Simon P Anderson
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5733442 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Simon P Anderson |
| PRENOMES | Simon P |
| SOBRENOME | Anderson |
| ASSINATURA | ANDERSON S P |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Virginia |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0161-8975 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 27 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1984 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Decoupling the CES Distribution Circle with Quality and Beyond
We show for CES demands with heterogeneous productivities that profit, revenue and output distributions lie in the same closed power family as the productivity distribution (e.g., the ‘Pareto circle’). The price distribution lies in the inverse power family. Equilibrium distribution shapes are linked by linear relations between their density elasticities. Introducing product quality decouples the CES circle, and reconciles Pareto price and Pareto…
Competition for Advertisers and for Viewers in Media Markets
Standard models of advertising‐financed media assume consumers patronise a single‐media platform, precluding effective competition for advertisers. Such competition ensues if consumers multi‐home. The principle of incremental pricing implies that multi‐homing consumers are less valuable to platforms. Then entry of new platforms decreases advertisement prices, while a merger increases them, and advertisement‐financed platforms may suffer if a publ…
Parking in the city
The economics of pricing parking
Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality
The winner‐take‐all nature of all‐pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibr…
Produits différenciés et information imparfaite des consommateurs
Anderson Simon P., Renault Régis, Jessua Claude. Produits différenciés et information imparfaite des consommateurs. In: Revue économique, volume 47, n°3, 1996. pp. 425-435
Spatial Competition with Price-Taking Firms
The authors consider a price-taking equilibrium in the spatial setting. A (unique) pricing equilibrium is shown to exist for any set of firm locations. This equilibrium is then used to examine locational incentives in the two-stage process in which firms first choose locations anticipating the subsequent price-taking outcome. The result is spatial agglomeration if demand is inelastic and there are only two firms. Agglomeration does not occur if d…
Incumbency effects in political campaigns
Equilibrium Existence in the Linear Model of Spatial Competition
This paper considers a generalization of the Hotelling model of spatial competition. It is shown that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in the two-stage location-price game exists only under very stringent conditions. These conditions are in fact the conditions for profit to be concave in price for any given location pair. When the solution concept is extended to allow for mixed strategies, there is no symmetric equilibrium involving pure strat…
Public opinion and regulatory behavior
Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality
The winner‐take‐all nature of all‐pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibr…
The economics of pricing parking
Incumbency effects in political campaigns
Parking in the city
Competition for Advertisers and for Viewers in Media Markets
Standard models of advertising‐financed media assume consumers patronise a single‐media platform, precluding effective competition for advertisers. Such competition ensues if consumers multi‐home. The principle of incremental pricing implies that multi‐homing consumers are less valuable to platforms. Then entry of new platforms decreases advertisement prices, while a merger increases them, and advertisement‐financed platforms may suffer if a publ…
Spatial Competition with Price-Taking Firms
The authors consider a price-taking equilibrium in the spatial setting. A (unique) pricing equilibrium is shown to exist for any set of firm locations. This equilibrium is then used to examine locational incentives in the two-stage process in which firms first choose locations anticipating the subsequent price-taking outcome. The result is spatial agglomeration if demand is inelastic and there are only two firms. Agglomeration does not occur if d…
Equilibrium Existence in the Linear Model of Spatial Competition
This paper considers a generalization of the Hotelling model of spatial competition. It is shown that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in the two-stage location-price game exists only under very stringent conditions. These conditions are in fact the conditions for profit to be concave in price for any given location pair. When the solution concept is extended to allow for mixed strategies, there is no symmetric equilibrium involving pure strat…
Public opinion and regulatory behavior
Equilibrium Existence in the Linear Model of Spatial Competition
This paper considers a generalization of the Hotelling model of spatial competition. It is shown that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in the two-stage location-price game exists only under very stringent conditions. These conditions are in fact the conditions for profit to be concave in price for any given location pair. When the solution concept is extended to allow for mixed strategies, there is no symmetric equilibrium involving pure strat…
Incumbency effects in political campaigns
Spatial Competition with Price-Taking Firms
The authors consider a price-taking equilibrium in the spatial setting. A (unique) pricing equilibrium is shown to exist for any set of firm locations. This equilibrium is then used to examine locational incentives in the two-stage process in which firms first choose locations anticipating the subsequent price-taking outcome. The result is spatial agglomeration if demand is inelastic and there are only two firms. Agglomeration does not occur if d…
Produits différenciés et information imparfaite des consommateurs
Anderson Simon P., Renault Régis, Jessua Claude. Produits différenciés et information imparfaite des consommateurs. In: Revue économique, volume 47, n°3, 1996. pp. 425-435
Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality
The winner‐take‐all nature of all‐pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibr…
The economics of pricing parking
Parking in the city
Competition for Advertisers and for Viewers in Media Markets
Standard models of advertising‐financed media assume consumers patronise a single‐media platform, precluding effective competition for advertisers. Such competition ensues if consumers multi‐home. The principle of incremental pricing implies that multi‐homing consumers are less valuable to platforms. Then entry of new platforms decreases advertisement prices, while a merger increases them, and advertisement‐financed platforms may suffer if a publ…
Decoupling the CES Distribution Circle with Quality and Beyond
We show for CES demands with heterogeneous productivities that profit, revenue and output distributions lie in the same closed power family as the productivity distribution (e.g., the ‘Pareto circle’). The price distribution lies in the inverse power family. Equilibrium distribution shapes are linked by linear relations between their density elasticities. Introducing product quality decouples the CES circle, and reconciles Pareto price and Pareto…
Economics (6 obras) · Microeconomics (6 obras) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (5 obras) · Business (4 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Mathematical economics (3 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras) · Merger and Competition Analysis (3 obras) · Political science (3 obras) · Advertising (2 obras)