Ellery Eells
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 965233 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Ellery Eells |
| PRENOMES | Ellery |
| SOBRENOME | Eells |
| ASSINATURA | EELLS E |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Wisconsin–Madison |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 24 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 52 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 24 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1981 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2016 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Rational Decision and Causality
First published in 1982, Ellery Eells' original work on rational decision making had extensive implications for probability theorists, economists, statisticians and psychologists concerned with decision making and the employment of Bayesian principles. His analysis of the philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theories, causal decision theories and Newcomb's paradox continues to be influential in philosophy of science. …
Rational Decision and Causality
Propensity Trajectories, Preemption, and The Identity of Events
Probability and Conditionals
List of contributors Introduction 1. Some questions about Adams' conditionals Patrick Suppes 2. Adams conditionals Brian Skyrms 3. Letter to Brian Skyrms Robert Stalnaker 4. Conditionals as random variables Robert Stalnaker and Richard Jeffrey 5. From Adams' conditionals to default expressions, causal conditionals, and counterfactuals Judea Pearl 6. The hypothesis of the conditional construal of conditional probability Alan Hajek and Ned Hall 7. …
Causal Decision Theory
After a brief presentation of evidential decision theory, causal decision theory, and Newcomb type prima facie counterexamples to the evidential theory, three kinds of defenses of the evidential theory are discussed. Each has its weaknesses, but one of them seems stronger than the other two. The weaknesses of the best of the three, and the intricacy of metatickle analysis, does not constitute an advantage of causal decision theory over the eviden…
Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract
Cartwright on Probabilistic Causality
I think Nancy Cartwright has written an interesting, informative, and penetrating book that defines a promising combination of realism and empiricism in the philosophy of science. It combines philosophical depth with a commitment to applications to and lessons from actual science. As the reader no doubt already knows, the main theses are that (1) science needs to appeal to unobservable causal connections (or to capacities), and hence that (2) the…
Bayesian Epistemology
Probabilistic Causality
Probabilistic Causality
In this important book, Ellery Eells explores and refines philosophical conceptions of probabilistic causality. In a probabilistic theory of causation, causes increase the probability of their effects rather than necessitate their effects in the ways traditional deterministic theories have specified. Philosophical interest in this subject arises from attempts to understand population sciences as well as indeterminism in physics. Taking into accou…
Probability and Rationality
Choices
The Popcorn Problem
The Dialogue of Reason
Analytical philosophy now embraces a much greater variety of topic and divergence of opinion than it once did. What presuppositions of relevance are implicit in its dialogue, what patterns of reasoning does it rely on, and why is consensus so hard to achieve? The author seeks to resolve these questions in an original and constructive way that also illuminates several important issues of philosophical substance, such as the question of whether the…
Pragmatics and Empiricism
On the Alleged Impossibility of Inductive Probability
Cartwright and Otte on Simpson's Paradox
Richard Otte (1985) has recently criticized the resolution of Simpson's paradox given by Nancy Cartwright (1979). He argues that there are difficulties with the version of the theory of probabilistic causality that Cartwright has developed, and that there is a way in which Simpson's paradox can arise that Cartwright's theory cannot handle. And Otte develops his own theory of probabilistic causality. I defend Cartwright's solution, and I argue tha…
Probabilistic Causality
John Dupré (1984) has recently criticized the theory of probabilistic causality developed by, among others, Good (1961–62), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980). He argues that there is a tension or incompatibility between one of its central requirements for the presence of a causal connection, on the one hand, and a feature of the theory pointed out by Elliott Sober and me (1983), on the other. He also argues that the requirement …
Probability, Objectivity and Evidence
Probabilistic Causal Interaction
It is possible for a causal factor to raise the probability of a second factor in some situations while lowering the probability of the second factor in other situations. Must a genuine cause always raise the probability of a genuine effect of it? When it does not always do so, an “interaction“ with some third factor may be the reason. I discuss causal interaction from the perspectives of Giere's counterfactual characterization of probabilistic c…
Common Causes and Decision Theory
One of us (Eells 1982) has defended traditional evidential decision theory against prima facie Newcomb counterexamples by assuming that a common cause forms a conjunctive fork with its joint effects. In this paper, the evidential theory is defended without this assumption. The suggested rationale shows that the theory's assumptions are not about the nature of causality, but about the nature of rational deliberation. These presuppositions are weak…
Objective probability theory theory
Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity
After clarifying the probabilistic conception of causality suggested by Good (1961–2), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980), we prove a sufficient condition for transitivity of causal chains. The bearing of these considerations on the units of selection problem in evolutionary theory and on the Newcomb paradox in decision theory is then discussed
Causality, utility, and decision
Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity
After clarifying the probabilistic conception of causality suggested by Good (1961–2), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980), we prove a sufficient condition for transitivity of causal chains. The bearing of these considerations on the units of selection problem in evolutionary theory and on the Newcomb paradox in decision theory is then discussed
Causality, utility, and decision
Probabilistic Causality
John Dupré (1984) has recently criticized the theory of probabilistic causality developed by, among others, Good (1961–62), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980). He argues that there is a tension or incompatibility between one of its central requirements for the presence of a causal connection, on the one hand, and a feature of the theory pointed out by Elliott Sober and me (1983), on the other. He also argues that the requirement …
Probabilistic Causal Interaction
It is possible for a causal factor to raise the probability of a second factor in some situations while lowering the probability of the second factor in other situations. Must a genuine cause always raise the probability of a genuine effect of it? When it does not always do so, an “interaction“ with some third factor may be the reason. I discuss causal interaction from the perspectives of Giere's counterfactual characterization of probabilistic c…
Common Causes and Decision Theory
One of us (Eells 1982) has defended traditional evidential decision theory against prima facie Newcomb counterexamples by assuming that a common cause forms a conjunctive fork with its joint effects. In this paper, the evidential theory is defended without this assumption. The suggested rationale shows that the theory's assumptions are not about the nature of causality, but about the nature of rational deliberation. These presuppositions are weak…
The Popcorn Problem
On the Alleged Impossibility of Inductive Probability
Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract
Objective probability theory theory
Causality, utility, and decision
Objective probability theory theory
Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity
After clarifying the probabilistic conception of causality suggested by Good (1961–2), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980), we prove a sufficient condition for transitivity of causal chains. The bearing of these considerations on the units of selection problem in evolutionary theory and on the Newcomb paradox in decision theory is then discussed
Probabilistic Causal Interaction
It is possible for a causal factor to raise the probability of a second factor in some situations while lowering the probability of the second factor in other situations. Must a genuine cause always raise the probability of a genuine effect of it? When it does not always do so, an “interaction“ with some third factor may be the reason. I discuss causal interaction from the perspectives of Giere's counterfactual characterization of probabilistic c…
Common Causes and Decision Theory
One of us (Eells 1982) has defended traditional evidential decision theory against prima facie Newcomb counterexamples by assuming that a common cause forms a conjunctive fork with its joint effects. In this paper, the evidential theory is defended without this assumption. The suggested rationale shows that the theory's assumptions are not about the nature of causality, but about the nature of rational deliberation. These presuppositions are weak…
Cartwright and Otte on Simpson's Paradox
Richard Otte (1985) has recently criticized the resolution of Simpson's paradox given by Nancy Cartwright (1979). He argues that there are difficulties with the version of the theory of probabilistic causality that Cartwright has developed, and that there is a way in which Simpson's paradox can arise that Cartwright's theory cannot handle. And Otte develops his own theory of probabilistic causality. I defend Cartwright's solution, and I argue tha…
Probabilistic Causality
John Dupré (1984) has recently criticized the theory of probabilistic causality developed by, among others, Good (1961–62), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980). He argues that there is a tension or incompatibility between one of its central requirements for the presence of a causal connection, on the one hand, and a feature of the theory pointed out by Elliott Sober and me (1983), on the other. He also argues that the requirement …
Probability, Objectivity and Evidence
Pragmatics and Empiricism
On the Alleged Impossibility of Inductive Probability
The Popcorn Problem
The Dialogue of Reason
Analytical philosophy now embraces a much greater variety of topic and divergence of opinion than it once did. What presuppositions of relevance are implicit in its dialogue, what patterns of reasoning does it rely on, and why is consensus so hard to achieve? The author seeks to resolve these questions in an original and constructive way that also illuminates several important issues of philosophical substance, such as the question of whether the…
Choices
Probabilistic Causality
In this important book, Ellery Eells explores and refines philosophical conceptions of probabilistic causality. In a probabilistic theory of causation, causes increase the probability of their effects rather than necessitate their effects in the ways traditional deterministic theories have specified. Philosophical interest in this subject arises from attempts to understand population sciences as well as indeterminism in physics. Taking into accou…
Probability and Rationality
Probabilistic Causality
Bayesian Epistemology
Cartwright on Probabilistic Causality
I think Nancy Cartwright has written an interesting, informative, and penetrating book that defines a promising combination of realism and empiricism in the philosophy of science. It combines philosophical depth with a commitment to applications to and lessons from actual science. As the reader no doubt already knows, the main theses are that (1) science needs to appeal to unobservable causal connections (or to capacities), and hence that (2) the…
Causal Decision Theory
After a brief presentation of evidential decision theory, causal decision theory, and Newcomb type prima facie counterexamples to the evidential theory, three kinds of defenses of the evidential theory are discussed. Each has its weaknesses, but one of them seems stronger than the other two. The weaknesses of the best of the three, and the intricacy of metatickle analysis, does not constitute an advantage of causal decision theory over the eviden…
Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract
Probability and Conditionals
List of contributors Introduction 1. Some questions about Adams' conditionals Patrick Suppes 2. Adams conditionals Brian Skyrms 3. Letter to Brian Skyrms Robert Stalnaker 4. Conditionals as random variables Robert Stalnaker and Richard Jeffrey 5. From Adams' conditionals to default expressions, causal conditionals, and counterfactuals Judea Pearl 6. The hypothesis of the conditional construal of conditional probability Alan Hajek and Ned Hall 7. …
Propensity Trajectories, Preemption, and The Identity of Events
Rational Decision and Causality
First published in 1982, Ellery Eells' original work on rational decision making had extensive implications for probability theorists, economists, statisticians and psychologists concerned with decision making and the employment of Bayesian principles. His analysis of the philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theories, causal decision theories and Newcomb's paradox continues to be influential in philosophy of science. …
Rational Decision and Causality
Epistemology (21 obras) · Philosophy (21 obras) · Computer Science (15 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (15 obras) · Mathematical economics (11 obras) · Mathematics (10 obras) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (8 obras) · Causality (physics) (8 obras) · Probabilistic logic (8 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras)