Richard K Betts
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 732074 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Richard K Betts |
| PRENOMES | Richard K |
| SOBRENOME | Betts |
| ASSINATURA | BETTS R K |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Brookings Institution |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 81 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 436 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 80 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1977 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 10 |
Good Man Makes Bad War? A Review Article
Robert McNamara was acknowledged by all to be brilliant and hyper-rational and secretly revealed to be emotional and altruistic, yet he recommended massive US military action in Vietnam. Then he quickly decided the war could not be won, yet he continued to support it in policy decisions. The Taubman book explores this contradiction and offers a psychological biography as well. Such a personality study is fascinating, but it is not clear that it i…
Nervous Allies and Trump
Conflict after the Cold War
Is Grand Strategy an Illusion?
The significance of the concept of grand strategy as distinct from foreign policy has been exaggerated. Grand strategy is promoted more by analysts than practitioners and rationalized in hindsight more than it has functioned as a plan. Divergence of practice from theory has been explained away by redefinitions that are wrong. Grand strategy is constrained by the complexity of great powers’ interests and the logic of democracy. It has been impleme…
The Grandiosity of Grand Strategy
Grand strategy is in vogue. Its importance as a guidepost for success in foreign affairs is celebrated, and practitioners’ mistakes in the practice of it have been criticized in a bunch of books an
Conflict After the Cold War
Conflict after the Cold War
The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy
In given conditions, action and reaction can be ridiculously out of proportion.... One can obtain results monstrously in excess of the effort.... Let’s consider this auto smash-up.... The driver lost control at high speed while swiping at a wasp which had flown in through a window and was buzzing around his face.... The weight of a wasp is under half an ounce. Compared with a human being, the wasp’s size is minute, its strength negligible. Its so…
Conflict After the Cold War
Civilians, Soldiers, and the Iraq Surge Decision
January 01 2012 Civilians, Soldiers, and the Iraq Surge Decision Richard K. Betts, Richard K. Betts Richard K. Betts is Director of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, and Director of the International Security Policy Program in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Michael C. Desch, Michael C. Desch Michael C. Desch is Profe…
From Cold War to Hot Peace
Strong Arguments, Weak Evidence
Freedom, License, and Responsibility
Contrary to the hand-wringing of some radicals, academic freedom in the United States is in very good shape. The test of this is not whether professors are vilified for their views by polemicists like David Horowitz, but whether professors are prevented from expressing those views or suffer material harm—such as losing their jobs—as a result of doing so. That has not happened on any significant scale in recent times, despite claims to the contrar…
Two Faces of Intelligence Failure
Journal Article Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq's Missing WMD Get access Richard K. Betts Richard K. Betts RICHARD K. BETTS is Director of Columbia University's Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, and a former member of the Military Advisory Panel of the Director of Central Intelligence and of the National Commission on Terrorism, and staffer of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This article …
Maybe I'll Stop Driving
The political support system for American primacy
Journal Article The political support system for American primacy Get access RICHARD K. BETTS RICHARD K. BETTS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 81, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00435.x Published: 21 January 2005
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence
The New Politics of Intelligence
The failure to prevent the attacks of September ll, 2001, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, and the proliferation of official investigations trying to figure out what went wrong in both cases have combined to put intelligence issues in a very unusual position this year: at the center of a closely contested presidential campaign. All the attention creates both an op portunity and a danger. The opportunity stems from th…
Deterrence
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence
Intelligence and the problem of strategic surprise, Michael I. Handel politicization of intelligence - costs and benefits, Richard K. Betts intelligence failures - forecasting and the lessons of epistemology, Woodrow J. Kuhns theory of surprise, James J. Wirtz FORTITUDE in context - the evolution of British military deception in two world wars, 1914-1945, John Ferris intelligence failure and the need for cognitive closure - the case of Yom Kippur…
Striking First
It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the mili…
Suicide from Fear of Death
WITH WAR in the Middle East imminent, it is clear that the United States has painted itself-as well as Iraq-into a corner. The Bush administration's success in engineering international support for a preventive war in the Persian Gulf is impressive, both politically and diplomatically. But Washington's case rests on two crucial errors. It understates the very real risk that an assault on Iraq will trigger a counterattack on American civilians. An…
The First-Year Foreign Policy of Bush the Younger
The author assesses President Bush s foreign policy, suggesting that there are surprisingly few differences beneath the surface between the policies of the current administration and the Clinton presidency. He gives high marks to the Bush administration for its conduct of the war in Afghanistan, but cites several ambiguous, and hence more difficult, obstacles that confront the Bush foreign policy team. In particular, he warns that the United Stat…
Fixing Intelligence
Is Strategy an Illusion
Analysis, War, and Decision
Strategic intelligence failures cannot be prevented by organizational solutions to problems of analysis and communication. Analytic certainty is precluded by ambiguity of evidence, ambivalence of judgment, and atrophy of institutional reforms designed to avert failures. Many sources of error are unresolvable paradoxes and dilemmas rather than curable pathologies. Major failures in attack warning, operational evaluation, and intelligence for strat…
Should Strategic Studies Survive
Political science attends to causes and consequences of war but only fitfully welcomes study of its conduct, because few grasp how much the dynamics of combat shape politics. Bernard Brodie called for development of strategic studies on the model of the discipline of economics, because neither the military nor academia treated the subject rigorously. His call was answered in the early cold war, with mixed results. Theories about nuclear deterrenc…
Wealth, Power, and Instability
The Delusion of Impartial Intervention
Physicians have a motto that peacemakers would do well to adopt: First, do no harm. Neither the United States nor the United Nations have quite grasped this. Since the end of the Cold War unleashed them to intervene in civil conflicts around the world, they have done reasonably well in some cases, but in others they have un wittingly prolonged suffering where they meant to relieve it. How does this happen? By following a principle that sounds lik…
Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance
In numerous crises after World War II--Berlin, Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and the Middle East--the United States resorted to vague threats to use nuclear weapons in order to deter Soviet or Chinese military action. On a few occasions the Soviet Union also engaged in nuclear saber-ratling. Using declassified documents and other sources, this volume examines those crises and compares the decisionmaking processes of leaders who considered nuclear th…
The Irony of Vietnam
Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe
Is Strategy an Illusion
October 01 2000 Is Strategy an Illusion? Richard K. Betts Richard K. Betts Professor and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Richard K. Betts Professor and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and Senior Fellow at the Co…
Conventional Deterrence
For over three decades the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has based its deterrent on the principle that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe succeeded. This notion has long troubled most strategic analysts. It remained generally acceptable to political elites, however, when U.S. nuclear superiority appeared massive enough to make the doctrine credible (as in the 1…
Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs & Nonproliferation
The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy
In given conditions, action and reaction can be ridiculously out of proportion.... One can obtain results monstrously in excess of the effort.... Let’s consider this auto smash-up.... The driver lost control at high speed while swiping at a wasp which had flown in through a window and was buzzing around his face.... The weight of a wasp is under half an ounce. Compared with a human being, the wasp’s size is minute, its strength negligible. Its so…
The New Threat of Mass Destruction
Since the Cold War, other matters have displaced strategic concerns on the foreign policy agenda, and that agenda itself is now barely on the public's radar screen. Apart from defense policy professionals, few Americans still lose sleep over weapons of mass destruction (wmd). After all, what do normal people feel is the main relief provided by the end of the Cold War? It is that the danger of nuclear war is off their backs
A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa
Striking First
It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the mili…
Fixing Intelligence
Doubletalk
A Nuclear Golden Age? The Balance before Parity
And what to do about it
Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation Revisited
This is an updated version of an article which appeared in Foreign Policy, no. 26 (Spring 1977). The article is reprinted with the permission of Foreign Policy and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The original text is in Roman; the updates are in italics
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence
Intelligence and the problem of strategic surprise, Michael I. Handel politicization of intelligence - costs and benefits, Richard K. Betts intelligence failures - forecasting and the lessons of epistemology, Woodrow J. Kuhns theory of surprise, James J. Wirtz FORTITUDE in context - the evolution of British military deception in two world wars, 1914-1945, John Ferris intelligence failure and the need for cognitive closure - the case of Yom Kippur…
Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance
Conventional Strategy
Surprise Despite Warning
Journal Article Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed Get access Richard K. Betts Richard K. Betts RICHARD K. BETTS, research associate at The Brookings Institution, has taught at Harvard, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins Universities, has served on the staffs of the National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and is author of Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. Search for other works by this author on: …
The political support system for American primacy
Journal Article The political support system for American primacy Get access RICHARD K. BETTS RICHARD K. BETTS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 81, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00435.x Published: 21 January 2005
Suicide from Fear of Death
WITH WAR in the Middle East imminent, it is clear that the United States has painted itself-as well as Iraq-into a corner. The Bush administration's success in engineering international support for a preventive war in the Persian Gulf is impressive, both politically and diplomatically. But Washington's case rests on two crucial errors. It understates the very real risk that an assault on Iraq will trigger a counterattack on American civilians. An…
Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs & Nonproliferation
Myths and Realities of America at War
The Weak in the World of the Strong
Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises
Analysis, War, and Decision
Strategic intelligence failures cannot be prevented by organizational solutions to problems of analysis and communication. Analytic certainty is precluded by ambiguity of evidence, ambivalence of judgment, and atrophy of institutional reforms designed to avert failures. Many sources of error are unresolvable paradoxes and dilemmas rather than curable pathologies. Major failures in attack warning, operational evaluation, and intelligence for strat…
A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa
Nuclear peace
Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises
Journal Article Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. By Richard K. Betts. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. xi + 292 pp. Charts, tables, appendixes, notes, sources, and index. $15.00.) Get access John Edward Wiltz John Edward Wiltz Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 65, Issue 4, March 1979, Pages 1189–1190, https://doi.org/10.2307/1894655 P…
The Irony of Vietnam
Incentives for Nuclear Weapons
Research Article| November 01 1979 Incentives for Nuclear Weapons: India, Pakistan, Iran Richard K. Betts Richard K. Betts Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1950) 19 (11): 1053–1072. https://doi.org/10.2307/2643954 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite…
Comment on Mueller
Journal Article Comment on Mueller: Interests, Burdens, and Persistence: Asymmetries Between Washington and Hanoi Get access Richard K. Betts Richard K. Betts The Brookings Institution Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 24, Issue 4, December 1980, Pages 520–524, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600288 Published: 01 December 1980
Alibi Alley
Intelligence for Policymaking
(1980). Intelligence for Policymaking. The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 118-129
The Tragicomedy of Arms Trade Control
Vietnam
Politics of Arms Control
Surprise Despite Warning
Journal Article Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed Get access Richard K. Betts Richard K. Betts RICHARD K. BETTS, research associate at The Brookings Institution, has taught at Harvard, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins Universities, has served on the staffs of the National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and is author of Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. Search for other works by this author on: …
The Irony of Vietnam
Cruise Missiles
(1981). Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics. The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 66-80
Surprise Attack
Hedging against surprise attack
Doubletalk
Vietnam
Cruise Missiles
Politics and Force Levels
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