Saul A Kripke
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 492502 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Saul A Kripke |
| PRENOMES | Saul A |
| SOBRENOME | Kripke |
| ASSINATURA | KRIPKE S A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | The Graduate Center, CUNY |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7993-9456 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 19 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 26 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1963 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Individual Concepts
Mathematical Incompleteness Results in First-Order Peano Arithmetic
In the Handbook of Mathematical Logic, the Paris-Harrington variant of Ramsey's theorem is celebrated as the first result of a long ‘search’ for a purely mathematical incompleteness result in first-order Peano arithmetic. This paper questions the existence of any such search and the status of the Paris-Harrington result as the first mathematical incompleteness result. In fact, I argue that Gentzen gave the first such result, and that it was resta…
Excerpt from “Identity and Necessity”
Yet Another Dogma of Empiricism
Reference and Existence
Saul A. Kripke's Reference and Existence, the John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth (whether it is true that fictional characters like Hamlet, or mythical kinds like bandersn…
Presupposition and Anaphora
Writers on presupposition, and on the "projection problem" of determining the presuppositions of compound sentences from their component clauses, traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. I argue that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. In compound sentences, these can be other clauses of the sentence. We thus need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to th…
Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference
Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well‐known ‘unlearnability’ argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is s…
A Puzzle about Belief
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Law and Metaphysics
There have always been lawyers deeply attracted to philosophical discourse.It is a phenomenon at least as old as Cicero,' and extends to the contemporary legal academic in search of an appropriate "fancy citation." 2 Such lawyers look to philosophy as a way of connecting law with broader questions of morality and truth.They tend to view at least some legal problems as manifestations of more fundamental philosophical questions.They may even look f…
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Facts and Super-Facts
Journal Article Facts and Super-Facts Get access Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. x + 150 Peter Winch Peter Winch King’s College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 133, October 1983, Pages 398–404, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219167 Published: 01 October 1983
A Puzzle about Belief
Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference
Outline of a Theory of Truth
Naming and Necessity
Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi
Presupposition and Anaphora
Writers on presupposition, and on the "projection problem" of determining the presuppositions of compound sentences from their component clauses, traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. I argue that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. In compound sentences, these can be other clauses of the sentence. We thus need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to th…
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Facts and Super-Facts
Journal Article Facts and Super-Facts Get access Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. x + 150 Peter Winch Peter Winch King’s College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 133, October 1983, Pages 398–404, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219167 Published: 01 October 1983
Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi
Naming and Necessity
Outline of a Theory of Truth
Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference
A Puzzle about Belief
Facts and Super-Facts
Journal Article Facts and Super-Facts Get access Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. x + 150 Peter Winch Peter Winch King’s College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 133, October 1983, Pages 398–404, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219167 Published: 01 October 1983
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Law and Metaphysics
There have always been lawyers deeply attracted to philosophical discourse.It is a phenomenon at least as old as Cicero,' and extends to the contemporary legal academic in search of an appropriate "fancy citation." 2 Such lawyers look to philosophy as a way of connecting law with broader questions of morality and truth.They tend to view at least some legal problems as manifestations of more fundamental philosophical questions.They may even look f…
A Puzzle about Belief
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference
Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well‐known ‘unlearnability’ argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is s…
Presupposition and Anaphora
Writers on presupposition, and on the "projection problem" of determining the presuppositions of compound sentences from their component clauses, traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. I argue that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. In compound sentences, these can be other clauses of the sentence. We thus need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to th…
Reference and Existence
Saul A. Kripke's Reference and Existence, the John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth (whether it is true that fictional characters like Hamlet, or mythical kinds like bandersn…
Excerpt from “Identity and Necessity”
Yet Another Dogma of Empiricism
Mathematical Incompleteness Results in First-Order Peano Arithmetic
In the Handbook of Mathematical Logic, the Paris-Harrington variant of Ramsey's theorem is celebrated as the first result of a long ‘search’ for a purely mathematical incompleteness result in first-order Peano arithmetic. This paper questions the existence of any such search and the status of the Paris-Harrington result as the first mathematical incompleteness result. In fact, I argue that Gentzen gave the first such result, and that it was resta…
Individual Concepts
Philosophy (17 obras) · Epistemology (15 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 obras) · Linguistics (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Mathematics (5 obras) · Analytic philosophy (4 obras) · Art (4 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (4 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (4 obras)