Marc A Moffett
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 8957496 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Marc A Moffett |
| PRENOMES | Marc A |
| SOBRENOME | Moffett |
| ASSINATURA | MOFFETT M A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Department of Philosophy University of Texas El Paso Texas USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8367-3600 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 5 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 0 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2002 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
Basic Epistemic Reasons
The goal of this paper is to argue that the foundations of epistemology are grounded in the theory of rational action. Specifically, I will articulate and defend a version of internalist foundationalism based on a distinctive, action‐theoretic version of non‐doxastic justification. The motivating idea is that the justification for our foundational beliefs is inherited from our justification for antecedent doxastic actions, acts of belief formatio…
Knowing HowEssays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action
This volume contains fifteen state of the art essays by leading figures in philosophy and linguistics that amplify and sharpen the debate between 'intellectualists' and 'anti-intellectualists' about mind and action, highlighting the conceptual, empirical, and linguistic issues that motivate and sustain the conflict.
Knowing how
Constructing Attitudes
The singular term theory maintains that that-clauses are complex singular terms which designate propositions. Though extremely well-supported, the theory is endangered by the existence of oblique thatclauses; that is, that-clauses occurring in what appear to be non-argument positions (e.g., ‘Lola was upset that Slick Willy had all the fun’). In this paper I argue that the best solution to the problem consistent with the singular term theory, invo…
A Note on the Relationship Between Mates' Puzzle and Frege's Puzzle
In this note I argue that, relative to certain largely uncontroversial background conditions, any instance of Mates' Puzzle is equivalent to some instance of Frege's Puzzle. If correct, this result is surprising. For, barring the radical move of rejecting the possibility of synonymous expressions in a language tout court, it shows that there is no strictly lexical solution to at least some instances of Frege's Puzzle. This forces the hand of theo…
Sem obras proeminentes nesta página.
A Note on the Relationship Between Mates' Puzzle and Frege's Puzzle
In this note I argue that, relative to certain largely uncontroversial background conditions, any instance of Mates' Puzzle is equivalent to some instance of Frege's Puzzle. If correct, this result is surprising. For, barring the radical move of rejecting the possibility of synonymous expressions in a language tout court, it shows that there is no strictly lexical solution to at least some instances of Frege's Puzzle. This forces the hand of theo…
Constructing Attitudes
The singular term theory maintains that that-clauses are complex singular terms which designate propositions. Though extremely well-supported, the theory is endangered by the existence of oblique thatclauses; that is, that-clauses occurring in what appear to be non-argument positions (e.g., ‘Lola was upset that Slick Willy had all the fun’). In this paper I argue that the best solution to the problem consistent with the singular term theory, invo…
Knowing how
Knowing HowEssays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action
This volume contains fifteen state of the art essays by leading figures in philosophy and linguistics that amplify and sharpen the debate between 'intellectualists' and 'anti-intellectualists' about mind and action, highlighting the conceptual, empirical, and linguistic issues that motivate and sustain the conflict.
Basic Epistemic Reasons
The goal of this paper is to argue that the foundations of epistemology are grounded in the theory of rational action. Specifically, I will articulate and defend a version of internalist foundationalism based on a distinctive, action‐theoretic version of non‐doxastic justification. The motivating idea is that the justification for our foundational beliefs is inherited from our justification for antecedent doxastic actions, acts of belief formatio…
Epistemology (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Action (physics) (2 obras) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (2 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Sociology (2 obras) · Act (philosophy) (1 obra) · Agency (philosophy) (1 obra) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (1 obra)