annual convening, eliminating the short (or “lame-duck”) session that had existed up to that time. The amendment was the brainchild of Sen. George W. Norris (R-NE), who argued that lame-duck sessions posed a grave threat to democratic accountability and responsiveness, as they …

  • The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824

    J A Jenkins, Brian R Sala•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1998•Citada por: 13•Referências: 7

    Theory: We extend research on the spatial theory of voting and the electoral connection by exploring how U.S. House members responded to Electoral College gridlock in the presidential election of 1824. We analyze whether John Quincy Adams's victory was consistent with a spatial-theoretic, ideological model of voting or more closely followed the standard historical account that emphasizes Adams's role in a vote-buying corrupt bargain. Hypotheses: …

  • Presidential Particularism and US Trade Politics

    Open Access•Kenneth Lowande, Kenneth S Lowande et al.•ARTICLE•Political Science Research and…•2018•Citada por: 12•Referências: 25

    Research on presidential distributive politics focuses almost exclusively on federal domestic spending. Yet, presidential influence on public policy extends well-beyond grant allocation. Since the early 20th Century, for example, the president has had substantial discretion to adjust tariff schedules and non-tariff barriers “with the stroke of a pen.” These trade adjustments via presidential directive allow us to test the logic of presidential pa…

  • Distributive politics, the electoral connection, and the antebellum US Congress

    Open Access•Charles J Finocchiaro, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2016•Citada por: 12•Referências: 39

    We investigate the rise of federal military pensions in the antebellum US Congress to examine whether key aspects of the contemporary electoral connection were present in earlier historical eras. Overall, the political responses of members of Congress to pressures for military service pensions reveal that the quest for credit-claiming opportunities significantly shaped the adoption and evolution of this type of distributive legislation. Analyzing…

  • Ideology, economic interests, and congressional roll-call voting

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Marc Weidenmier•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1999•Citada por: 11•Referências: 19

  • In Search of Killer Amendments In the Modern U.S. House

    Open Access•Charles J Finocchiaro, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2008•Citada por: 9•Referências: 25

    Numerous studies have examined the incidence of killer amendments in Congress, but most of these studies have been either case specific, focusing on the legislative maneuverings around a single issue or bill, or temporally limited, focusing on strategic activity in only one or two Congresses. In this article, we present the beginning of a comprehensive research agenda for the systematic study of killer amendments. Using roll‐call data from the 83…

  • Negative Agenda Control and the Conservative Coalition in the U.S. House

    J A Jenkins, Nathan W Monroe•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2014•Citada por: 8•Referências: 11

    While it is widely believed that a “conservative coalition” of Southern Democrats and Republicans sometimes formed on floor votes in the mid-twentieth-century House to block liberal policy initiatives, a fully fleshed-out picture of what the coalition was and how it operated is lacking. In this article, we investigate whether the conservative coalition wielded negative agenda control, that is, whether it used positions of power in the House to bl…

  • The 1970s

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Political Science Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 8

    Journal Article The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality Get access The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality by Thomas Borstelmann. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2011. 416 pp. $29.95. Jeffery A. Jenkins Jeffery A. Jenkins University of Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 128, Issue 1, Sprin…

  • The origin of the cultivated tomato

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Economic Botany•1948•Citada por: 6•Referências: 11

  • Property Rights and the Emergence of Standing Committee Dominance in the Nineteenth-Century House

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1998•Citada por: 18

  • The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824

    J A Jenkins, Brian R Sala•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1998•Citada por: 13•Referências: 7

    Theory: We extend research on the spatial theory of voting and the electoral connection by exploring how U.S. House members responded to Electoral College gridlock in the presidential election of 1824. We analyze whether John Quincy Adams's victory was consistent with a spatial-theoretic, ideological model of voting or more closely followed the standard historical account that emphasizes Adams's role in a vote-buying corrupt bargain. Hypotheses: …

  • Why No Parties

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Studies in American Political…•1999

    The impact of political parties on political life in the United States has long been a subject of much interest to political scientists and other scholars.Works, beginning with Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1881), comprise a good many political science classics. Below I will refer to James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Po…

  • Partisanship and Confederate Constitution-Making Reconsidered

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Studies in American Political…•1999•Referências: 1

    In his response to my essay on the connection between partisan machinations in the Confederate Constitutional Convention and the disappearance of Democrat-Whig divisions in the Confederacy, Professor Richard Bensel raises a number of interesting arguments as to why partisanship was not a factor during the making of the Confederate Constitution. Additionally, Professor Bensel suggests a different avenue to examine the link between partisanship and…

  • Ideology, economic interests, and congressional roll-call voting

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Marc Weidenmier•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1999•Citada por: 11•Referências: 19

  • Examining the Bonding Effects of Party

    J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1999•Citada por: 48•Referências: 7

    This paper examines whether political parties influence Congressional roll-call voting. Rather than focusing on contemporary evidence, my approach is historical: analyzing voting behavior in the U.S. and Confederate Houses during the Civil War. The U.S. and Confederate cases provide a unique opportunity for a comparative analysis because the two legislative systems were nearly identical in all facets, except that a strong two-party system was in …

  • The Institutional Origins of the Republican Party

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Timothy P Nokken•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2000•Citada por: 8

  • Examining the Robustness of Ideological Voting

    J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2000•Citada por: 30•Referências: 17

    A majority of work on Congressional voting behavior finds that members of Congress establish ideological positions and maintain them throughout the entirety of their careers, regardless of how their career aspirations, political positions, or underlying constituencies change. Based on this evidence, Poole (1998) concludes that members of Congress die in their ideological boots. I examine the robustness of the thesis more closely, using vote-scali…

  • The Impact of National Tides and District-Level Effects on Electoral Outcomes

    Jamie L Carson, J A Jenkins et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2001•Citada por: 43•Referências: 18

    We examine the U.S. Congressional elections of 1862-63, which resulted in a stunning setback for President Abraham Lincoln and the incumbent Republican Party. After the electoral dust had cleared, the Republicans lost control of the House, as their share of seats declined from 59 percent to just over 46 percent. While historians contend that the national electorate's general unhappiness with the war effort produced a largely systematic backlash a…

  • Race and the Representation of Blacks' Interests During Reconstruction

    Michael D Cobb, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2001•Citada por: 15•Referências: 23

    A majority of recent studies finds that black members of Congress are more supportive of blacks' interests than are white members of Congress, even white Democrats. These results are limited, however, exclusively to the contemporary period as scholars have not studied how black members of Congress behaved during Reconstruction, the first era of blacks' descriptive representation. Although black representatives from this era are typically portraye…

  • Why Congressional Reforms Fail

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Political Science Quarterly•2003•Citada por: 7

    Journal Article Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System Get access Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System by E. Scott Adler. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002. 264 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.00. Jeffery A. Jenkins Jeffery A. Jenkins Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 118…

  • Investigating the Incidence of Killer Amendments in Congress

    J A Jenkins, Michael C Munger•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2003•Citada por: 17•Referências: 22

    While much empirical research has been devoted to the study of “killer amendments” in recent years, few studies have explicitly examined the theoretical foundations of the phenomenon. The goal of this paper is to investigate why some killer amendment attempts are successful, when theory suggests that they should always fail. More specifically, we examine the practical political constraints on legislators’ abilities to neutralize the imminent thre…

  • Out in the Open

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Charles Stewart•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2003•Citada por: 6•Referências: 3

    We examine the internal politics that preceded the House adoption in 1839 of viva voce (voice) voting for Speaker and other House officers. First, we find that the struggles over the rule's adoption actually centered on the election of the House Printer. These struggles were tied to attempts by the two major parties to establish effective newspaper networks to assist in national political campaigns. Democrats generally favored public election of …

  • Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives, 1789–2002

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Studies in American Political…•2004•Citada por: 14

    Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution states: “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members. . . .” With this simple statement, each chamber of Congress is granted complete authority over how its membership will be comprised. Thus, when a given election is contested, that is, when there is a dispute over who is the rightful occupant of a given seat after the ballots have…

  • Constituency Cleavages and Congressional Parties

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Eric Schickler et al.•ARTICLE•Social Science History•2004•Citada por: 1•Referências: 45

    We analyze the constituency bases of the congressional parties from 1857 through 1913 by focusing on two key concepts: party homogeneity and party polarization. With a few notable exceptions, prior efforts to assess these concepts have relied upon measures based on members’ roll call votes. This is potentially problematic, as such measures are likely endogenous: They reflect the party’s actual level of success as much as the party’s underlying ho…

  • Constituency Cleavages and Congressional Parties

    J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Social Science History•2004•Citada por: 4

    We analyze the constituency bases of the congressional parties from 1857 through 1913 by focusing on two key concepts: party homogeneity and party polarization. With a few notable exceptions, prior efforts to assess these concepts have relied upon measures based on members' roll call votes. This is potentially problematic, as such measures are likely endogenous: They reflect the party's actual level of success as much as the party's underlying ho…

  • Shirking in the Contemporary Congress

    Open Access•Jamie L Carson, Michael H Crespin et al.•ARTICLE•Political Analysis•2004•Citada por: 21•Referências: 8

    This paper replicates the findings that appeared in the article “Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress,” published in theAmerican Journal of Political Science(44:316–325), in which Lawrence Rothenberg and Mitchell Sanders incorporated a new research design and, contrary to all previous studies, found evidence of ideological shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives. We investigate the robustness of their res…

  • Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the Senate, 1789–2002

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Studies in American Political…•2005•Citada por: 4

    While the Founding Fathers included a number of checks and balances in the U.S. Constitution as a way of dispersing power across the various branches of the federal government, they made no such allowance regarding the internal makeup of Congress. Specifically, Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 of the Constitution states that “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members. . . .” This clause, in effec…

  • Congress, Progressive Reform, and the New American State

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Political Science Quarterly•2005

    Journal Article Congress, Progressive Reform, and the New American State Get access Congress, Progressive Reform, and the New American State by Robert Harrison. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 310 pp. $75.00. Jeffery A. Jenkins Jeffery A. Jenkins Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 120, Issue 2, Summer 2005, Pages 321–322, https://doi.org/…

  • Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Michael H Crespin et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2005•Citada por: 26•Referências: 42

    We examine the degree to which parties act as procedural coalitions in Congress by testing predictions from the party cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 2002). We gain leverage on the question of party influence in Congress by focusing on three types of House members: reelection seekers, higher-office seekers, and retiring members. We argue that retiring House members are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect …

  • Who Should Govern Congress? Access to Power and the Salary Grab of 1873

    Open Access•Lee J Alston, J A Jenkins et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2006•Citada por: 3•Referências: 17

    We examine the politics of the "Salary Grab" of 1873, legislation that increased congressional salaries retroactively by 50 percent. A group of New England and Midwestern elites opposed the Salary Grab, along with congressional franking and patronage-based civil service appointments, as part of a reform effort to reshape "who should govern Congress." Our analyses of congressional voting confirm the existence of this nonparty elite coalition. Alth…

  • Running to Lose

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Irwin L Morris•ARTICLE•Electoral Studies•2006•Citada por: 4•Referências: 13

  • Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House

    Sean Gailmard, J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2007•Citada por: 71•Referências: 12

    We present evidence suggesting that the majority party in the U.S. Senate exercises significant negative agenda control. Furthermore, this majority party negative agenda control in the Senate is very similar, in empirical terms, to negative agenda control exercised by the majority party in the U.S. House of Representatives. This evidence comes from comparisons of majority party roll rates across legislative vehicles (S bills, confirmation votes, …

  • The Supreme Court and American Political Development

    Open Access•J A Jenkins•ARTICLE•Perspectives on Politics•2007•Citada por: 24

    The Supreme Court and American Political Development. Edited by Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 400p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.In this book, Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch bring together an impressive group of scholars to present essays on how the theoretical tenets of the American political development (or APD) research agenda can help illuminate the behavior and institutional trajectory of the U.S. Su…

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