Patrick Tomlin
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 971141 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Patrick Tomlin |
| PRENOMES | Patrick |
| SOBRENOME | Tomlin |
| ASSINATURA | TOMLIN P |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Reading |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6258-2988 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 19 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 44 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2008 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Accidentally Killing on Purpose Again
Many philosophers believe that intentions are relevant to the justification of harm—they believe that intentional harms, or harms that result from intentionally affecting or using another person, are harder to justify than harms that are merely foreseen. How does this idea work in cases in which we are uncertain about what will happen—for example, about who will be harmed, in what way they will be harmed, or how much they will be harmed? All pote…
What Does the Best Available Parent View Require
Who gets to parent whom? Anca Gheaus claims that each child should be parented by the “best available parent” and that parental interests should play no role in assigning parental authority. I investigate this view. I find that it does not clearly rule out parental interests and is underspecified. Various further specifications do not seem to be about giving children the best available parent, but rather concern familiar distributive principles t…
Consenting Under Coercion
How is the validity of our consent, and others’ moral permission to act on our consent affected by coercion? Everyone agrees that in cases of two-party coercion—when X coerces Y to do something with or for X—the consent of the coerced is invalid, and the coercer is not permitted to act upon the consent they receive. But coercers and the recipients of consent are not always identical. Sometimes a victim, Y, agrees to do something to, with, or for …
Accidentally Killing on Purpose
Transferred malice, or transferred intent, is the criminal doctrine that states that if D tries to kill A, and accidentally kills B, the intent to kill transfers from A to B, and so D is guilty of murdering B. This is widely viewed as a useful legal fiction. One of the finest essays on this topic was written by our honorand, Douglas N. Husak. Husak views both the potential usefulness of, and his preferred alternative to, transferred malice throug…
Distributive Justice for Aggressors
The individualist nature of much contemporary just war theory means that we often discuss cases with single attackers. But even if war is best understood in this individualist way, in war combatants often have to make decisions about how to distribute harms among a plurality of aggressors: they must decide whom and how many to harm, and how much to harm them. In this paper, I look at simultaneous multiple aggressor cases in which more than one di…
Proportionality in War
In this article I argue that revisionists in just war theory must further revise their proportionality principles. I show that on the revisionist view it is possible for a war to be proportionate, even though all the acts of war are disproportionate, and it is possible for a war to be disproportionate, even though all the acts of war are proportionate. I then argue that consideration of these cases shows the revisionist view, as it stands, to be …
Issues in Political Theory
Issues in Political Theory provides an introduction to political theory and how it is applied to address the most important issues confronting the world today. It has a focus on real-world issues and includes case studies. The text examines important and influential areas of political theory. The text includes chapters on liberty, global poverty, sovereignty and borders, and the environment provide readers with fresh insight on important debates …
On Limited Aggregation
Consider the following pair of cases: \n \nCase 1. You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 1, from paralysis. \n \nCase 2.You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 2, from a mild headache. \n \nOn one view, let’s call it Pure Aggregation, in both cases we have to see how large N is before deciding what to do. If N 1 gets large enough, we should save the people from paralysis. And if N 2 …
Saplings or Caterpillars? Trying to Understand Children's Wellbeing
Is childhood valuable? And is childhood as, less, or more, valuable than adulthood? In this article I first delineate several different questions that we might be asking when we think about the ‘value of childhood’, and I explore some difficulties of doing so. I then focus on the question of whether childhood is good for the person who experiences it. I argue for two key claims. First, if childhood wellbeing is measured by the same standards as a…
Should Retributivists Prefer Prepunishment
Some philosophers believe that we can, in theory, justifiably prepunish people—that is, punish them for a crime before they have committed that crime. In particular, it has been claimed that retributivists ought (in principle) to accept prepunishment. The question of whether prepunishment can be justified has sparked an interesting and growing philosophical debate. In this paper I look at a slightly different question: whether retributivists who …
The Geometry of Desert
Desert claims are common enough in our moral and political discourse. But do people really deserve things? If so, what do they deserve, and in virtue of what? Is desert part of the right or the good, a primarily normative or evaluative concept? How strong a consideration is desert in determining who should have what? Should our political institutions (which to a large extent determine who gets what) pay any attention to desert?Before I read this …
Should Kids Pay Their Own Way
Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised in such a way that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that th…
What is the point of egalitarian social relationships?
The subject matter of this essay is a certain understanding of the value of equality which I will call ‘relational egalitarianism’ – a view which locates the value of equality not in distributions but in social and political relationships. This is a suitable topic for a contribution to a volume based on themes from the work of G.A. Cohen for (at least) two, somewhat contradictory, reasons.
Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage
G. A. Cohen was one of the world's leading political theorists. He was noted, in particular, for his contributions to the literature of egalitarian justice. Cohen's classic writings offer one of the most influential responses to the currency of the egalitarian justice question – the question, that is, of whether egalitarians should seek to equalize welfare, resources, opportunity, or some other indicator of well-being. Underlying Cohen's argument…
Extending the Golden Thread? Criminalisation and the Presumption of Innocence
It seems to be widely accepted that the presumption of innocence, and the attendant standard of 'beyond reasonable doubt' properly apply in the courtroom as a procedural principle directly grounded in the moral imperative to avoid punishing those who should not be punished. In this article I argue that if this is correct, then we ought be as careful about what we criminalise, as we are about who we punish, since people can be wrongfully punished …
On Fairness and Claims
Perhaps the best-known theory of fairness is John Broome's: that fairness is the proportional satisfaction of claims. In this article, I question whether claims are the appropriate focus for a theory of fairness, at least as Broome understands them in his current theory. If fairness is the proportionate satisfaction of claims, I argue, then the following would be true: fairness could not help determine the correct distribution of claims; fairness…
Should We be Utopophobes about Democracy in Particular
In his book Democratic Authority, David Estlund puts forward a case for democracy, which he labels epistemic proceduralism, that relies on democracy's ability to produce good – that is, substantively just – results. Alongside this case for democracy Estlund attacks what he labels ‘utopophobia’, an aversion to idealistic political theory. In this article I make two points. The first is a general point about what the correct level of ‘idealisation’…
Survey Article
G.A. Cohen's Rescuing Justice and Equality is the culmination of twenty years' work on Rawls's theory of justice. In this paper I distinguish three prongs of attack advanced by Cohen, and show how two of the prongs (the claim that egalitarianism includes productive demands and the claim that equality is best understood as 'luck egalitarianism') are incompatible
Envy, Facts and Justice
On Limited Aggregation
Consider the following pair of cases: \n \nCase 1. You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 1, from paralysis. \n \nCase 2.You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 2, from a mild headache. \n \nOn one view, let’s call it Pure Aggregation, in both cases we have to see how large N is before deciding what to do. If N 1 gets large enough, we should save the people from paralysis. And if N 2 …
Saplings or Caterpillars? Trying to Understand Children's Wellbeing
Is childhood valuable? And is childhood as, less, or more, valuable than adulthood? In this article I first delineate several different questions that we might be asking when we think about the ‘value of childhood’, and I explore some difficulties of doing so. I then focus on the question of whether childhood is good for the person who experiences it. I argue for two key claims. First, if childhood wellbeing is measured by the same standards as a…
Extending the Golden Thread? Criminalisation and the Presumption of Innocence
It seems to be widely accepted that the presumption of innocence, and the attendant standard of 'beyond reasonable doubt' properly apply in the courtroom as a procedural principle directly grounded in the moral imperative to avoid punishing those who should not be punished. In this article I argue that if this is correct, then we ought be as careful about what we criminalise, as we are about who we punish, since people can be wrongfully punished …
On Fairness and Claims
Perhaps the best-known theory of fairness is John Broome's: that fairness is the proportional satisfaction of claims. In this article, I question whether claims are the appropriate focus for a theory of fairness, at least as Broome understands them in his current theory. If fairness is the proportionate satisfaction of claims, I argue, then the following would be true: fairness could not help determine the correct distribution of claims; fairness…
Should We be Utopophobes about Democracy in Particular
In his book Democratic Authority, David Estlund puts forward a case for democracy, which he labels epistemic proceduralism, that relies on democracy's ability to produce good – that is, substantively just – results. Alongside this case for democracy Estlund attacks what he labels ‘utopophobia’, an aversion to idealistic political theory. In this article I make two points. The first is a general point about what the correct level of ‘idealisation’…
Survey Article
G.A. Cohen's Rescuing Justice and Equality is the culmination of twenty years' work on Rawls's theory of justice. In this paper I distinguish three prongs of attack advanced by Cohen, and show how two of the prongs (the claim that egalitarianism includes productive demands and the claim that equality is best understood as 'luck egalitarianism') are incompatible
Should Kids Pay Their Own Way
Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised in such a way that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that th…
Envy, Facts and Justice
Envy, Facts and Justice
Survey Article
G.A. Cohen's Rescuing Justice and Equality is the culmination of twenty years' work on Rawls's theory of justice. In this paper I distinguish three prongs of attack advanced by Cohen, and show how two of the prongs (the claim that egalitarianism includes productive demands and the claim that equality is best understood as 'luck egalitarianism') are incompatible
Extending the Golden Thread? Criminalisation and the Presumption of Innocence
It seems to be widely accepted that the presumption of innocence, and the attendant standard of 'beyond reasonable doubt' properly apply in the courtroom as a procedural principle directly grounded in the moral imperative to avoid punishing those who should not be punished. In this article I argue that if this is correct, then we ought be as careful about what we criminalise, as we are about who we punish, since people can be wrongfully punished …
On Fairness and Claims
Perhaps the best-known theory of fairness is John Broome's: that fairness is the proportional satisfaction of claims. In this article, I question whether claims are the appropriate focus for a theory of fairness, at least as Broome understands them in his current theory. If fairness is the proportionate satisfaction of claims, I argue, then the following would be true: fairness could not help determine the correct distribution of claims; fairness…
Should We be Utopophobes about Democracy in Particular
In his book Democratic Authority, David Estlund puts forward a case for democracy, which he labels epistemic proceduralism, that relies on democracy's ability to produce good – that is, substantively just – results. Alongside this case for democracy Estlund attacks what he labels ‘utopophobia’, an aversion to idealistic political theory. In this article I make two points. The first is a general point about what the correct level of ‘idealisation’…
What is the point of egalitarian social relationships?
The subject matter of this essay is a certain understanding of the value of equality which I will call ‘relational egalitarianism’ – a view which locates the value of equality not in distributions but in social and political relationships. This is a suitable topic for a contribution to a volume based on themes from the work of G.A. Cohen for (at least) two, somewhat contradictory, reasons.
Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage
G. A. Cohen was one of the world's leading political theorists. He was noted, in particular, for his contributions to the literature of egalitarian justice. Cohen's classic writings offer one of the most influential responses to the currency of the egalitarian justice question – the question, that is, of whether egalitarians should seek to equalize welfare, resources, opportunity, or some other indicator of well-being. Underlying Cohen's argument…
Should Retributivists Prefer Prepunishment
Some philosophers believe that we can, in theory, justifiably prepunish people—that is, punish them for a crime before they have committed that crime. In particular, it has been claimed that retributivists ought (in principle) to accept prepunishment. The question of whether prepunishment can be justified has sparked an interesting and growing philosophical debate. In this paper I look at a slightly different question: whether retributivists who …
The Geometry of Desert
Desert claims are common enough in our moral and political discourse. But do people really deserve things? If so, what do they deserve, and in virtue of what? Is desert part of the right or the good, a primarily normative or evaluative concept? How strong a consideration is desert in determining who should have what? Should our political institutions (which to a large extent determine who gets what) pay any attention to desert?Before I read this …
Should Kids Pay Their Own Way
Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised in such a way that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that th…
Saplings or Caterpillars? Trying to Understand Children's Wellbeing
Is childhood valuable? And is childhood as, less, or more, valuable than adulthood? In this article I first delineate several different questions that we might be asking when we think about the ‘value of childhood’, and I explore some difficulties of doing so. I then focus on the question of whether childhood is good for the person who experiences it. I argue for two key claims. First, if childhood wellbeing is measured by the same standards as a…
On Limited Aggregation
Consider the following pair of cases: \n \nCase 1. You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 1, from paralysis. \n \nCase 2.You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 2, from a mild headache. \n \nOn one view, let’s call it Pure Aggregation, in both cases we have to see how large N is before deciding what to do. If N 1 gets large enough, we should save the people from paralysis. And if N 2 …
Issues in Political Theory
Issues in Political Theory provides an introduction to political theory and how it is applied to address the most important issues confronting the world today. It has a focus on real-world issues and includes case studies. The text examines important and influential areas of political theory. The text includes chapters on liberty, global poverty, sovereignty and borders, and the environment provide readers with fresh insight on important debates …
Distributive Justice for Aggressors
The individualist nature of much contemporary just war theory means that we often discuss cases with single attackers. But even if war is best understood in this individualist way, in war combatants often have to make decisions about how to distribute harms among a plurality of aggressors: they must decide whom and how many to harm, and how much to harm them. In this paper, I look at simultaneous multiple aggressor cases in which more than one di…
Proportionality in War
In this article I argue that revisionists in just war theory must further revise their proportionality principles. I show that on the revisionist view it is possible for a war to be proportionate, even though all the acts of war are disproportionate, and it is possible for a war to be disproportionate, even though all the acts of war are proportionate. I then argue that consideration of these cases shows the revisionist view, as it stands, to be …
Accidentally Killing on Purpose
Transferred malice, or transferred intent, is the criminal doctrine that states that if D tries to kill A, and accidentally kills B, the intent to kill transfers from A to B, and so D is guilty of murdering B. This is widely viewed as a useful legal fiction. One of the finest essays on this topic was written by our honorand, Douglas N. Husak. Husak views both the potential usefulness of, and his preferred alternative to, transferred malice throug…
What Does the Best Available Parent View Require
Who gets to parent whom? Anca Gheaus claims that each child should be parented by the “best available parent” and that parental interests should play no role in assigning parental authority. I investigate this view. I find that it does not clearly rule out parental interests and is underspecified. Various further specifications do not seem to be about giving children the best available parent, but rather concern familiar distributive principles t…
Consenting Under Coercion
How is the validity of our consent, and others’ moral permission to act on our consent affected by coercion? Everyone agrees that in cases of two-party coercion—when X coerces Y to do something with or for X—the consent of the coerced is invalid, and the coercer is not permitted to act upon the consent they receive. But coercers and the recipients of consent are not always identical. Sometimes a victim, Y, agrees to do something to, with, or for …
Accidentally Killing on Purpose Again
Many philosophers believe that intentions are relevant to the justification of harm—they believe that intentional harms, or harms that result from intentionally affecting or using another person, are harder to justify than harms that are merely foreseen. How does this idea work in cases in which we are uncertain about what will happen—for example, about who will be harmed, in what way they will be harmed, or how much they will be harmed? All pote…
Sociology (15 obras) · Law (13 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (13 obras) · Political science (13 obras) · Philosophy (10 obras) · Politics (9 obras) · Economics (8 obras) · Law and economics (8 obras) · Epistemology (7 obras) · Free Will and Agency (7 obras)