Mogens Kamp Justesen
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 816460 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Mogens Kamp Justesen |
| PRENOMES | Mogens Kamp |
| SOBRENOME | Justesen |
| ASSINATURA | JUSTESEN M K |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Copenhagen Business School |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5985-9600 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 22 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 175 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 22 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2006 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
Fighting for a Better Life
How do civic protests affect public opinion? Protests may lead governments to address certain policy issues, but can also exert pressure on politicians by causing shifts in public opinion. We examine the effects of peaceful and disruptive protest on public opinion using evidence from South Africa, where citizens regularly use protests to express dissatisfaction with public services. First, we test the effects of protests on public opinion in a di…
Clientelism and programmatic redistribution
The Cost of Voting and the Cost of Votes
In new democracies, political parties often use clientelist strategies to mobilize voters during elections. In this article, we show that political machines systematically use vote buying to target voters with low costs of voting. We employ a geocoded survey of 3,192 respondents collected immediately after the municipal elections of 2016 in South Africa. We combine the survey data with administrative data on the geographical location of more than…
Electoral competition, political parties and clientelism
How does electoral competition shape parties’ use of clientelist strategies during elections? In this article, we present a theoretical framework which suggests that in contexts where electoral clientelism is present but not ubiquitous, clientelist strategies take a distinctive form by being more considered and rationally targeted at individuals and areas that maximize the value of the transaction for the clientelist party. Using individual-level…
Female representation and electoral clientelism
Do citizens experience less electoral clientelism in polities with more elected female representatives? The current literature is remarkably silent on the role of gender and female political representation for electoral clientelism. Due to gender differences in issue priorities, targeted constituent groups, networks and resources, we argue that voters experience less clientelism in municipalities with a higher proportion of female politicians bec…
Poverty, Partisanship, and Vote Buying in Latin America
Electoral contests in Latin America are often characterized by attempts by political parties to sway the outcome of elections using vote buying-a practice that seems to persist during elections throughout the region. This article examines how clientelist parties' use of vote buying is jointly shaped by two voter traits: poverty and partisanship. We hypothesize that clientelist parties pursue a mixed strategy, broadly targeting their core voters b…
Vote buying and redistribution
Vote buying is a form of political clientelism involving pre-electoral transfers of money or material benefits from candidates to voters. Despite the presence of secret ballots, vote buying remains a pervasive phenomenon during elections in developing countries. While prior literature has focused on how vote buying is enforced by parties and political candidates and which types of voters are most likely targeted, we know much less about the behav…
Asset Specificity, Corporate Protection and Trade Policy
This letter provides firm-level evidence that policy makers tailor trade policy to suit selected firms. It argues that firms with higher levels of specific assets find it more costly to reorganize production, and are hurt more by international competition. In response, policy makers grant more trade protection to firms with fixed assets. Since protectionism is costly, firms compete for it, which creates diffusion dynamics in which the protection …
Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa
Democratic elections are supposed to prevent corrupt politicians from winning office. In practice, however, corrupt politicians frequently get elected for public office in mass elections. In this article, we examine how voters respond to corruption allegations against political candidates and how voter responses may be attenuated by patronage and partisanship. We test these explanations through a survey experiment in South Africa—a country where …
Redistribution in a political union
A key function of centralized budgets in federal and political unions is to act as an equalizing mechanism to support economic and social cohesion. This is also the case with the European Union's (EU) budget, which operates as a redistributive mechanism that counteracts the cross‐national and cross‐regional inequalities created by the single market. Despite the limits on cross‐national redistribution imposed by a centrifugal system of representat…
Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability
How does armed conflict affect accountability and political trust in democratic governments? To answer this question, we present quasi-experimental evidence based on survey data which, coincidentally, were collected in the days surrounding an unanticipated violent attack by a rebel group in Mali. The chance occurrence of the attack five days into the survey demarcates respondents into two groups surveyed before and after the attack and allows us …
The Decline of the African National Congress in South Africa's 2016 Municipal Elections
Using data from a nationally representative post-election public opinion survey, the article argues that the electoral losses experienced by the African National Congress (ANC) in the 2016 municipal election were a manifestation of an attitudinal shift among the governing party’s traditional support base. ANC vote choice was influenced by a combination of performance-based evaluations of the party at both the national and local levels: namely, a …
Institutional constraints, legislative activism and policy change
This article presents a study of how institutional constraints affect legislative activism and how legislative activism in turn affects policy change through an analysis of the European Union's legislative process. The argument revolves around the key role of the European Commission in advancing policy change, and emphasises that the Commission can successfully push for increased policy change by increasing its legislative activity when the insti…
Making and Breaking Property Rights
This paper analyzes why some governments protect property rights while others do not. Although institutional constraints may affect government incentives to protect property rights, the paper emphasizes that different political institutions have dissimilar effects. Coalition institutions that make governments accountable to large groups in society are particularly important, whereas division of powers between veto players is hypothesized to have …
Too Poor to Care? The Salience of Aids in Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa is the part of the world that is most severely affected by HIV/AIDS. Yet, surveys of attitudes to AIDS across African countries show that voters do not attach great importance to the issue. This paper argues that the low salience of AIDS is in large part a result of the widespread poverty that exists on the continent, which means that AIDS is crowded out by other issues. Using multilevel regressions, results from four waves of …
Exploiting the Poor
Measuring and explaining regulatory reform in the EU
Over the last three decades, European Union regulation of the internal market has become highly pervasive, affecting practically all domains of European citizens' lives. Many studies have focused on understanding the process and causes of regulatory change, but with limited attempts to analyse the more general sources of regulatory reform. This article focuses on the determinants of stability and change in EU regulation. An original dataset of 16…
Better Safe than Sorry
A growing literature argues that division of powers matter for economic growth by increasing the security of property rights. However, less effort has been devoted to examining the political and institutional conditions under which property rights have economic effects. This paper emphasizes that the economic effects of property rights depend on the division of powers between veto players, meaning that the interaction of veto players and property…
Poverty and vote buying
Institutional interactions and economic growth
The Social Choice of EU Treaties
The article applies Social Choice theory to analyse new and so far undiscovered aspects of the Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993. The article queries whether the amended Maastricht Treaty adopted in 1993 was, in fact, the most preferred alternative for a majority of Danish voters. A reconstruction of voter preferences regarding the political alternatives in the European Union — the Maastricht Treaty, the amended Maastri…
The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism
Poverty and vote buying
The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism
Exploiting the Poor
Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability
How does armed conflict affect accountability and political trust in democratic governments? To answer this question, we present quasi-experimental evidence based on survey data which, coincidentally, were collected in the days surrounding an unanticipated violent attack by a rebel group in Mali. The chance occurrence of the attack five days into the survey demarcates respondents into two groups surveyed before and after the attack and allows us …
Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa
Democratic elections are supposed to prevent corrupt politicians from winning office. In practice, however, corrupt politicians frequently get elected for public office in mass elections. In this article, we examine how voters respond to corruption allegations against political candidates and how voter responses may be attenuated by patronage and partisanship. We test these explanations through a survey experiment in South Africa—a country where …
The Decline of the African National Congress in South Africa's 2016 Municipal Elections
Using data from a nationally representative post-election public opinion survey, the article argues that the electoral losses experienced by the African National Congress (ANC) in the 2016 municipal election were a manifestation of an attitudinal shift among the governing party’s traditional support base. ANC vote choice was influenced by a combination of performance-based evaluations of the party at both the national and local levels: namely, a …
Electoral competition, political parties and clientelism
How does electoral competition shape parties’ use of clientelist strategies during elections? In this article, we present a theoretical framework which suggests that in contexts where electoral clientelism is present but not ubiquitous, clientelist strategies take a distinctive form by being more considered and rationally targeted at individuals and areas that maximize the value of the transaction for the clientelist party. Using individual-level…
Poverty, Partisanship, and Vote Buying in Latin America
Electoral contests in Latin America are often characterized by attempts by political parties to sway the outcome of elections using vote buying-a practice that seems to persist during elections throughout the region. This article examines how clientelist parties' use of vote buying is jointly shaped by two voter traits: poverty and partisanship. We hypothesize that clientelist parties pursue a mixed strategy, broadly targeting their core voters b…
Vote buying and redistribution
Vote buying is a form of political clientelism involving pre-electoral transfers of money or material benefits from candidates to voters. Despite the presence of secret ballots, vote buying remains a pervasive phenomenon during elections in developing countries. While prior literature has focused on how vote buying is enforced by parties and political candidates and which types of voters are most likely targeted, we know much less about the behav…
Redistribution in a political union
A key function of centralized budgets in federal and political unions is to act as an equalizing mechanism to support economic and social cohesion. This is also the case with the European Union's (EU) budget, which operates as a redistributive mechanism that counteracts the cross‐national and cross‐regional inequalities created by the single market. Despite the limits on cross‐national redistribution imposed by a centrifugal system of representat…
Institutional interactions and economic growth
The Cost of Voting and the Cost of Votes
In new democracies, political parties often use clientelist strategies to mobilize voters during elections. In this article, we show that political machines systematically use vote buying to target voters with low costs of voting. We employ a geocoded survey of 3,192 respondents collected immediately after the municipal elections of 2016 in South Africa. We combine the survey data with administrative data on the geographical location of more than…
Measuring and explaining regulatory reform in the EU
Over the last three decades, European Union regulation of the internal market has become highly pervasive, affecting practically all domains of European citizens' lives. Many studies have focused on understanding the process and causes of regulatory change, but with limited attempts to analyse the more general sources of regulatory reform. This article focuses on the determinants of stability and change in EU regulation. An original dataset of 16…
Better Safe than Sorry
A growing literature argues that division of powers matter for economic growth by increasing the security of property rights. However, less effort has been devoted to examining the political and institutional conditions under which property rights have economic effects. This paper emphasizes that the economic effects of property rights depend on the division of powers between veto players, meaning that the interaction of veto players and property…
Asset Specificity, Corporate Protection and Trade Policy
This letter provides firm-level evidence that policy makers tailor trade policy to suit selected firms. It argues that firms with higher levels of specific assets find it more costly to reorganize production, and are hurt more by international competition. In response, policy makers grant more trade protection to firms with fixed assets. Since protectionism is costly, firms compete for it, which creates diffusion dynamics in which the protection …
Institutional constraints, legislative activism and policy change
This article presents a study of how institutional constraints affect legislative activism and how legislative activism in turn affects policy change through an analysis of the European Union's legislative process. The argument revolves around the key role of the European Commission in advancing policy change, and emphasises that the Commission can successfully push for increased policy change by increasing its legislative activity when the insti…
Too Poor to Care? The Salience of Aids in Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa is the part of the world that is most severely affected by HIV/AIDS. Yet, surveys of attitudes to AIDS across African countries show that voters do not attach great importance to the issue. This paper argues that the low salience of AIDS is in large part a result of the widespread poverty that exists on the continent, which means that AIDS is crowded out by other issues. Using multilevel regressions, results from four waves of …
The Social Choice of EU Treaties
The article applies Social Choice theory to analyse new and so far undiscovered aspects of the Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993. The article queries whether the amended Maastricht Treaty adopted in 1993 was, in fact, the most preferred alternative for a majority of Danish voters. A reconstruction of voter preferences regarding the political alternatives in the European Union — the Maastricht Treaty, the amended Maastri…
Clientelism and programmatic redistribution
Female representation and electoral clientelism
Do citizens experience less electoral clientelism in polities with more elected female representatives? The current literature is remarkably silent on the role of gender and female political representation for electoral clientelism. Due to gender differences in issue priorities, targeted constituent groups, networks and resources, we argue that voters experience less clientelism in municipalities with a higher proportion of female politicians bec…
The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism
The Social Choice of EU Treaties
The article applies Social Choice theory to analyse new and so far undiscovered aspects of the Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993. The article queries whether the amended Maastricht Treaty adopted in 1993 was, in fact, the most preferred alternative for a majority of Danish voters. A reconstruction of voter preferences regarding the political alternatives in the European Union — the Maastricht Treaty, the amended Maastri…
Institutional interactions and economic growth
Exploiting the Poor
Measuring and explaining regulatory reform in the EU
Over the last three decades, European Union regulation of the internal market has become highly pervasive, affecting practically all domains of European citizens' lives. Many studies have focused on understanding the process and causes of regulatory change, but with limited attempts to analyse the more general sources of regulatory reform. This article focuses on the determinants of stability and change in EU regulation. An original dataset of 16…
Better Safe than Sorry
A growing literature argues that division of powers matter for economic growth by increasing the security of property rights. However, less effort has been devoted to examining the political and institutional conditions under which property rights have economic effects. This paper emphasizes that the economic effects of property rights depend on the division of powers between veto players, meaning that the interaction of veto players and property…
Poverty and vote buying
Making and Breaking Property Rights
This paper analyzes why some governments protect property rights while others do not. Although institutional constraints may affect government incentives to protect property rights, the paper emphasizes that different political institutions have dissimilar effects. Coalition institutions that make governments accountable to large groups in society are particularly important, whereas division of powers between veto players is hypothesized to have …
Too Poor to Care? The Salience of Aids in Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa is the part of the world that is most severely affected by HIV/AIDS. Yet, surveys of attitudes to AIDS across African countries show that voters do not attach great importance to the issue. This paper argues that the low salience of AIDS is in large part a result of the widespread poverty that exists on the continent, which means that AIDS is crowded out by other issues. Using multilevel regressions, results from four waves of …
Institutional constraints, legislative activism and policy change
This article presents a study of how institutional constraints affect legislative activism and how legislative activism in turn affects policy change through an analysis of the European Union's legislative process. The argument revolves around the key role of the European Commission in advancing policy change, and emphasises that the Commission can successfully push for increased policy change by increasing its legislative activity when the insti…
The Decline of the African National Congress in South Africa's 2016 Municipal Elections
Using data from a nationally representative post-election public opinion survey, the article argues that the electoral losses experienced by the African National Congress (ANC) in the 2016 municipal election were a manifestation of an attitudinal shift among the governing party’s traditional support base. ANC vote choice was influenced by a combination of performance-based evaluations of the party at both the national and local levels: namely, a …
Political Trust, Shocks, and Accountability
How does armed conflict affect accountability and political trust in democratic governments? To answer this question, we present quasi-experimental evidence based on survey data which, coincidentally, were collected in the days surrounding an unanticipated violent attack by a rebel group in Mali. The chance occurrence of the attack five days into the survey demarcates respondents into two groups surveyed before and after the attack and allows us …
Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa
Democratic elections are supposed to prevent corrupt politicians from winning office. In practice, however, corrupt politicians frequently get elected for public office in mass elections. In this article, we examine how voters respond to corruption allegations against political candidates and how voter responses may be attenuated by patronage and partisanship. We test these explanations through a survey experiment in South Africa—a country where …
Redistribution in a political union
A key function of centralized budgets in federal and political unions is to act as an equalizing mechanism to support economic and social cohesion. This is also the case with the European Union's (EU) budget, which operates as a redistributive mechanism that counteracts the cross‐national and cross‐regional inequalities created by the single market. Despite the limits on cross‐national redistribution imposed by a centrifugal system of representat…
Vote buying and redistribution
Vote buying is a form of political clientelism involving pre-electoral transfers of money or material benefits from candidates to voters. Despite the presence of secret ballots, vote buying remains a pervasive phenomenon during elections in developing countries. While prior literature has focused on how vote buying is enforced by parties and political candidates and which types of voters are most likely targeted, we know much less about the behav…
Asset Specificity, Corporate Protection and Trade Policy
This letter provides firm-level evidence that policy makers tailor trade policy to suit selected firms. It argues that firms with higher levels of specific assets find it more costly to reorganize production, and are hurt more by international competition. In response, policy makers grant more trade protection to firms with fixed assets. Since protectionism is costly, firms compete for it, which creates diffusion dynamics in which the protection …
The Cost of Voting and the Cost of Votes
In new democracies, political parties often use clientelist strategies to mobilize voters during elections. In this article, we show that political machines systematically use vote buying to target voters with low costs of voting. We employ a geocoded survey of 3,192 respondents collected immediately after the municipal elections of 2016 in South Africa. We combine the survey data with administrative data on the geographical location of more than…
Electoral competition, political parties and clientelism
How does electoral competition shape parties’ use of clientelist strategies during elections? In this article, we present a theoretical framework which suggests that in contexts where electoral clientelism is present but not ubiquitous, clientelist strategies take a distinctive form by being more considered and rationally targeted at individuals and areas that maximize the value of the transaction for the clientelist party. Using individual-level…
Female representation and electoral clientelism
Do citizens experience less electoral clientelism in polities with more elected female representatives? The current literature is remarkably silent on the role of gender and female political representation for electoral clientelism. Due to gender differences in issue priorities, targeted constituent groups, networks and resources, we argue that voters experience less clientelism in municipalities with a higher proportion of female politicians bec…
Poverty, Partisanship, and Vote Buying in Latin America
Electoral contests in Latin America are often characterized by attempts by political parties to sway the outcome of elections using vote buying-a practice that seems to persist during elections throughout the region. This article examines how clientelist parties' use of vote buying is jointly shaped by two voter traits: poverty and partisanship. We hypothesize that clientelist parties pursue a mixed strategy, broadly targeting their core voters b…
Clientelism and programmatic redistribution
Fighting for a Better Life
How do civic protests affect public opinion? Protests may lead governments to address certain policy issues, but can also exert pressure on politicians by causing shifts in public opinion. We examine the effects of peaceful and disruptive protest on public opinion using evidence from South Africa, where citizens regularly use protests to express dissatisfaction with public services. First, we test the effects of protests on public opinion in a di…
Political science (21 obras) · Economics (19 obras) · Politics (19 obras) · Law (16 obras) · Law (14 obras) · Political economy (11 obras) · Democracy (7 obras) · Development economics (7 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 obras) · Poverty (6 obras)