Julien Dutant
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5723310 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Julien Dutant |
| PRENOMES | Julien |
| SOBRENOME | Dutant |
| ASSINATURA | DUTANT J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | King's College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2939-5670 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 3 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2012 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Safety’s coordination problems
The safety conception of knowledge holds that a belief constitutes knowledge iff relevantly similar beliefs—its epistemic counterparts—are true. It promises an instructive account of why certain general principles of knowledge hold. We focus on two such principles that anyone should endorse: the closure principle that knowledge is downward closed under competent conjunction elimination, and the counter-closure principle that knowledge is upward c…
What is rational belief
A theory of rational belief should get the cases right. It should also reach its verdicts using the right theoretical assumptions. Leading theories seem to predict the wrong things. With only one exception, they don't accommodate principles that we should use to explain these verdicts. We offer a theory of rational belief that combines an attractive picture of epistemic desirability with plausible principles connecting desirability to rationality
Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false
Wordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about our environment. It follows that some evidence is false. Worldly internalism is thought to provide a more satisfying answer to scepticism than classical internalist views that deny that these propositions about our environment might belong to our evidence and to provide a generally more attractive account o…
Inexact knowledge 2.0
Many of our sources of knowledge only afford us knowledge that is inexact. When trying to see how tall something is, or to hear how far away something is, or to remember how long something lasted, we may come to know some facts about the approximate size, distance or duration of the thing in question but we don’t come to know exactly what its size, distance or duration is. In some such situations we also have some pointed knowledge of how inexact…
Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do
The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis
The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge
Meno’s Thesis —the idea that knowing something is better than merely having a true belief about it—is incompatible with the joint claims that (a) believing the truth is the sole source of the value of knowledge and (b) true belief and knowledge are equally successful in believing the truth. Recent answers to that so-called “swamping” problem reject either (a) or (b). This paper rejects Meno’s Thesis instead, as relying on a confusion between expe…
The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge
Meno’s Thesis —the idea that knowing something is better than merely having a true belief about it—is incompatible with the joint claims that (a) believing the truth is the sole source of the value of knowledge and (b) true belief and knowledge are equally successful in believing the truth. Recent answers to that so-called “swamping” problem reject either (a) or (b). This paper rejects Meno’s Thesis instead, as relying on a confusion between expe…
The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis
Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do
Inexact knowledge 2.0
Many of our sources of knowledge only afford us knowledge that is inexact. When trying to see how tall something is, or to hear how far away something is, or to remember how long something lasted, we may come to know some facts about the approximate size, distance or duration of the thing in question but we don’t come to know exactly what its size, distance or duration is. In some such situations we also have some pointed knowledge of how inexact…
Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false
Wordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about our environment. It follows that some evidence is false. Worldly internalism is thought to provide a more satisfying answer to scepticism than classical internalist views that deny that these propositions about our environment might belong to our evidence and to provide a generally more attractive account o…
Safety’s coordination problems
The safety conception of knowledge holds that a belief constitutes knowledge iff relevantly similar beliefs—its epistemic counterparts—are true. It promises an instructive account of why certain general principles of knowledge hold. We focus on two such principles that anyone should endorse: the closure principle that knowledge is downward closed under competent conjunction elimination, and the counter-closure principle that knowledge is upward c…
What is rational belief
A theory of rational belief should get the cases right. It should also reach its verdicts using the right theoretical assumptions. Leading theories seem to predict the wrong things. With only one exception, they don't accommodate principles that we should use to explain these verdicts. We offer a theory of rational belief that combines an attractive picture of epistemic desirability with plausible principles connecting desirability to rationality
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Epistemology (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Philosophy of language (3 obras) · Philosophy of science (3 obras)