Peter Achinstein
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 981829 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Peter Achinstein |
| PRENOMES | Peter |
| SOBRENOME | Achinstein |
| ASSINATURA | ACHINSTEIN P |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Johns Hopkins University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 37 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 45 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 37 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1960 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Disregarding evidence
The War on Induction
I consider and reject William Whewell's attack on the inductivism of Isaac Newton and John Stuart Mill, as well as John Norton's attack on any universal system of inductive rules. I also explain how a system of inductive rules of the sort proposed by Newton and Mill should be understood
Evidence, explanation, and realism
A Challenge to Positive Relevance Theorists
Recently in this journal Sherrilyn Roush (2004) defends positive relevance as a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) condition for evidence by rejecting two of the counterexamples from my earlier (2001) work. In this reply I argue that Roush's critique is not successful
The book of evidence
Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought To Be) Ignored by Scientists
There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation
Swimming in Evidence
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Are Empirical Evidence Claims A Priori
An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to whi…
Stronger Evidence
According to a standard account of evidence, one piece of information is stronger evidence for an hypothesis than is another iff the probability of the hypothesis on the one is greater than it is on the other. This condition, I argue, is neither necessary nor sufficient because various factors can strengthen the evidence for an hypothesis without increasing (and even decreasing) its probability. Contrary to what probabilists claim, I show that th…
Particles and Waves
Inference to the best explanation
Particles And Waves
This volume brings together six published and two new essays by the noted philosopher of science, Peter Achinstein. It represents the culmination of his examination of methodological issues that arise in nineteenth-century physics. He focuses on the philosophical problem of how, if at all, is it possible to confirm scientific hypotheses that postulate `unobservables’ such as light waves, molecules, and electrons? This question is one that not onl…
Particles and waves
Light problems
Hypotheses, Probability, and Waves
Light hypotheses
Scientific Discovery and Maxwell's Kinetic Theory
By reference to Maxwell's kinetic theory, one feature of hypothetico-deductivism is defended. A scientist need make no inference to a hypothesis when he first proposes it. He may have no reason at all for thinking it is true. Yet it may be worth considering. In developing his kinetic theory there were central assumptions Maxwell made (for example, that molecules are spherical, that they exert contact forces, and that their motion is linear) that …
Theoretical derivations
The Nature of Explanation
Theory and Meaning
Function Statements
An examination of difficulties in three standard accounts of functions leads to the suggestion that sentences of the form “the function of x is to do y ” are used to make a variety of different claims, all of which involve a means-end relationship and the idea of design, or use, or benefit. The analysis proposed enables us to see what is right and also wrong with accounts that analyze the meaning of function statements in terms of good consequenc…
Law and Explanation
Models and Analogies
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Law and Explanation
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Law and Explanation : An Essay in the Philosophy of Science. By Peter Achinstein. (Oxford: Clarendon Press : Oxford University Press. 1971. Pp. xii + 168. Price £2.75) R. G. Swinburne R. G. Swinburne Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 22, Issue 89, October 1972, Pages 375–377, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218325 Published: 01 October 1972
Concepts of Science
On the New Riddle of Induction
Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory
Confirmation theorists seek to define a function that will take into account the various factors relevant in determining the degree to which an hypothesis is confirmed by its evidence. Among confirmation theorists, only Rudolf Carnap has constructed a system which purports to consider factors in addition to the number of instances, viz. the variety manifested by the instances and the amount of analogy between the instances. It is the purpose of t…
Inference to the best explanation
Theoretical Models
Models, Analogies, and Theories
Recent accounts of scientific method suggest that a model, or analogy, for an axiomatized theory is another theory, or postulate set, with an identical calculus. The present paper examines five central theses underlying this position. In the light of examples from physical science it seems necessary to distinguish between models and analogies and to recognize the need for important revisions in the position under study, especially in claims invol…
The War on Induction
I consider and reject William Whewell's attack on the inductivism of Isaac Newton and John Stuart Mill, as well as John Norton's attack on any universal system of inductive rules. I also explain how a system of inductive rules of the sort proposed by Newton and Mill should be understood
Theoretical Terms and Partial Interpretation
Are Empirical Evidence Claims A Priori
An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to whi…
Hypotheses, Probability, and Waves
Light hypotheses
Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought To Be) Ignored by Scientists
There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation
Theoretical derivations
Confirmation Theory, Order, and Periodicity
This paper examines problems of order and periodicity which arise when the attempt is made to define a confirmation function for a language containing elementary number theory as applied to a universe in which the individuals are considered to be arranged in some fixed order. Certain plausible conditions of adequacy are stated for such a confirmation function. By the construction of certain types of predicates, it is proved, however, that these c…
The Identity Hypothesis
On the New Riddle of Induction
The Identity Hypothesis
Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory
Confirmation theorists seek to define a function that will take into account the various factors relevant in determining the degree to which an hypothesis is confirmed by its evidence. Among confirmation theorists, only Rudolf Carnap has constructed a system which purports to consider factors in addition to the number of instances, viz. the variety manifested by the instances and the amount of analogy between the instances. It is the purpose of t…
Confirmation Theory, Order, and Periodicity
This paper examines problems of order and periodicity which arise when the attempt is made to define a confirmation function for a language containing elementary number theory as applied to a universe in which the individuals are considered to be arranged in some fixed order. Certain plausible conditions of adequacy are stated for such a confirmation function. By the construction of certain types of predicates, it is proved, however, that these c…
Theoretical Terms and Partial Interpretation
Foresight and Understanding. Stephen Toulmin
Sensationalism and Scientific Explanation . Peter Alexander
Models, Analogies, and Theories
Recent accounts of scientific method suggest that a model, or analogy, for an axiomatized theory is another theory, or postulate set, with an identical calculus. The present paper examines five central theses underlying this position. In the light of examples from physical science it seems necessary to distinguish between models and analogies and to recognize the need for important revisions in the position under study, especially in claims invol…
Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time
Theoretical Models
The Foundations of Scientific Inference
Concepts of Science
The Legacy of Logical Positivism
Book Reviews Get access The Legacy of Logical Positivism : Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Edited By Peter Achinstein and Stephen F. Barker. (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press. 1969. Pp. x + 300. Price £4.05) T. Greenwood T. Greenwood Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 21, Issue 82, January 1971, Pages 85–86, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217585 Published: 01 January 197…
Models and Analogies
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Law and Explanation
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Law and Explanation : An Essay in the Philosophy of Science. By Peter Achinstein. (Oxford: Clarendon Press : Oxford University Press. 1971. Pp. xii + 168. Price £2.75) R. G. Swinburne R. G. Swinburne Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 22, Issue 89, October 1972, Pages 375–377, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218325 Published: 01 October 1972
Law and Explanation
Function Statements
An examination of difficulties in three standard accounts of functions leads to the suggestion that sentences of the form “the function of x is to do y ” are used to make a variety of different claims, all of which involve a means-end relationship and the idea of design, or use, or benefit. The analysis proposed enables us to see what is right and also wrong with accounts that analyze the meaning of function statements in terms of good consequenc…
Theory and Meaning
The Nature of Explanation
Theoretical derivations
Light hypotheses
Scientific Discovery and Maxwell's Kinetic Theory
By reference to Maxwell's kinetic theory, one feature of hypothetico-deductivism is defended. A scientist need make no inference to a hypothesis when he first proposes it. He may have no reason at all for thinking it is true. Yet it may be worth considering. In developing his kinetic theory there were central assumptions Maxwell made (for example, that molecules are spherical, that they exert contact forces, and that their motion is linear) that …
Light problems
Hypotheses, Probability, and Waves
Particles And Waves
This volume brings together six published and two new essays by the noted philosopher of science, Peter Achinstein. It represents the culmination of his examination of methodological issues that arise in nineteenth-century physics. He focuses on the philosophical problem of how, if at all, is it possible to confirm scientific hypotheses that postulate `unobservables’ such as light waves, molecules, and electrons? This question is one that not onl…
Epistemology (29 obras) · Philosophy (29 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (24 obras) · Computer Science (14 obras) · Mathematics (9 obras) · Philosophy of science (8 obras) · Mathematical economics (7 obras) · Analytic philosophy (6 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (6 obras) · General interest (6 obras)