Paul Heidhues
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5805956 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Paul Heidhues |
| PRENOMES | Paul |
| SOBRENOME | Heidhues |
| ASSINATURA | HEIDHUES P |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 7 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2004 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Steering Fallible Consumers
Online intermediaries with information about a consumer’s tendencies often ‘steer’ her toward products she is more likely to purchase. We analyse the welfare implications of this practice for ‘fallible’ consumers, who make statistical and strategic mistakes in evaluating offers. The welfare effects depend on the nature and quality of the intermediary’s information and on properties of the consumer’s mistakes. In particular, steering based on high…
Defaults and Donations
We study the effects of defaults on charitable giving in a large-scale field experiment on an online fundraising platform. We exogenously vary default options along two choice dimensions: the charitable donation decision and the “co-donation” decision regarding how much to contribute to supporting the platform. We document a strong effect of defaults on individual behavior but nevertheless find that aggregate donation levels are unaffected by def…
Convergence in Misspecified Learning Models with Endogenous Actions
Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions
We study tacit collusion, which we interpret as collusion without communication about strategies, in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and not their bids. Strategies cannot discriminate among initially nameless bidders until they have become named through winning an auction. We obtain two classes of results: (1) Completely refraining from using names rules out collusion altogether, and even if naming is permitted, a…
Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
A group bargaining solution
A group bargaining solution
Steering Fallible Consumers
Online intermediaries with information about a consumer’s tendencies often ‘steer’ her toward products she is more likely to purchase. We analyse the welfare implications of this practice for ‘fallible’ consumers, who make statistical and strategic mistakes in evaluating offers. The welfare effects depend on the nature and quality of the intermediary’s information and on properties of the consumer’s mistakes. In particular, steering based on high…
A group bargaining solution
Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions
We study tacit collusion, which we interpret as collusion without communication about strategies, in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and not their bids. Strategies cannot discriminate among initially nameless bidders until they have become named through winning an auction. We obtain two classes of results: (1) Completely refraining from using names rules out collusion altogether, and even if naming is permitted, a…
Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Convergence in Misspecified Learning Models with Endogenous Actions
Defaults and Donations
We study the effects of defaults on charitable giving in a large-scale field experiment on an online fundraising platform. We exogenously vary default options along two choice dimensions: the charitable donation decision and the “co-donation” decision regarding how much to contribute to supporting the platform. We document a strong effect of defaults on individual behavior but nevertheless find that aggregate donation levels are unaffected by def…
Steering Fallible Consumers
Online intermediaries with information about a consumer’s tendencies often ‘steer’ her toward products she is more likely to purchase. We analyse the welfare implications of this practice for ‘fallible’ consumers, who make statistical and strategic mistakes in evaluating offers. The welfare effects depend on the nature and quality of the intermediary’s information and on properties of the consumer’s mistakes. In particular, steering based on high…
Economics (6 obras) · Business (4 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 obras) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (2 obras) · Digital Platforms and Economics (2 obras) · Economic theories and models (2 obras) · Industrial organization (2 obras) · Microeconomics (2 obras) · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research (1 obra)