Jillian Jordan
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5449783 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jillian Jordan |
| PRENOMES | Jillian |
| SOBRENOME | Jordan |
| ASSINATURA | JORDAN J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Harvard University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2443-0526 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2015 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Punitive but discerning
The desire to appear virtuous can motivate people to punish wrongdoers, a desirable outcome when punishment is clearly deserved. Yet claims that "virtue signaling" is fueling a culture of outrage suggest that reputation concerns may inspire even potentially unmerited punishment. Moreover, might reputation do more to drive punishment in ambiguous situations, where punishment is less clearly deserved, eroding punishers' sensitivity to moral nuance?…
Giving-by-proxy triggers subsequent charitable behavior
Does observability amplify sensitivity to moral frames? Evaluating a reputation-based account of moral preferences
Signaling when no one is watching
on Jul 22 2019 (see record 2019-43753-001). In the article, a printer error did not enable the authors to correct various errors before publication. Tables 1 and 2 have been corrected. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that repu…
Which accusations stick
No unique effect of intergroup competition on cooperation
Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling
Why do people judge hypocrites, who condemn immoral behaviors that they in fact engage in, so negatively? We propose that hypocrites are disliked because their condemnation sends a false signal about their personal conduct, deceptively suggesting that they behave morally. We show that verbal condemnation signals moral goodness (Study 1) and does so even more convincingly than directly stating that one behaves morally (Study 2). We then demonstrat…
Costly third-party punishment in young children
Signaling when no one is watching
on Jul 22 2019 (see record 2019-43753-001). In the article, a printer error did not enable the authors to correct various errors before publication. Tables 1 and 2 have been corrected. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that repu…
Costly third-party punishment in young children
No unique effect of intergroup competition on cooperation
Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling
Why do people judge hypocrites, who condemn immoral behaviors that they in fact engage in, so negatively? We propose that hypocrites are disliked because their condemnation sends a false signal about their personal conduct, deceptively suggesting that they behave morally. We show that verbal condemnation signals moral goodness (Study 1) and does so even more convincingly than directly stating that one behaves morally (Study 2). We then demonstrat…
Which accusations stick
Signaling when no one is watching
on Jul 22 2019 (see record 2019-43753-001). In the article, a printer error did not enable the authors to correct various errors before publication. Tables 1 and 2 have been corrected. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that repu…
Does observability amplify sensitivity to moral frames? Evaluating a reputation-based account of moral preferences
Giving-by-proxy triggers subsequent charitable behavior
Punitive but discerning
The desire to appear virtuous can motivate people to punish wrongdoers, a desirable outcome when punishment is clearly deserved. Yet claims that "virtue signaling" is fueling a culture of outrage suggest that reputation concerns may inspire even potentially unmerited punishment. Moreover, might reputation do more to drive punishment in ambiguous situations, where punishment is less clearly deserved, eroding punishers' sensitivity to moral nuance?…
Psychology (8 obras) · Social Psychology (8 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (6 obras) · Political science (5 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 obras) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Reputation (3 obras) · Social Psychology (3 obras) · Biology (2 obras)