Cosmin Vraciu
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 6737396 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Cosmin Vraciu |
| PRENOMES | Cosmin |
| SOBRENOME | Vraciu |
| ASSINATURA | VRACIU C |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Bucharest, Romania |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9115-6411 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 2 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 0 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2019 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
Authority, Democracy, and Legislative Intent
On one account, courts ought to enforce legislative intent only when the public meaning of the text of the statute is unclear, and on another account, they should enforce the intent even when the public meaning is clear. In this paper, I argue against both approaches. My argument rests on considerations related to the moral authority of the democratically made law. More specifically, I argue that those considerations which make democratic law mor…
Governmental functions and the specification of rights
The separation-of-powers literature has entertained the possibility of differentiating governmental functions at a conceptual, pre-institutional level, as a way of defining the separation of powers. However, it can be objected that attempts at differentiating functions at this level cannot escape a problem of arbitrariness. In this article, I develop an account of the separation of powers which addresses this problem. On my account, the legislati…
Sem obras proeminentes nesta página.
Governmental functions and the specification of rights
The separation-of-powers literature has entertained the possibility of differentiating governmental functions at a conceptual, pre-institutional level, as a way of defining the separation of powers. However, it can be objected that attempts at differentiating functions at this level cannot escape a problem of arbitrariness. In this article, I develop an account of the separation of powers which addresses this problem. On my account, the legislati…
Authority, Democracy, and Legislative Intent
On one account, courts ought to enforce legislative intent only when the public meaning of the text of the statute is unclear, and on another account, they should enforce the intent even when the public meaning is clear. In this paper, I argue against both approaches. My argument rests on considerations related to the moral authority of the democratically made law. More specifically, I argue that those considerations which make democratic law mor…
Epistemology (2 obras) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Law and economics (2 obras) · Legislature (2 obras) · Philosophy (2 obras) · Political science (2 obras) · Politics (2 obras) · Sociology (2 obras) · Arbitrariness (1 obra)