Joseph J Ruggiero
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 6097456 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Joseph J Ruggiero |
| PRENOMES | Joseph J |
| SOBRENOME | Ruggiero |
| ASSINATURA | RUGGIERO J J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Princeton University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0362-2556 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 2 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2021 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition. The ability to compete for leverage generates a new channel through which the nature of potential war affects the quality of peace. First, costs of war grow the bargaining surpl…
Preventive war and sovereign debt
The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of th…
Preventive war and sovereign debt
The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of th…
Preventive war and sovereign debt
The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of th…
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition. The ability to compete for leverage generates a new channel through which the nature of potential war affects the quality of peace. First, costs of war grow the bargaining surpl…
International Development and Aid (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Political science (2 obras) · Bargaining power (1 obras) · Commit (1 obras) · Debt (1 obras) · Diplomacy (1 obras) · Economic Policies and Impacts (1 obras) · Economics (1 obras)