Randolph Sloof
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5734852 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Randolph Sloof |
| PRENOMES | Randolph |
| SOBRENOME | Sloof |
| ASSINATURA | SLOOF R |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Amsterdam |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8113-1269 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 15 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 16 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 15 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1996 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Effective leadership and the allocation and exercise of power in organizations
Does relative grading help male students? Evidence from a field experiment in the classroom
Entrepreneurs
In a large survey (n = 1928), we examine whether entrepreneurs differ in their decision-making style from managers and employees. Besides two self-reported measures taken from psychology, we build on Rubinstein (Quarterly Journal of Economics 131: 859–890, 2016) by including two behavioral measures derived from response times and the nature of the strategic choices made. Supporting conventional wisdom, entrepreneurs report a stronger Faith in Int…
Discrimination In the Labour Market
In an experiment we identify a crucial factor that determines whether employers engage in statistical discrimination of ex ante equal groups. In the standard no‐competition setup of Coate and Loury (1993), we do not find systematic evidence for statistical discrimination. When we introduce competition between workers of different groups for the same job, the non‐discrimination equilibrium ceases to be stable. In line with this theoretical observa…
On the Importance of Default Breach Remedies
Theory predicts that default breach remedies are immaterial whenever contracting costs are negligible. Some experimental studies, however, suggest that in practice default rules do matter, as they may affect parties' preferences over contract terms. This paper presents results from an experiment designed to address the importance of default breach remedies for actual contract outcomes. We find that default rules do have an influence. The reason f…
Gift Exchange in a Multi‐Worker Firm
One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that a considerable fraction of workers reward higher wages with higher effort. These results are observed for simple one-employer-one-worker relationships. In this article we investigate whether they generalise to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers. We compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has …
Promotion Rules and Skill Acquisition
Standard economic theory identifies a trade‐off between up‐or‐stay and up‐or‐out promotion rules. Up‐or‐stay never wastes the skills of those not promoted but may provide insufficient incentives to invest in skills. Up‐or‐out can always induce investment in skill acquisition but may waste the skills of those not promoted. The paper reports an experiment designed to study this trade‐off. Under up‐or‐out, parties behave almost exactly as theory pre…
Opting Out
Theory predicts that in alternating-offer bargaining the threat to delay agreement is effectively empty when the proposer can also opt out after a rejection (high-tech market), while this is not the case when only the responder can do so (bazaar). First proposers therefore have much more bargaining power in the former and get significantly more in equilibrium. This paper reports about an experiment designed to test these predictions. Our results …
Who should invest in specific training
Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training
Standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers. Evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts. We propose a simple model in which a firm invests the socially optimal amounts in general and specific training if th…
Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments
This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from ultimatum game experiments. We find that on average the proposer offers 40% of the pie to the responder. This share is smaller for larger pie sizes and larger when a strategy method is used or when subjects are inexperienced. On average 16% of the offers is rejected. The rejection rate is lower for larger pie sizes and for larger shares offered. Responders are le…
On the Relation Between Asset Ownership and Specific Investments
Experimental results are presented for a simplified version of Hart s(1995) theory of the firm. Theory predicts that investment levels remain constant when investors no-trade pay-offs increase, if these pay-offs are threat points. While they may decrease when no-trade pay-offs are outside options. Our results support these predictions in a relative sense. Average investment levels exceed the predicted level. Actual investment behaviour is consist…
Show Them Your Teeth First
Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information
Interest groups
Gift Exchange in a Multi‐Worker Firm
One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that a considerable fraction of workers reward higher wages with higher effort. These results are observed for simple one-employer-one-worker relationships. In this article we investigate whether they generalise to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers. We compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has …
Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training
Standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers. Evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts. We propose a simple model in which a firm invests the socially optimal amounts in general and specific training if th…
On the Relation Between Asset Ownership and Specific Investments
Experimental results are presented for a simplified version of Hart s(1995) theory of the firm. Theory predicts that investment levels remain constant when investors no-trade pay-offs increase, if these pay-offs are threat points. While they may decrease when no-trade pay-offs are outside options. Our results support these predictions in a relative sense. Average investment levels exceed the predicted level. Actual investment behaviour is consist…
Show Them Your Teeth First
Who should invest in specific training
Discrimination In the Labour Market
In an experiment we identify a crucial factor that determines whether employers engage in statistical discrimination of ex ante equal groups. In the standard no‐competition setup of Coate and Loury (1993), we do not find systematic evidence for statistical discrimination. When we introduce competition between workers of different groups for the same job, the non‐discrimination equilibrium ceases to be stable. In line with this theoretical observa…
Interest groups
Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information
Show Them Your Teeth First
On the Relation Between Asset Ownership and Specific Investments
Experimental results are presented for a simplified version of Hart s(1995) theory of the firm. Theory predicts that investment levels remain constant when investors no-trade pay-offs increase, if these pay-offs are threat points. While they may decrease when no-trade pay-offs are outside options. Our results support these predictions in a relative sense. Average investment levels exceed the predicted level. Actual investment behaviour is consist…
Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments
This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from ultimatum game experiments. We find that on average the proposer offers 40% of the pie to the responder. This share is smaller for larger pie sizes and larger when a strategy method is used or when subjects are inexperienced. On average 16% of the offers is rejected. The rejection rate is lower for larger pie sizes and for larger shares offered. Responders are le…
Opting Out
Theory predicts that in alternating-offer bargaining the threat to delay agreement is effectively empty when the proposer can also opt out after a rejection (high-tech market), while this is not the case when only the responder can do so (bazaar). First proposers therefore have much more bargaining power in the former and get significantly more in equilibrium. This paper reports about an experiment designed to test these predictions. Our results …
Who should invest in specific training
Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training
Standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers. Evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts. We propose a simple model in which a firm invests the socially optimal amounts in general and specific training if th…
On the Importance of Default Breach Remedies
Theory predicts that default breach remedies are immaterial whenever contracting costs are negligible. Some experimental studies, however, suggest that in practice default rules do matter, as they may affect parties' preferences over contract terms. This paper presents results from an experiment designed to address the importance of default breach remedies for actual contract outcomes. We find that default rules do have an influence. The reason f…
Gift Exchange in a Multi‐Worker Firm
One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that a considerable fraction of workers reward higher wages with higher effort. These results are observed for simple one-employer-one-worker relationships. In this article we investigate whether they generalise to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers. We compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has …
Promotion Rules and Skill Acquisition
Standard economic theory identifies a trade‐off between up‐or‐stay and up‐or‐out promotion rules. Up‐or‐stay never wastes the skills of those not promoted but may provide insufficient incentives to invest in skills. Up‐or‐out can always induce investment in skill acquisition but may waste the skills of those not promoted. The paper reports an experiment designed to study this trade‐off. Under up‐or‐out, parties behave almost exactly as theory pre…
Discrimination In the Labour Market
In an experiment we identify a crucial factor that determines whether employers engage in statistical discrimination of ex ante equal groups. In the standard no‐competition setup of Coate and Loury (1993), we do not find systematic evidence for statistical discrimination. When we introduce competition between workers of different groups for the same job, the non‐discrimination equilibrium ceases to be stable. In line with this theoretical observa…
Entrepreneurs
In a large survey (n = 1928), we examine whether entrepreneurs differ in their decision-making style from managers and employees. Besides two self-reported measures taken from psychology, we build on Rubinstein (Quarterly Journal of Economics 131: 859–890, 2016) by including two behavioral measures derived from response times and the nature of the strategic choices made. Supporting conventional wisdom, entrepreneurs report a stronger Faith in Int…
Does relative grading help male students? Evidence from a field experiment in the classroom
Effective leadership and the allocation and exercise of power in organizations
Economics (14 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (11 obras) · Business (8 obras) · Microeconomics (8 obras) · Political science (7 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Social Psychology (6 obras) · Labour economics (4 obras) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (3 obras)