Marc Möller
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5732027 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Marc Möller |
| PRENOMES | Marc |
| SOBRENOME | Möller |
| ASSINATURA | MÖLLER M |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Bern |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5893-2335 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 3 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2010 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Fighting for Lemons
In a common-value environment with multi-stage competition, losing a stage conveys positive news about a rival’s estimation of a contested prize, capable of balancing the discouraging effect of falling behind. We show that, due to players’ learning from stage outcomes, aggregate incentives under private information are often greater than under public information and may even exceed the static competition benchmark. Moreover, laggards can become m…
The Distribution of Talent Across Contests
Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? To what extent do contestants avoid competition? We show that the distribution of abilities is crucial in determining contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high‐ability contestants is small. As this proportion increases, high‐ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases, making reverse sorting a possibility. We test our …
Advance Purchase Discounts Versus Clearance Sales
This article considers advance selling problems. It explains why some goods (e.g. airline tickets) are sold cheap to early buyers, while others (e.g. theatre tickets) offer discounts to those who buy late. We derive the profit maximising selling strategy for a monopolist when aggregate demand is certain but buyers face uncertainty about their individual demands. When aggregate demand exceeds capacity, both Advance Purchase Discounts as well as Cl…
Advance Purchase Discounts Versus Clearance Sales
This article considers advance selling problems. It explains why some goods (e.g. airline tickets) are sold cheap to early buyers, while others (e.g. theatre tickets) offer discounts to those who buy late. We derive the profit maximising selling strategy for a monopolist when aggregate demand is certain but buyers face uncertainty about their individual demands. When aggregate demand exceeds capacity, both Advance Purchase Discounts as well as Cl…
The Distribution of Talent Across Contests
Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? To what extent do contestants avoid competition? We show that the distribution of abilities is crucial in determining contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high‐ability contestants is small. As this proportion increases, high‐ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases, making reverse sorting a possibility. We test our …
Advance Purchase Discounts Versus Clearance Sales
This article considers advance selling problems. It explains why some goods (e.g. airline tickets) are sold cheap to early buyers, while others (e.g. theatre tickets) offer discounts to those who buy late. We derive the profit maximising selling strategy for a monopolist when aggregate demand is certain but buyers face uncertainty about their individual demands. When aggregate demand exceeds capacity, both Advance Purchase Discounts as well as Cl…
The Distribution of Talent Across Contests
Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? To what extent do contestants avoid competition? We show that the distribution of abilities is crucial in determining contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high‐ability contestants is small. As this proportion increases, high‐ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases, making reverse sorting a possibility. We test our …
Fighting for Lemons
In a common-value environment with multi-stage competition, losing a stage conveys positive news about a rival’s estimation of a contested prize, capable of balancing the discouraging effect of falling behind. We show that, due to players’ learning from stage outcomes, aggregate incentives under private information are often greater than under public information and may even exceed the static competition benchmark. Moreover, laggards can become m…
Economics (3 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 obras) · Microeconomics (2 obras) · Art (1 obras) · Biology (1 obras) · Competition (biology (1 obras) · Competitor analysis (1 obras) · Computer security (1 obras) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (1 obras)