Miriam Schoenfield
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 977029 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Miriam Schoenfield |
| PRENOMES | Miriam |
| SOBRENOME | Schoenfield |
| ASSINATURA | SCHOENFIELD M |
| AFILIAÇÕES | The University of Texas at Austin |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 61 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2014 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Why I Am Not a Boltzmann Brain
This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications
Dilating and contracting arbitrarily
Standard accuracy‐based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy‐based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise…
Accuracy and Verisimilitude
It seems like we care about at least two features of our credence function: gradational-accuracy (high credences in truths, low credences in falsehoods) and verisimilitude (investing higher credence in worlds that are more similar to the actual world). Accuracy-first epistemology requires that we care about one feature of our credence function: gradational-accuracy. So if you want to be a verisimilitude-valuing accuracy-firster, you must be able …
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality
In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational …
An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence
The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy based approach to epistemology to the case of higher order evidence: evidence that bears on the rationality of one's beliefs. I proceed in two stages. First, I show that the accuracy based framework that is standardly used to motivate rational requirements supports steadfastness —a position according to which higher order evidence should have no impact on one's doxastic attitudes towards first order …
Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness
The aim of this essay is to argue that, if a robust form of moral realism is true, then moral vagueness is ontic vagueness. The argument is by elimination: I show that neither semantic nor epistemic approaches to moral vagueness are satisfactory
Decision Making in the Face of Parity
This paper defends a constraint that any satisfactory decision theory must satisfy.I show how this constraint is violated by all of the decision theories that have been endorsed in the literature that are designed to deal with cases in which opinions or values are represented by a set of functions rather than a single one.Such a decision theory is necessary to account for the existence of what Ruth Chang has called "parity" (as well as for cases …
A Dilemma for Calibrationism
The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism : a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: Th…
An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence
The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy based approach to epistemology to the case of higher order evidence: evidence that bears on the rationality of one's beliefs. I proceed in two stages. First, I show that the accuracy based framework that is standardly used to motivate rational requirements supports steadfastness —a position according to which higher order evidence should have no impact on one's doxastic attitudes towards first order …
Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness
The aim of this essay is to argue that, if a robust form of moral realism is true, then moral vagueness is ontic vagueness. The argument is by elimination: I show that neither semantic nor epistemic approaches to moral vagueness are satisfactory
Decision Making in the Face of Parity
This paper defends a constraint that any satisfactory decision theory must satisfy.I show how this constraint is violated by all of the decision theories that have been endorsed in the literature that are designed to deal with cases in which opinions or values are represented by a set of functions rather than a single one.Such a decision theory is necessary to account for the existence of what Ruth Chang has called "parity" (as well as for cases …
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality
In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational …
A Dilemma for Calibrationism
The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism : a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: Th…
Accuracy and Verisimilitude
It seems like we care about at least two features of our credence function: gradational-accuracy (high credences in truths, low credences in falsehoods) and verisimilitude (investing higher credence in worlds that are more similar to the actual world). Accuracy-first epistemology requires that we care about one feature of our credence function: gradational-accuracy. So if you want to be a verisimilitude-valuing accuracy-firster, you must be able …
Decision Making in the Face of Parity
This paper defends a constraint that any satisfactory decision theory must satisfy.I show how this constraint is violated by all of the decision theories that have been endorsed in the literature that are designed to deal with cases in which opinions or values are represented by a set of functions rather than a single one.Such a decision theory is necessary to account for the existence of what Ruth Chang has called "parity" (as well as for cases …
A Dilemma for Calibrationism
The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism : a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: Th…
Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness
The aim of this essay is to argue that, if a robust form of moral realism is true, then moral vagueness is ontic vagueness. The argument is by elimination: I show that neither semantic nor epistemic approaches to moral vagueness are satisfactory
An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence
The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy based approach to epistemology to the case of higher order evidence: evidence that bears on the rationality of one's beliefs. I proceed in two stages. First, I show that the accuracy based framework that is standardly used to motivate rational requirements supports steadfastness —a position according to which higher order evidence should have no impact on one's doxastic attitudes towards first order …
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality
In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational …
Dilating and contracting arbitrarily
Standard accuracy‐based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy‐based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise…
Accuracy and Verisimilitude
It seems like we care about at least two features of our credence function: gradational-accuracy (high credences in truths, low credences in falsehoods) and verisimilitude (investing higher credence in worlds that are more similar to the actual world). Accuracy-first epistemology requires that we care about one feature of our credence function: gradational-accuracy. So if you want to be a verisimilitude-valuing accuracy-firster, you must be able …
Why I Am Not a Boltzmann Brain
This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 obras) · Epistemology (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 obras) · Physics (3 obras)