Eric T Olson
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 978617 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Eric T Olson |
| PRENOMES | Eric T |
| SOBRENOME | Olson |
| ASSINATURA | OLSON E T |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Sheffield |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 17 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 39 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 17 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1995 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Do We Have a Soul
Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics
Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) metaphysics is currently undergoing something of a renaissance. This volume brings together fourteen essays from leading philosophers who are sympathetic to this conception of metaphysics, which takes its cue from the idea that metaphysics is the first philosophy. The primary input from Aristotle is methodological, but many themes familiar from his metaphysics will be discussed, including ontological categories,…
Pourquoi nous sommes des animaux
Que sommes-nous ? En quoi consistons-nous ultimement ? Vaste tâche que de répondre à ces questions. S'il est bien une chose que nous pouvons hasarder à dire à ce sujet, c'est que nous sommes des animaux. Voilà qui paraît difficile à contester. Et pourtant, la plupart des philosophes se refusent à l'admettre. Hier, c'était en raison de leur hostilité à l'encontre du matérialisme. Aujourd'hui, les philosophes matérialistes rejettent ce point de vue…
What Are We?
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possi…
What are we
The Paradox of Increase
The paradox of increase in an ancient argument purporting to show that nothing can grow by acquiring new parts. If it is sound, similar reasoning leads to the more general conclusion that nothing can ever change its parts. After discussing the implications of this principle, the paper lays out the paradox in a way that reveals the premises that figure in it. It emerges that the paradox has no easy solution, and can be resisted only by taking on o…
Consciousness and Persons
Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism says that qualitatively different objects can be made of the same matter at once. Critics claim that we should expect such objects to be qualitatively indistinguishable. E.J. Lowe thinks this complaint is based on the false assumption that differences in the way things are at a time must always be grounded in how things are at that time, and that we can answer it by pointing out that different kinds of coinciding objects are sub…
Was Jekyll Hyde
Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split‐personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split‐personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental uni…
Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem
Journal Article Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem Get access Eric T. Olson Eric T. Olson Churchill College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 51, Issue 204, July 2001, Pages 337–355, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00233 Published: 07 January 2003
The Human Animal
This book argues that our identity over time involves no psychological facts. Psychological accounts of personal identity lead to grave metaphysical problems, and the arguments for them are inconclusive. The book argues that we are animals, and thus have the purely biological identity conditions of animals.
The Human Animal
Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker
In Was I Ever a Fetus? ([5]; see also [4], ch. 4) 1 argued that, since each of us was once an unthinking fetus, psychological continuity cannot be necessary for us to persist from one time to another. Lynne Rudder Baker [1] thinks that the argument is invalid, and that in any case both the premise and the conclusion are false. I will discuss these three charges in order. First the validity of the argument. I take it that everyone will concede tha…
The Human Animal
Was I Ever a Fetus
The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is als…
Why I have no hands
[FIRST PARAGRAPH] Consider the following argument for the claim that there are no hands--or feet \nor ears or any other arbitrary parts of human beings. \n \n \nPremise One: I am the only rational, conscious being--for short, the only person-- \nnow sitting in this chair. \n \n \nTrust me: my chair isn't big enough for two. You may doubt that every rational, \nconscious being is a person; perhaps there are beings that mistakenly believe \nthemsel…
Human people or human animals
The Human Animal
Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem
Journal Article Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem Get access Eric T. Olson Eric T. Olson Churchill College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 51, Issue 204, July 2001, Pages 337–355, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00233 Published: 07 January 2003
Was I Ever a Fetus
The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is als…
Pourquoi nous sommes des animaux
Que sommes-nous ? En quoi consistons-nous ultimement ? Vaste tâche que de répondre à ces questions. S'il est bien une chose que nous pouvons hasarder à dire à ce sujet, c'est que nous sommes des animaux. Voilà qui paraît difficile à contester. Et pourtant, la plupart des philosophes se refusent à l'admettre. Hier, c'était en raison de leur hostilité à l'encontre du matérialisme. Aujourd'hui, les philosophes matérialistes rejettent ce point de vue…
Consciousness and Persons
Was Jekyll Hyde
Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split‐personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split‐personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental uni…
Human people or human animals
Why I have no hands
[FIRST PARAGRAPH] Consider the following argument for the claim that there are no hands--or feet \nor ears or any other arbitrary parts of human beings. \n \n \nPremise One: I am the only rational, conscious being--for short, the only person-- \nnow sitting in this chair. \n \n \nTrust me: my chair isn't big enough for two. You may doubt that every rational, \nconscious being is a person; perhaps there are beings that mistakenly believe \nthemsel…
Human people or human animals
Was I Ever a Fetus
The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is als…
The Human Animal
This book argues that our identity over time involves no psychological facts. Psychological accounts of personal identity lead to grave metaphysical problems, and the arguments for them are inconclusive. The book argues that we are animals, and thus have the purely biological identity conditions of animals.
The Human Animal
Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker
In Was I Ever a Fetus? ([5]; see also [4], ch. 4) 1 argued that, since each of us was once an unthinking fetus, psychological continuity cannot be necessary for us to persist from one time to another. Lynne Rudder Baker [1] thinks that the argument is invalid, and that in any case both the premise and the conclusion are false. I will discuss these three charges in order. First the validity of the argument. I take it that everyone will concede tha…
The Human Animal
Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem
Journal Article Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem Get access Eric T. Olson Eric T. Olson Churchill College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 51, Issue 204, July 2001, Pages 337–355, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00233 Published: 07 January 2003
Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism says that qualitatively different objects can be made of the same matter at once. Critics claim that we should expect such objects to be qualitatively indistinguishable. E.J. Lowe thinks this complaint is based on the false assumption that differences in the way things are at a time must always be grounded in how things are at that time, and that we can answer it by pointing out that different kinds of coinciding objects are sub…
Was Jekyll Hyde
Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split‐personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split‐personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental uni…
The Paradox of Increase
The paradox of increase in an ancient argument purporting to show that nothing can grow by acquiring new parts. If it is sound, similar reasoning leads to the more general conclusion that nothing can ever change its parts. After discussing the implications of this principle, the paper lays out the paradox in a way that reveals the premises that figure in it. It emerges that the paradox has no easy solution, and can be resisted only by taking on o…
Consciousness and Persons
What Are We?
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possi…
What are we
Pourquoi nous sommes des animaux
Que sommes-nous ? En quoi consistons-nous ultimement ? Vaste tâche que de répondre à ces questions. S'il est bien une chose que nous pouvons hasarder à dire à ce sujet, c'est que nous sommes des animaux. Voilà qui paraît difficile à contester. Et pourtant, la plupart des philosophes se refusent à l'admettre. Hier, c'était en raison de leur hostilité à l'encontre du matérialisme. Aujourd'hui, les philosophes matérialistes rejettent ce point de vue…
Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics
Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) metaphysics is currently undergoing something of a renaissance. This volume brings together fourteen essays from leading philosophers who are sympathetic to this conception of metaphysics, which takes its cue from the idea that metaphysics is the first philosophy. The primary input from Aristotle is methodological, but many themes familiar from his metaphysics will be discussed, including ontological categories,…
Do We Have a Soul
Philosophy (13 obras) · Epistemology (10 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Sociology (5 obras) · Aesthetics (4 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 obras) · Biology (3 obras)