Sydney Shoemaker
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 969708 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Sydney Shoemaker |
| PRENOMES | Sydney |
| SOBRENOME | Shoemaker |
| ASSINATURA | SHOEMAKER S |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Cornell University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 54 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 99 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 54 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1960 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2016 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
Self-Knowledge for Humans
The phrase “for humans” in Quassim Cassam's title signals a central concern of the book. We are, he emphasizes, Homo sapiens, not members of the fictitious tribe Homo philosophicus that figures in much of the recent philosophical literature on self-knowledge, namely, in the work of those he calls “Rationalists.” Rationalism embraces the “Transparency Method” (TM) to account for our knowledge of our propositional attitudes. He quotes a well-known …
The Evident Connexion
Book Review| April 01 2013 The Evident Connexion Strawson, Galen, The Evident Connexion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. xii + 165 pp. Sydney Shoemaker Sydney Shoemaker Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 314–317. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1963752 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Sydney Shoemaker; The Evident Connexion. The Philos…
Realization, Powers, and Property Identity
Journal Article Realization, Powers, and Property Identity Get access Sydney Shoemaker Sydney Shoemaker Cornell University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 January 2011, Pages 3–18, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist20119411 Published: 26 November 2014
On What we are
This article evaluates whether personal identity should be sought only in the biological or embodied existence of the person or exclusively in psychological existence. It suggests that whatever the answer turns out to be, it would involve causality. It argues against the animalist view of personal identity and defends the classical neo-Lockean view by arguing that the thick properties of person are psychological or mental ones. The author's answe…
Careers and Quareers
Tyler Burge argues on the basis of an account of memory that the notion of quasimemory cannot be used to answer the circularity objection to psychological accounts of personal identity. His account implies the impossibility of the “Parfit people,” creatures psychologically like us who undergo amoeba-like fission at the age of twenty-one, with only one offshoot allowed to survive, and who have “quareers,” made up of the career of the original pers…
Self-Knowing Agents - Lucy O'Brien
Persons, animals, and identity
Physical Realization
"In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysic…
Identity & identities
Self-reference and self-awareness
If we consider the logical powers of first-person statements and the role played by the first-person pronoun in communication, nothing seems clearer than that in all first-person statements, including “avowals,” the word ‘I’ functions as a singular term or singular referring expression. Statements expressed by the sentence “I feel pain” have it in common with those expressed by sentences like “He feels pain” and “Jones feels pain” that they contr…
Identity, cause, and mind
Realization, Micro‐Realization, and Coincidence
Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick…
Persons and their pasts
Persons have, in memory, a special access to facts about their own past histories and their own identities, a kind of access they do not have to the histories and identities of other persons and other things. John Locke thought this special access important enough to warrant a special mention in his definition of “person,” viz., “a thinking, intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking …
Physicalism and its Discontents
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…
Self-Concern
Phenomenal Character Revisited
I am grateful to Michael Tye for his discussion of my book, and to the editor for offering me the opportunity to respond to Tye's criticisms of my account of the character of perceptual experience-especially since this prompted reflections that led me to see a way of removing one unattractive feature of the account. The view Tye criticizes in his review is the view I think one must hold if one thinks that the following is a possible case: (1) und…
On David Chalmers's the Conscious Mind
Reply to Cynthia Macdonald
If there were not similarities between introspection and perception, it would be unaccountable that it should have occurred to anyone to former on latter. While I have opposed such modeling, I certainly have never denied that there are such similarities. And contrary to what Cynthia Macdonald supposes, I have no quarrel with her claim that introspective awareness in what she calls cases resembles perceptual observation with respect to epistemic d…
Causal and Metaphysical Necessity
Any property has two sorts of causal features: “forward‐looking” ones, having to do with what its instantiation can contribute to causing, and ldquo;backward‐looking” ones, having to do with how its instantiation can be caused. Such features of a property are essential to it, and properties sharing all of their causal features are identical. Causal necessity is thus a special case of metaphysical necessity. Appeals to imaginability have no more f…
Two Cheers for Representationalism
The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-r…
On knowing one's own mind
One of the views associated with Descartes is that it is of the essence of mind that each mind has a special, privileged access to its own contents. Recently, I think, this view has been very much out of favor. Those who have rejected it have not, in general, denied that there is something that might be called a "special access" to one's own mental states. Usually they have not denied that normally a person knows of his own beliefs, desires, sens…
Self-knowledge and “inner sense.” Lecture II
Let me begin by presenting two opposed conceptions of the relationship between the realm of the mental and our knowledge of this realm, neither of which is the conception I shall be supporting.
"Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense
"Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense
"Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense
Qualities and Qualia
Since the I7th century, a central issue in metaphysics and epistemology has concerned the status of what, following John Locke, have come to be called secondary qualities: colors, odors, tastes, sounds, warmth and coldness, etc. The problem is posed by the fact that while these qualities are experienced as belonging to objects in our external environment the apple is experienced as red, the rose as fragrant, the lemon as sour, etc. the scientific…
On Knowing One's Own Mind
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ One of the views associated with Descartes is that it is of the essence of mind that each mind has a special, privileged to its own contents. Recently, I think, this view has been very much out of favor. Those who have rejected it have not, in general, denied that there is something that might be called a special access to one's own mental states. Usually they have not denied that normally a person knows of his own beliefs, de…
"Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense
Realization, Micro‐Realization, and Coincidence
Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick…
Persons, animals, and identity
Persons and their pasts
Persons have, in memory, a special access to facts about their own past histories and their own identities, a kind of access they do not have to the histories and identities of other persons and other things. John Locke thought this special access important enough to warrant a special mention in his definition of “person,” viz., “a thinking, intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking …
On David Chalmers's the Conscious Mind
Phenomenal Character Revisited
I am grateful to Michael Tye for his discussion of my book, and to the editor for offering me the opportunity to respond to Tye's criticisms of my account of the character of perceptual experience-especially since this prompted reflections that led me to see a way of removing one unattractive feature of the account. The view Tye criticizes in his review is the view I think one must hold if one thinks that the following is a possible case: (1) und…
"Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense
Wiggins on Identity
PROFESSOR WIGGINS' book is an impressive and stimulating study of the subject of identity.' It is also an exasperating book to read. The writing is compressed and allusive, often to the point of obscurity. Many of the arguments are extremely sketchy, containing crucial and unobvious inferences for which no justification is given, and some of them are presented in a way that is confusing, if not confused. And the book does not seem to have been de…
Unger's Psychological Continuity Theory
Peter Unger says he favors the to the topic of personal identity, and opposes the approach. This is curious, for the account he offers is straightforwardly a version of the psychological account of personal identity. What marks off his account from other versions of the psychological account is he thinks what constitutes personal identity is with respect to psychology, i.e., basic psychological capacities, whereas other accounts stress with respe…
First-Person Access
On What we are
This article evaluates whether personal identity should be sought only in the biological or embodied existence of the person or exclusively in psychological existence. It suggests that whatever the answer turns out to be, it would involve causality. It argues against the animalist view of personal identity and defends the classical neo-Lockean view by arguing that the thick properties of person are psychological or mental ones. The author's answe…
Identity & identities
Lovely and Suspect Ideas
is so much that is brilliant, delightful, and right in Dennett's book that it is tempting try explain away, or sweep under the rug, the things that seem wrong. I was aware of one long standing disagreement between him and me, namely over the existence of But I had hoped that this was an isolated case. And, indeed, the book a whole presents a vision of mind and its place in nature (to steal C. D. Broad's phrase) that me admirable and basically rig…
On Projecting the Unprojectible
Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity
The Unconscious
Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy
Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity
Ziff's Other Minds
Analytical Philosophy
Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity
Book Reviews Get access Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. By Sydney Shoemaker. (Ithaca : Cornell U.P. ; London : O.U.P. 1963. Pp. xii + 264. Price 38s). P. F. Strawson P. F. Strawson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 15, Issue 58, January 1965, Pages 78–79, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218638 Published: 01 January 1965
The Embodied Mind
Analytical Philosophy
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Analytical Philosophy : Second Series. Edited by R. J. Butler. (Oxford : Basil Blackwell. 1965. Pp. vii + 193. Price 25s). Sydney Shoemaker Sydney Shoemaker Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 17, Issue 67, April 1967, Pages 176–179, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217984 Published: 01 April 1967
Self-Reference and Self-Awareness
Material Objects
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Material Objects. By W. D. Joske. (London : Macmillan; New York : St. Martins Press. 1967. Pp. viii + 187. Price 30s). Sydney Shoemaker Sydney Shoemaker Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 18, Issue 73, October 1968, Pages 370–372, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217809 Published: 01 October 1968
The Philosophy of Mind
Wiggins on Identity
PROFESSOR WIGGINS' book is an impressive and stimulating study of the subject of identity.' It is also an exasperating book to read. The writing is compressed and allusive, often to the point of obscurity. Many of the arguments are extremely sketchy, containing crucial and unobvious inferences for which no justification is given, and some of them are presented in a way that is confusing, if not confused. And the book does not seem to have been de…
Semejanza fenoménica
On Projecting the Unprojectible
V Embodiment and Behavior
Causality and Properties
Absent Qualia are Impossible--A Reply to Block
Personal identity
Personal Identity
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Personal Identity. By Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. Pp. 158. Price £15, Pb. £5.50) Geoffrey Madell Geoffrey Madell University of Edinburgh Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 35, Issue 139, April 1985, Pages 214–217, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219353 Published: 01 April 1985
Personal Identity
Personal Identity (Great Debates in Philosophy)
On Knowing One's Own Mind
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ One of the views associated with Descartes is that it is of the essence of mind that each mind has a special, privileged to its own contents. Recently, I think, this view has been very much out of favor. Those who have rejected it have not, in general, denied that there is something that might be called a special access to one's own mental states. Usually they have not denied that normally a person knows of his own beliefs, de…
Identity, Cause, and Mind
Since the appearance of a widely influential book, Self-Knowledge and Self-ldentity, Sydney Shoemaker has continued to work on a series of interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This volume contains a collection of the most important essays he has published since then. The topics that he deals with here include, among others, the nature of personal and other forms of identity, the relation of time to change, the nature of …
First-Person Access
Causation
Philosophy (47 obras) · Epistemology (38 obras) · Psychology (29 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (19 obras) · Philosophy (17 obras) · Aesthetics (16 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (14 obras) · Analytic philosophy (12 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (12 obras) · General interest (10 obras)