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Saul A Kripke

Dados Biográficos

ID492502
NOMESaul A Kripke
PRENOMESSaul A
SOBRENOMEKripke
ASSINATURAKRIPKE S A
AFILIAÇÕESThe Graduate Center, CUNY
ORCID0000-0001-7993-9456
VERIFICADOSim
TOTAL DE OBRAS19
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES26
TOTAL COMO AUTOR19
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1963
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2024
ÍNDICE H2
  • Individual Concepts

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Saul Kripke on Modal Logic•2024

  • Mathematical Incompleteness Results in First-Order Peano Arithmetic

    Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•History and Philosophy of Logic•2022

    In the Handbook of Mathematical Logic, the Paris-Harrington variant of Ramsey's theorem is celebrated as the first result of a long ‘search’ for a purely mathematical incompleteness result in first-order Peano arithmetic. This paper questions the existence of any such search and the status of the Paris-Harrington result as the first mathematical incompleteness result. In fact, I argue that Gentzen gave the first such result, and that it was resta…

  • Excerpt from “Identity and Necessity”

    Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Readings in Philosophy of…•2014

  • Yet Another Dogma of Empiricism

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke, Saul Kripke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2014•Referências: 1

  • Reference and Existence

    Saul A Kripke•BOOK•Reference and Existence•2013

    Saul A. Kripke's Reference and Existence, the John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth (whether it is true that fictional characters like Hamlet, or mythical kinds like bandersn…

  • Presupposition and Anaphora

    Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•Linguistic Inquiry•2009•Citada por: 22•Referências: 9

    Writers on presupposition, and on the "projection problem" of determining the presuppositions of compound sentences from their component clauses, traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. I argue that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. In compound sentences, these can be other clauses of the sentence. We thus need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to th…

  • Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•Theoria•2008

    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well‐known ‘unlearnability’ argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is s…

  • A Puzzle about Belief

    Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Meaning and Use•2007

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Saul A Kripke•BOOK•Wittgenstein on Rules and Private…•2007

  • Law and Metaphysics

    Charles M Yablon, Saul A Kripke et al.•ARTICLE•The Yale Law Journal•1987

    There have always been lawyers deeply attracted to philosophical discourse.It is a phenomenon at least as old as Cicero,' and extends to the contemporary legal academic in search of an appropriate "fancy citation." 2 Such lawyers look to philosophy as a way of connecting law with broader questions of morality and truth.They tend to view at least some legal problems as manifestations of more fundamental philosophical questions.They may even look f…

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Fred Feldman, Saul A Kripke et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1986•Citada por: 2

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Barbara Abbott, Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•Language•1984

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Christopher Peacocke, Saul A Kripke•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1984•Citada por: 1

  • Facts and Super-Facts

    Peter Winch, Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1983•Citada por: 1

    Journal Article Facts and Super-Facts Get access Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. x + 150 Peter Winch Peter Winch King’s College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 133, October 1983, Pages 398–404, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219167 Published: 01 October 1983

  • A Puzzle about Belief

    Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Meaning and Use•1979

  • Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke, Saul Kripke et al.•ARTICLE•Midwest Studies in Philosophy•1977

  • Outline of a Theory of Truth

    Saul A Kripke, Saul Kripke•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1975

  • Naming and Necessity

    Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Semantics of Natural Language•1972

  • Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•Mathematical Logic Quarterly•1963

  • Presupposition and Anaphora

    Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•Linguistic Inquiry•2009•Citada por: 22•Referências: 9

    Writers on presupposition, and on the "projection problem" of determining the presuppositions of compound sentences from their component clauses, traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. I argue that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. In compound sentences, these can be other clauses of the sentence. We thus need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to th…

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Fred Feldman, Saul A Kripke et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1986•Citada por: 2

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Christopher Peacocke, Saul A Kripke•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1984•Citada por: 1

  • Facts and Super-Facts

    Peter Winch, Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1983•Citada por: 1

    Journal Article Facts and Super-Facts Get access Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. x + 150 Peter Winch Peter Winch King’s College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 133, October 1983, Pages 398–404, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219167 Published: 01 October 1983

  • Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•Mathematical Logic Quarterly•1963

  • Naming and Necessity

    Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Semantics of Natural Language•1972

  • Outline of a Theory of Truth

    Saul A Kripke, Saul Kripke•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1975

  • Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke, Saul Kripke et al.•ARTICLE•Midwest Studies in Philosophy•1977

  • A Puzzle about Belief

    Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Meaning and Use•1979

  • Facts and Super-Facts

    Peter Winch, Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1983•Citada por: 1

    Journal Article Facts and Super-Facts Get access Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. x + 150 Peter Winch Peter Winch King’s College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 133, October 1983, Pages 398–404, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219167 Published: 01 October 1983

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Barbara Abbott, Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•Language•1984

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Christopher Peacocke, Saul A Kripke•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1984•Citada por: 1

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Fred Feldman, Saul A Kripke et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1986•Citada por: 2

  • Law and Metaphysics

    Charles M Yablon, Saul A Kripke et al.•ARTICLE•The Yale Law Journal•1987

    There have always been lawyers deeply attracted to philosophical discourse.It is a phenomenon at least as old as Cicero,' and extends to the contemporary legal academic in search of an appropriate "fancy citation." 2 Such lawyers look to philosophy as a way of connecting law with broader questions of morality and truth.They tend to view at least some legal problems as manifestations of more fundamental philosophical questions.They may even look f…

  • A Puzzle about Belief

    Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Meaning and Use•2007

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Saul A Kripke•BOOK•Wittgenstein on Rules and Private…•2007

  • Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•Theoria•2008

    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well‐known ‘unlearnability’ argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is s…

  • Presupposition and Anaphora

    Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•Linguistic Inquiry•2009•Citada por: 22•Referências: 9

    Writers on presupposition, and on the "projection problem" of determining the presuppositions of compound sentences from their component clauses, traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. I argue that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. In compound sentences, these can be other clauses of the sentence. We thus need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to th…

  • Reference and Existence

    Saul A Kripke•BOOK•Reference and Existence•2013

    Saul A. Kripke's Reference and Existence, the John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth (whether it is true that fictional characters like Hamlet, or mythical kinds like bandersn…

  • Excerpt from “Identity and Necessity”

    Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Readings in Philosophy of…•2014

  • Yet Another Dogma of Empiricism

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke, Saul Kripke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2014•Referências: 1

  • Mathematical Incompleteness Results in First-Order Peano Arithmetic

    Saul A Kripke•ARTICLE•History and Philosophy of Logic•2022

    In the Handbook of Mathematical Logic, the Paris-Harrington variant of Ramsey's theorem is celebrated as the first result of a long ‘search’ for a purely mathematical incompleteness result in first-order Peano arithmetic. This paper questions the existence of any such search and the status of the Paris-Harrington result as the first mathematical incompleteness result. In fact, I argue that Gentzen gave the first such result, and that it was resta…

  • Individual Concepts

    Open Access•Saul A Kripke•CHAPTER•Saul Kripke on Modal Logic•2024

Philosophy (17 obras) · Epistemology (15 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 obras) · Linguistics (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Mathematics (5 obras) · Analytic philosophy (4 obras) · Art (4 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (4 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (4 obras)

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