Marco Facchin
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5995748 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Marco Facchin |
| PRENOMES | Marco |
| SOBRENOME | Facchin |
| ASSINATURA | FACCHIN M |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Antwerp |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5753-9873 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2021 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Defusing the Representation-Hungry Challenge
Fictional minds extend for real
Toon’s (2023) Mind as Metaphor defends a fictionalist view of propositional attitude ascriptions, according to which propositional attitudes are metaphors projecting the use of certain representational media “inside” the agent. Ascribing a belief, for example, means treating a person as if they had an “inner notebook” storing the relevant information. Such a link between propositional attitude ascriptions and our material culture puts Toon’s view…
Maps, Simulations, Spaces and Dynamics
Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense
Phenomenal transparency, cognitive extension, and predictive processing
Troubles with mathematical contents
To account for the explanatory role representations play in cognitive science, Egan’s deflationary account introduces a distinction between cognitive and mathematical contents. According to that account, only the latter are genuine explanatory posits of cognitive-scientific theories, as they represent the arguments and values cognitive devices need to represent to compute. Here, I argue that the deflationary account suffers from two important pro…
Extended animal cognition
Extended Predictive Minds
Neural representations unobserved—or
Is radically enactive imagination really contentless
Structural representations do not meet the job description challenge
Predictive processing and anti-representationalism
Structural representations do not meet the job description challenge
Predictive processing and anti-representationalism
Is radically enactive imagination really contentless
Extended Predictive Minds
Neural representations unobserved—or
Phenomenal transparency, cognitive extension, and predictive processing
Troubles with mathematical contents
To account for the explanatory role representations play in cognitive science, Egan’s deflationary account introduces a distinction between cognitive and mathematical contents. According to that account, only the latter are genuine explanatory posits of cognitive-scientific theories, as they represent the arguments and values cognitive devices need to represent to compute. Here, I argue that the deflationary account suffers from two important pro…
Extended animal cognition
Fictional minds extend for real
Toon’s (2023) Mind as Metaphor defends a fictionalist view of propositional attitude ascriptions, according to which propositional attitudes are metaphors projecting the use of certain representational media “inside” the agent. Ascribing a belief, for example, means treating a person as if they had an “inner notebook” storing the relevant information. Such a link between propositional attitude ascriptions and our material culture puts Toon’s view…
Maps, Simulations, Spaces and Dynamics
Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense
Defusing the Representation-Hungry Challenge
Epistemology (11 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (9 obras) · Psychology (9 obras) · Cognitive science (8 obras) · Cognition (6 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Metaphysics (6 obras) · Philosophy of language (5 obras) · Philosophy of mind (5 obras)