Christian Klamler
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 6037709 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Christian Klamler |
| PRENOMES | Christian |
| SOBRENOME | Klamler |
| ASSINATURA | KLAMLER C |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Graz |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1225-5943 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2004 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Rank information and inequality in social welfare functions
In this paper we use rank information to construct a measure of preference satisfaction by collective decision rules and to compare the Borda rule with the plurality rule with respect to the inequality their outcome induces. While the construction of our measure of preference satisfaction is formally equivalent to Borda utilities, it turns out that, with respect to equality, the Borda rule is not necessarily superior to plurality rule for the cas…
Simplex subtraction to estimate unanimity violations in sequential majority voting
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items
Suppose two players wish to divide a finite set of indivisible items, over which each distributes a specified number of points. Assuming the utility of a player’s bundle is the sum of the points it assigns to the items it contains, we analyze what divisions are fair. We show that if there is an envy-free (EF) allocation of the items, two other desirable properties—Pareto-optimality (PO) and Maximinality (MM)—can also be satisfied, rendering these…
Does the rule matter? A comparison of preference elicitation methods and voting rules based on data from an Austrian regional parliamentary election in 2019
Based on data collected in connection with the 2019 parliamentary election in the Austrian region of Styria, we analyze (the use of) different voting rules. Following previous empirical studies in the literature, we use the results of an empirical survey to show that the choice of a voting rule will impact the outcome of an election (if revealed preferences are sincere), at least in certain parts of the social ranking. In addition, we observe a c…
Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences
We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally,…
How to Divide Things Fairly
We propose an intuitively simple sequential algorithm (SA) for the fair division of indivisible items that are strictly ranked by two or more players. We analyze several properties of the allocations that it yields and discuss SA's application to real-life problems, such as dividing the marital property in a divorce or assigning people to committees or projects. Additional informationNotes on contributorsSteven J. BramsSTEVEN J. BRAMS (MR Author …
A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count
Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences
We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally,…
Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
Does the rule matter? A comparison of preference elicitation methods and voting rules based on data from an Austrian regional parliamentary election in 2019
Based on data collected in connection with the 2019 parliamentary election in the Austrian region of Styria, we analyze (the use of) different voting rules. Following previous empirical studies in the literature, we use the results of an empirical survey to show that the choice of a voting rule will impact the outcome of an election (if revealed preferences are sincere), at least in certain parts of the social ranking. In addition, we observe a c…
A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count
The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count
Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
How to Divide Things Fairly
We propose an intuitively simple sequential algorithm (SA) for the fair division of indivisible items that are strictly ranked by two or more players. We analyze several properties of the allocations that it yields and discuss SA's application to real-life problems, such as dividing the marital property in a divorce or assigning people to committees or projects. Additional informationNotes on contributorsSteven J. BramsSTEVEN J. BRAMS (MR Author …
Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences
We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally,…
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items
Suppose two players wish to divide a finite set of indivisible items, over which each distributes a specified number of points. Assuming the utility of a player’s bundle is the sum of the points it assigns to the items it contains, we analyze what divisions are fair. We show that if there is an envy-free (EF) allocation of the items, two other desirable properties—Pareto-optimality (PO) and Maximinality (MM)—can also be satisfied, rendering these…
Does the rule matter? A comparison of preference elicitation methods and voting rules based on data from an Austrian regional parliamentary election in 2019
Based on data collected in connection with the 2019 parliamentary election in the Austrian region of Styria, we analyze (the use of) different voting rules. Following previous empirical studies in the literature, we use the results of an empirical survey to show that the choice of a voting rule will impact the outcome of an election (if revealed preferences are sincere), at least in certain parts of the social ranking. In addition, we observe a c…
Rank information and inequality in social welfare functions
In this paper we use rank information to construct a measure of preference satisfaction by collective decision rules and to compare the Borda rule with the plurality rule with respect to the inequality their outcome induces. While the construction of our measure of preference satisfaction is formally equivalent to Borda utilities, it turns out that, with respect to equality, the Borda rule is not necessarily superior to plurality rule for the cas…
Simplex subtraction to estimate unanimity violations in sequential majority voting
Game Theory and Voting Systems (6 obras) · Mathematics (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Combinatorics (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Cardinal voting systems (3 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Mathematical economics (3 obras) · Mathematical optimization (3 obras) · Minimax (3 obras)