Zvika Neeman
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 982504 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Zvika Neeman |
| PRENOMES | Zvika |
| SOBRENOME | Neeman |
| ASSINATURA | NEEMAN Z |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Tel Aviv University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8719-9969 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 115 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1995 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Improving broadband subsidy allocation
Public broadband subsidy programs increasingly require regulators to allocate limited public funds across many geographically interdependent projects under both informational and computational constraints. When firms may submit bundled offers over clusters of areas, the winner-determination problem becomes combinatorial: the regulator must balance coverage, budget, and overlap across competing offers. We study this problem through the case of bro…
Judging under Public Pressure
We study the circumstances under which public pressure affects judging. We show that crowd pressure biases decisions in favor of the crowd for “subjective decisions” with respect to which the judge has more discretion but not for “objective decisions.” The bias is strengthened after a judge's error against the crowd and when errors are costlier to the crowd. We use data about referees' decisions and errors from the Bundesliga. We exploit three re…
The rarity of consistent aggregators
Differential Performance in High Versus Low Stakes Tests
We study how different demographic groups respond to incentives by comparing their performance in ‘high’ and ‘low’ stakes situations. The high stakes situation is the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and the low stakes situation is a voluntary experimental section of the GRE. We find that males exhibit a larger drop in performance between the high and low stakes examinations than females, and that whites exhibit a larger drop in performance tha…
Geography, Transparency, and Institutions
We propose a theory in which geographic attributes explain cross-regional institutional differences in (1) the scale of the state, (2) the distribution of power within state hierarchy, and (3) property rights to land. In this theory, geography and technology affect the transparency of farming, and transparency, in turn, affects the elite's ability to appropriate revenue from the farming sector, thus affecting institutions. We apply the theory to …
Personality traits and strategic behavior
Saving Rates and Poverty
Journal Article Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital Get access Omer Moav and, Omer Moav and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Royal Holloway University of London, and CEPR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Zvika Neeman Zvika Neeman Tel‐Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 122, Issue …
Civil Justice Reform
The main goal of the court system is to differentiate between those who obeyed the law and those who did not. We describe a mechanism design framework that facilitates the characterization of a set of procedural mechanisms that would minimize the resources used to achieve this goal. This framework can also help to formulate and evaluate procedural rules, and to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for deciding disputes according to substa…
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization
We model the transition from a chaotic status quo to a more orderly political regime as a two-stage game involving two warring factions and the citizens. The warring factions move first and decide the form of government by (1) inviting an external arbitrator, (2) choosing the people as arbitrator, i.e. democratizing or (3) maintaining the status quo. We analyze the conditions under which democracy is likely to emerge as the outcome of the game. W…
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition
Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In this paper, we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model the electoral competition between two candidates as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies, in the second stage, they simultaneously choose their levels of ambiguity. …
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition
Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In this paper, we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model the electoral competition between two candidates as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies, in the second stage, they simultaneously choose their levels of ambiguity. …
A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization
We model the transition from a chaotic status quo to a more orderly political regime as a two-stage game involving two warring factions and the citizens. The warring factions move first and decide the form of government by (1) inviting an external arbitrator, (2) choosing the people as arbitrator, i.e. democratizing or (3) maintaining the status quo. We analyze the conditions under which democracy is likely to emerge as the outcome of the game. W…
Saving Rates and Poverty
Journal Article Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital Get access Omer Moav and, Omer Moav and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Royal Holloway University of London, and CEPR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Zvika Neeman Zvika Neeman Tel‐Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 122, Issue …
Geography, Transparency, and Institutions
We propose a theory in which geographic attributes explain cross-regional institutional differences in (1) the scale of the state, (2) the distribution of power within state hierarchy, and (3) property rights to land. In this theory, geography and technology affect the transparency of farming, and transparency, in turn, affects the elite's ability to appropriate revenue from the farming sector, thus affecting institutions. We apply the theory to …
Differential Performance in High Versus Low Stakes Tests
We study how different demographic groups respond to incentives by comparing their performance in ‘high’ and ‘low’ stakes situations. The high stakes situation is the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and the low stakes situation is a voluntary experimental section of the GRE. We find that males exhibit a larger drop in performance between the high and low stakes examinations than females, and that whites exhibit a larger drop in performance tha…
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition
Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In this paper, we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model the electoral competition between two candidates as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies, in the second stage, they simultaneously choose their levels of ambiguity. …
A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization
We model the transition from a chaotic status quo to a more orderly political regime as a two-stage game involving two warring factions and the citizens. The warring factions move first and decide the form of government by (1) inviting an external arbitrator, (2) choosing the people as arbitrator, i.e. democratizing or (3) maintaining the status quo. We analyze the conditions under which democracy is likely to emerge as the outcome of the game. W…
Civil Justice Reform
The main goal of the court system is to differentiate between those who obeyed the law and those who did not. We describe a mechanism design framework that facilitates the characterization of a set of procedural mechanisms that would minimize the resources used to achieve this goal. This framework can also help to formulate and evaluate procedural rules, and to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for deciding disputes according to substa…
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Saving Rates and Poverty
Journal Article Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital Get access Omer Moav and, Omer Moav and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Royal Holloway University of London, and CEPR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Zvika Neeman Zvika Neeman Tel‐Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 122, Issue …
Personality traits and strategic behavior
Geography, Transparency, and Institutions
We propose a theory in which geographic attributes explain cross-regional institutional differences in (1) the scale of the state, (2) the distribution of power within state hierarchy, and (3) property rights to land. In this theory, geography and technology affect the transparency of farming, and transparency, in turn, affects the elite's ability to appropriate revenue from the farming sector, thus affecting institutions. We apply the theory to …
Differential Performance in High Versus Low Stakes Tests
We study how different demographic groups respond to incentives by comparing their performance in ‘high’ and ‘low’ stakes situations. The high stakes situation is the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and the low stakes situation is a voluntary experimental section of the GRE. We find that males exhibit a larger drop in performance between the high and low stakes examinations than females, and that whites exhibit a larger drop in performance tha…
The rarity of consistent aggregators
Judging under Public Pressure
We study the circumstances under which public pressure affects judging. We show that crowd pressure biases decisions in favor of the crowd for “subjective decisions” with respect to which the judge has more discretion but not for “objective decisions.” The bias is strengthened after a judge's error against the crowd and when errors are costlier to the crowd. We use data about referees' decisions and errors from the Bundesliga. We exploit three re…
Improving broadband subsidy allocation
Public broadband subsidy programs increasingly require regulators to allocate limited public funds across many geographically interdependent projects under both informational and computational constraints. When firms may submit bundled offers over clusters of areas, the winner-determination problem becomes combinatorial: the regulator must balance coverage, budget, and overlap across competing offers. We study this problem through the case of bro…
Economics (7 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Microeconomics (5 obras) · Political science (5 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (3 obras) · Mathematical economics (3 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras) · Psychology (3 obras) · Social Psychology (3 obras)