David Faraci
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5911247 |
|---|---|
| NOME | David Faraci |
| PRENOMES | David |
| SOBRENOME | Faraci |
| ASSINATURA | FARACI D |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Georgetown University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 0 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2012 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes
Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best e…
Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge
It is widely agreed that normative properties supervene on natural properties. Non-naturalists face a distinctive challenge to explain this relation. Stephanie Leary argues that non-naturalists can meet this explanatory demand by positing the existence of hybrid normative properties. I argue that this proposal does not meet the supervenience challenge
Good Selves, True Selves
David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously
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David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously
Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge
It is widely agreed that normative properties supervene on natural properties. Non-naturalists face a distinctive challenge to explain this relation. Stephanie Leary argues that non-naturalists can meet this explanatory demand by positing the existence of hybrid normative properties. I argue that this proposal does not meet the supervenience challenge
Good Selves, True Selves
We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes
Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best e…
Epistemology (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 obras) · Philosophy (2 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 obras) · Political science (2 obras)