J Keith Murnighan
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 91211 |
|---|---|
| NOME | J Keith Murnighan |
| PRENOMES | J Keith |
| SOBRENOME | Murnighan |
| ASSINATURA | MURNIGHAN J K |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Northwestern University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 33 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 167 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 33 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1977 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2017 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
The Goldilocks contract
Contracts are commonly used to regulate a wide range of interactions and relationships. Yet relying on contracts as a mechanism of control often comes at a cost to motivation. Integrating theoretical perspectives from psychology, economics, and organizational theory, we explore this control-motivation dilemma inherent in contracts and present the Contract-Autonomy-Motivation-Performance-Structure (CAMPS) model, which highlights the synergistic be…
Reciprocity
Reciprocity is a strong, pervasive, and ancient norm that can be represented by three sayings: one negative (“An eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth”), one positive (“You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours”), and one general (“Do unto others as you would have others do unto you”).
Consensus
Consensus is an informal process that many groups use for making decisions. Its informality makes it vulnerable to political influence. It can also result in far less than optimal results.
Exchange Relations
Exchange relations is a research area that addresses the social and economic interactions that individuals and groups have with each other. It assesses the relative power and dependence of the parties and uses that analysis to explore a variety of logically expected outcomes and processes.
Game Theory
Game theory uses formal mathematics to analyze all kinds of social and conflictual interactions between rational, well‐informed individuals and groups. It has been incorporating empirical observations into its analyses, which have been more and more applicable to organizational strategies.
Reciprocal Altruism
Altruism involves action that benefits others, without respect to the actor's outcomes; it is strictly focused on others. People engage in all sorts of reciprocal altruism; at the same time, they are tempted to cheat by reciprocating less.
Coalition Formation
Coalitions are an essential form of organizational decision making: people come together to reach a decision that affects more than the set of individuals who favor a particular decision. Thus, coalition formation can be an important political process in organizations. Ironically, it has not been often studied.
Cheating at the end to avoid regret
How do people behave when they face a finite series of opportunities to cheat with little or no risk of detection? In 4 experiments and a small meta-analysis, we analyzed over 25,000 cheating opportunities faced by over 2,500 people. The results suggested that the odds of cheating are almost 3 times higher at the end of a series than earlier. Participants could cheat in 1 of 2 ways: They could lie about the outcome of a private coin flip to get a…
When Hierarchy Wins
Past research on pay dispersion has found that hierarchy hurts commitment, cooperation, and performance. In contrast, functional theories of social hierarchy propose that hierarchy can facilitate coordination and performance. We investigated the effects of hierarchical differentiation using a sample of professional basketball teams from the National Basketball Association (NBA). Analyses of archival data revealed that hierarchical differentiation…
Mind games
Perception and misperception play a pivotal role in conflict and negotiation. We introduce a framework that explains how people think about their outcome interdependence in conflict and negotiation and how their views shape their behavior. Seven studies show that people's mental representations of conflict are predictably constrained to a small set of possibilities with important behavioral and social consequences. Studies 1 and 2 found that, whe…
Striving for the Moral Self
People’s desires to see themselves as moral actors can contribute to their striving for and achievement of a sense of self-completeness. The authors use self-completion theory to predict (and show) that recalling one’s own (im)moral behavior leads to compensatory rather than consistent moral action as a way of completing the moral self. In three studies, people who recalled their immoral behavior reported greater participation in moral activities…
Dormant Ties
The social networks literature suggests that ties must be maintained to retain value. In contrast, we show that reconnecting dormant ties—former ties, now out of touch—can be extremely useful. Our research prompted Executive MBA students to consult their dormant contacts about an important work project; outcomes compared favorably to those of their current ties. In addition, reconnecting previously strong ties led to all of the four benefits that…
Honesty pays
International audience
Do groups lie more than individuals? Honesty and deception as a function of strategic self-interest
Speaking the Same Language
The long history of experimental research on the prisoner's dilemma (PD) has primarily used a methodology that eliminates cues to participants. Researchers, however, have interpreted participants' choices as cooperative or competitive. The authors' research shows that giving participants researchers' interpretive labels of the game, the choices, and the outcomes, compared to no labels, led to significantly more cooperation; labels such as trust a…
Starting low but ending high
Counter to the "start high, end high" effect of anchors in individual judgments and dyadic negotiations, 6 studies using a diverse set of methodologies document how and why, in the social setting of auctions, lower starting prices result in higher final prices. Three processes contribute to this effect. First, lower starting prices reduce barriers to entry, which increase traffic and generate higher final prices. Second, lower starting prices ent…
Interactions Within Groups and Subgroups
We investigated the effects of intragroup and cross-subgroup communications in an experimental field study on demographic faultlines. The results indicated that faultlines explained more variance in perceptions of team learning, psychological safety, satisfaction, and expected performance than single-attribute heterogeneity indexes. In addition, cross-subgroup work communications were effective for groups with weak faultlines but not for groups w…
Attributions of trust and the calculus of reciprocity
Fairness in Bargaining
Egocentric Perceptions of Relationships, Competence, and Trustworthiness in Salary Allocation Choices
When Talk Is Not Cheap
Interpersonal relationships can be fragile. The mere perception of opportunistic behavior can lead to a breakdown in cooperation. Once damaged, the question then arises as to whether and how cooperation might be restored. Noncooperative game theory raises serious doubts about the possibilities, although interactional justice and impression management research have shown that verbal explanations can dampen reactions to aversive behavior. Philosoph…
Fair Division
Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults
Unfairness, Anger, and Spite
The Emergence of Norms in Competitive Decision-Making Groups
Kenneth Bettenhausen and J. Keith Murnighan This paper examines the development of norms in newly formed groups. The behavior of 19 decision-making groups provided the basis for a model of norm development, in which uncertainty over appropriate behavior leads members to use their past experiences in similar social settings as scripts for choosing behaviors in the current situation. Depending on the similarity of the members' scripts, a common bas…
Attributions of trust and the calculus of reciprocity
Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Several models of prisoner's dilemma interactions were tested in a series of twelve games whose termination point was determined probabilistically. A new model was introduced to discriminate among equilibrium and nonequilibrium situations on the basis of a player's expected benefits or losses for cooperating. The experiment included twelve payoff matrices, three probabilities for continuing, two opponent strategies, and the player's sex as indepe…
Models of coalition behavior
Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults
Theories of coalition formation and the effects of reference groups
Fairness in Bargaining
Mind games
Perception and misperception play a pivotal role in conflict and negotiation. We introduce a framework that explains how people think about their outcome interdependence in conflict and negotiation and how their views shape their behavior. Seven studies show that people's mental representations of conflict are predictably constrained to a small set of possibilities with important behavioral and social consequences. Studies 1 and 2 found that, whe…
Starting low but ending high
Counter to the "start high, end high" effect of anchors in individual judgments and dyadic negotiations, 6 studies using a diverse set of methodologies document how and why, in the social setting of auctions, lower starting prices result in higher final prices. Three processes contribute to this effect. First, lower starting prices reduce barriers to entry, which increase traffic and generate higher final prices. Second, lower starting prices ent…
Do groups lie more than individuals? Honesty and deception as a function of strategic self-interest
Speaking the Same Language
The long history of experimental research on the prisoner's dilemma (PD) has primarily used a methodology that eliminates cues to participants. Researchers, however, have interpreted participants' choices as cooperative or competitive. The authors' research shows that giving participants researchers' interpretive labels of the game, the choices, and the outcomes, compared to no labels, led to significantly more cooperation; labels such as trust a…
Effects of group size and communication availability on coalition bargaining in a veto game
This study examined the effects of manipulating the size of groups of male student negotiators and their ability to communicate with one another in a game in which one player held veto power (i.e., had to be included in any winning coalition). The predictions of three models, the core, the value, and the weighted probability model, were tested. The game, in which the veto player could form a winning coalition with any other single player, was rep…
The Goldilocks contract
Contracts are commonly used to regulate a wide range of interactions and relationships. Yet relying on contracts as a mechanism of control often comes at a cost to motivation. Integrating theoretical perspectives from psychology, economics, and organizational theory, we explore this control-motivation dilemma inherent in contracts and present the Contract-Autonomy-Motivation-Performance-Structure (CAMPS) model, which highlights the synergistic be…
Honesty pays
International audience
Defectors, Vulnerability, and Relative Power
This study explored the causes and effects of defecting from a stable coalition. Vulnerability and the relative power of the defectors were the primary independent variables. Results showed that defectors were obtaining higher payoffs than nondefectors prior to their defection. Defection from stable coalitions in the four coalition games studied here led to reduced benefits for both the defectors and the nondefectors. At the same time defectors f…
Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game
This paper presents the results of an n-person characteristic function game played by between seven and and twelve players, one of whom was a monopolist. A factorial design allowed for analysis of the effects of group size, the availability of information, and communication opportunities for a series of seven trials. The data were compared to the game theoretic concepts of the core and Shapley value, (Shapley, 1953, Roth, 1977a), and to the predi…
Cheating at the end to avoid regret
How do people behave when they face a finite series of opportunities to cheat with little or no risk of detection? In 4 experiments and a small meta-analysis, we analyzed over 25,000 cheating opportunities faced by over 2,500 people. The results suggested that the odds of cheating are almost 3 times higher at the end of a series than earlier. Participants could cheat in 1 of 2 ways: They could lie about the outcome of a private coin flip to get a…
Egocentric Perceptions of Relationships, Competence, and Trustworthiness in Salary Allocation Choices
The formation of blocs in an experimental study of coalition
Any group that includes three or more people provides the opportunity for its members to form coalitions. This study used two three‐person games to investigate the formation of blocs, the joint action of two people against a third. The process as well as the outcomes of negotiations were observed: in addition to the two games, the secrecy of negotiations and the experience of the bargainers were studied. The results did not support either the app…
Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player
Theories of coalition formation and the effects of reference groups
Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game
This paper presents the results of an n-person characteristic function game played by between seven and and twelve players, one of whom was a monopolist. A factorial design allowed for analysis of the effects of group size, the availability of information, and communication opportunities for a series of seven trials. The data were compared to the game theoretic concepts of the core and Shapley value, (Shapley, 1953, Roth, 1977a), and to the predi…
Models of coalition behavior
Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player
Effects of group size and communication availability on coalition bargaining in a veto game
This study examined the effects of manipulating the size of groups of male student negotiators and their ability to communicate with one another in a game in which one player held veto power (i.e., had to be included in any winning coalition). The predictions of three models, the core, the value, and the weighted probability model, were tested. The game, in which the veto player could form a winning coalition with any other single player, was rep…
Defectors, Vulnerability, and Relative Power
This study explored the causes and effects of defecting from a stable coalition. Vulnerability and the relative power of the defectors were the primary independent variables. Results showed that defectors were obtaining higher payoffs than nondefectors prior to their defection. Defection from stable coalitions in the four coalition games studied here led to reduced benefits for both the defectors and the nondefectors. At the same time defectors f…
Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Several models of prisoner's dilemma interactions were tested in a series of twelve games whose termination point was determined probabilistically. A new model was introduced to discriminate among equilibrium and nonequilibrium situations on the basis of a player's expected benefits or losses for cooperating. The experiment included twelve payoff matrices, three probabilities for continuing, two opponent strategies, and the player's sex as indepe…
The Emergence of Norms in Competitive Decision-Making Groups
Kenneth Bettenhausen and J. Keith Murnighan This paper examines the development of norms in newly formed groups. The behavior of 19 decision-making groups provided the basis for a model of norm development, in which uncertainty over appropriate behavior leads members to use their past experiences in similar social settings as scripts for choosing behaviors in the current situation. Depending on the similarity of the members' scripts, a common bas…
The formation of blocs in an experimental study of coalition
Any group that includes three or more people provides the opportunity for its members to form coalitions. This study used two three‐person games to investigate the formation of blocs, the joint action of two people against a third. The process as well as the outcomes of negotiations were observed: in addition to the two games, the secrecy of negotiations and the experience of the bargainers were studied. The results did not support either the app…
Unfairness, Anger, and Spite
Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults
Fair Division
When Talk Is Not Cheap
Interpersonal relationships can be fragile. The mere perception of opportunistic behavior can lead to a breakdown in cooperation. Once damaged, the question then arises as to whether and how cooperation might be restored. Noncooperative game theory raises serious doubts about the possibilities, although interactional justice and impression management research have shown that verbal explanations can dampen reactions to aversive behavior. Philosoph…
Attributions of trust and the calculus of reciprocity
Fairness in Bargaining
Egocentric Perceptions of Relationships, Competence, and Trustworthiness in Salary Allocation Choices
Interactions Within Groups and Subgroups
We investigated the effects of intragroup and cross-subgroup communications in an experimental field study on demographic faultlines. The results indicated that faultlines explained more variance in perceptions of team learning, psychological safety, satisfaction, and expected performance than single-attribute heterogeneity indexes. In addition, cross-subgroup work communications were effective for groups with weak faultlines but not for groups w…
Starting low but ending high
Counter to the "start high, end high" effect of anchors in individual judgments and dyadic negotiations, 6 studies using a diverse set of methodologies document how and why, in the social setting of auctions, lower starting prices result in higher final prices. Three processes contribute to this effect. First, lower starting prices reduce barriers to entry, which increase traffic and generate higher final prices. Second, lower starting prices ent…
Speaking the Same Language
The long history of experimental research on the prisoner's dilemma (PD) has primarily used a methodology that eliminates cues to participants. Researchers, however, have interpreted participants' choices as cooperative or competitive. The authors' research shows that giving participants researchers' interpretive labels of the game, the choices, and the outcomes, compared to no labels, led to significantly more cooperation; labels such as trust a…
Do groups lie more than individuals? Honesty and deception as a function of strategic self-interest
Striving for the Moral Self
People’s desires to see themselves as moral actors can contribute to their striving for and achievement of a sense of self-completeness. The authors use self-completion theory to predict (and show) that recalling one’s own (im)moral behavior leads to compensatory rather than consistent moral action as a way of completing the moral self. In three studies, people who recalled their immoral behavior reported greater participation in moral activities…
Dormant Ties
The social networks literature suggests that ties must be maintained to retain value. In contrast, we show that reconnecting dormant ties—former ties, now out of touch—can be extremely useful. Our research prompted Executive MBA students to consult their dormant contacts about an important work project; outcomes compared favorably to those of their current ties. In addition, reconnecting previously strong ties led to all of the four benefits that…
Honesty pays
International audience
When Hierarchy Wins
Past research on pay dispersion has found that hierarchy hurts commitment, cooperation, and performance. In contrast, functional theories of social hierarchy propose that hierarchy can facilitate coordination and performance. We investigated the effects of hierarchical differentiation using a sample of professional basketball teams from the National Basketball Association (NBA). Analyses of archival data revealed that hierarchical differentiation…
Mind games
Perception and misperception play a pivotal role in conflict and negotiation. We introduce a framework that explains how people think about their outcome interdependence in conflict and negotiation and how their views shape their behavior. Seven studies show that people's mental representations of conflict are predictably constrained to a small set of possibilities with important behavioral and social consequences. Studies 1 and 2 found that, whe…
Psychology (27 obras) · Social Psychology (26 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (24 obras) · Political science (16 obras) · Computer Science (15 obras) · Economics (12 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (9 obras) · Social Psychology (9 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (8 obras)