Lise Wallach
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5861333 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Lise Wallach |
| PRENOMES | Lise |
| SOBRENOME | Wallach |
| ASSINATURA | WALLACH L |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Duke University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 3 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1971 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2010 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Some Theories are Unfalsifiable
Trafimow (2009) claims that there are no unfalsifiable theories: To test any theory, one must make auxiliary assumptions, and with sufficient creativity about auxiliary assumptions one could always arrive at reasonably risky predictions. We argue that a prediction from a theory plus a given set of auxiliary assumptions will not be risky for the theory when the initial level of confidence in the theory is greater than the initial level of confiden…
Experiments in Social Psychology
Criticisms of the very idea of experimentation in social psychology are longstanding; a focal claim recently has been that social psychological hypotheses are non-empirical. We contest this claim, but argue that many experiments in social psychology are pointless nonetheless because they are fundamentally circular. Testing hypotheses requires operationalization; operationalization requires assumptions; and in social psychology, we argue, the nece…
A Response on Concepts, Laws and Measurement in Social Psychology
While appreciating Kimble's (2001) praise of our paper (Wallach & Wallach, 2001), we argue against his reduction of mental states to behavioral dispositions. Crandall and Schaller (2001) make five points in criticism of our argument that much research in social psychology is plagued by circularity. We show that their first point is based on a misunderstanding, that their third point is irrelevant, and that their last two points do not attempt to …
When Experiments Serve Little Purpose
This paper attempts further to explicate and justify the belief, held by a number of critics of mainstream psychology, that much customary empirical research tells one little that could not have been known without it. Apart from questions of tautology or indeterminate relations to observation, many hypotheses are derivable from propositions that are unfalsifiable because they cannot be tested without relying on conceptualizations which imply the …
Of Surrogacy, Circularity, Causality and Near-Tautologies
Gigerenzer (1998) agrees with our critique of mainstream work (Wallach & Wallach, 1994, 1998). However, while he views near-tautologies as an additional species of surrogates for theory, we believe near-tautologies are implied by entrenched and uncontested proto-theories that are not without function, but pointless to subject to empirical test. Schaller and Crandall (1998) seem to have backed down from Schaller, Crandall, Stangor and Neuberg's (1…
Gergen versus the mainstream
K. J. Gergen's (1982) argument that hypotheses in social psychology are not empirical propositions is critically examined and shown to be erroneous. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that, without necessarily appearing obvious, some hypotheses can be derived from propositions that are like tautologies and that their confirmation as such is of little interest. An analysis of hypotheses in recent articles in the Journal of Experimental Social…
Implications of Recent Work in Philosophy of Science for the Role of Operational Definition in Psychology
Philosophers of science have recently shown that not only extreme operationism but any operationist position faces very serious difficulties. Psychology has tended to take for granted that only one kind of terms, terms in the “data language” or “observation terms,” have direct empirical meaning, and that the empirical meaning of all other terms is given by their operational definitions. Strong arguments have now been put forth indicating both tha…
Gergen versus the mainstream
K. J. Gergen's (1982) argument that hypotheses in social psychology are not empirical propositions is critically examined and shown to be erroneous. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that, without necessarily appearing obvious, some hypotheses can be derived from propositions that are like tautologies and that their confirmation as such is of little interest. An analysis of hypotheses in recent articles in the Journal of Experimental Social…
Implications of Recent Work in Philosophy of Science for the Role of Operational Definition in Psychology
Philosophers of science have recently shown that not only extreme operationism but any operationist position faces very serious difficulties. Psychology has tended to take for granted that only one kind of terms, terms in the “data language” or “observation terms,” have direct empirical meaning, and that the empirical meaning of all other terms is given by their operational definitions. Strong arguments have now been put forth indicating both tha…
Gergen versus the mainstream
K. J. Gergen's (1982) argument that hypotheses in social psychology are not empirical propositions is critically examined and shown to be erroneous. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that, without necessarily appearing obvious, some hypotheses can be derived from propositions that are like tautologies and that their confirmation as such is of little interest. An analysis of hypotheses in recent articles in the Journal of Experimental Social…
When Experiments Serve Little Purpose
This paper attempts further to explicate and justify the belief, held by a number of critics of mainstream psychology, that much customary empirical research tells one little that could not have been known without it. Apart from questions of tautology or indeterminate relations to observation, many hypotheses are derivable from propositions that are unfalsifiable because they cannot be tested without relying on conceptualizations which imply the …
Of Surrogacy, Circularity, Causality and Near-Tautologies
Gigerenzer (1998) agrees with our critique of mainstream work (Wallach & Wallach, 1994, 1998). However, while he views near-tautologies as an additional species of surrogates for theory, we believe near-tautologies are implied by entrenched and uncontested proto-theories that are not without function, but pointless to subject to empirical test. Schaller and Crandall (1998) seem to have backed down from Schaller, Crandall, Stangor and Neuberg's (1…
Experiments in Social Psychology
Criticisms of the very idea of experimentation in social psychology are longstanding; a focal claim recently has been that social psychological hypotheses are non-empirical. We contest this claim, but argue that many experiments in social psychology are pointless nonetheless because they are fundamentally circular. Testing hypotheses requires operationalization; operationalization requires assumptions; and in social psychology, we argue, the nece…
A Response on Concepts, Laws and Measurement in Social Psychology
While appreciating Kimble's (2001) praise of our paper (Wallach & Wallach, 2001), we argue against his reduction of mental states to behavioral dispositions. Crandall and Schaller (2001) make five points in criticism of our argument that much research in social psychology is plagued by circularity. We show that their first point is based on a misunderstanding, that their third point is irrelevant, and that their last two points do not attempt to …
Some Theories are Unfalsifiable
Trafimow (2009) claims that there are no unfalsifiable theories: To test any theory, one must make auxiliary assumptions, and with sufficient creativity about auxiliary assumptions one could always arrive at reasonably risky predictions. We argue that a prediction from a theory plus a given set of auxiliary assumptions will not be risky for the theory when the initial level of confidence in the theory is greater than the initial level of confiden…
Epistemology (7 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Social Psychology (4 obras) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (3 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Empirical research (3 obras) · Mainstream (3 obras) · Social Representations and Identity (3 obras)