John Greco
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 982572 |
|---|---|
| NOME | John Greco |
| PRENOMES | John |
| SOBRENOME | Greco |
| ASSINATURA | GRECO J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Fordham University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4586-3403 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 41 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 105 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 35 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 6 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1953 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
The Transmission of Knowledge via Large-Scale Technology
Replies to critics
The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology, the first to appear on the topic, introduces the current state of religious epistemology and provides a discussion of fundamental topics related to the epistemology of religious belief. Its wide-ranging chapters not only survey fundamental topics, but also develop non-traditional epistemic theories and explore the religious epistemology endorsed by non-Western traditions. In the first section, Fai…
Trauma sensitive schools
Sharing Knowledge
In this excellent book, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion defend an etiological-functionalist account of the normativity of assertion. Specifically, the etiological function of assertion is to generate knowledge in hearers. Kelp and Simion argue that this functionalist thesis has two important implications: a) that epistemically good assertions are those that are disposed to generate knowledge in hearers, and b) that epistemically permissible assert…
Skepticism, virtue and transmission in the theory of knowledge
What Is Social Epistemic Dependence
A central theme in social epistemology is that there are important and underappreciated phenomena involving social epistemic dependence—that is, epistemic dependence on other persons and on features of the broader social environment. Epistemologies that are inconsistent with this kind of dependence are labeled “individualist” and epistemologies that accommodate it are labeled “anti-individualist.” But how should the relevant notion of social epis…
Does anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony imply interest relativism about knowledge attributions
Anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the thesis that testimonial knowledge is not reducible to knowledge of some other familiar kind, such as inductive knowledge. Interest relativism about knowledge attributions is the thesis that the standards for knowledge attributions are relative to practical contexts. This paper argues that anti-reductionism implies interest relativism. The notion of “implies” here is a fairly strong one: an…
Hinge epistemology and the prospects for a unified theory of knowledge
The transmission of knowledge and garbage
Safety in Sosa
Post-Gettier Epistemology
In this paper, it is argued that the differences between Gettier-era epistemology and post-Gettier epistemology can be largely traced to differences in methodology. We will give a “rational reconstruction” of how we did things then, what we do now, and what considerations moved us to do things differently. In summary form, during the Gettier era the methodology of epistemology was roughly what Chisholm called “particularism” and Rawls called “the…
Epistemic Evaluation
This volume aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point(s) or purpose(s) of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection.
Episteme
This chapter articulates and defends a neo-Aristotelian account of understanding, modeled on Aristotle’s account of episteme as knowledge of causes. The account replaces Aristotle’s notion of ‘cause’ with a notion of dependence relations more generally. Dependence relations are various, including relations akin to Aristotle’s ‘four causes,’ but others as well, such as logical relations, mathematical relations, and various kinds of supervenience r…
Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism
This book is a qualified defence of ‘epistemological disjunctivism’, a view about visual perceptual knowledge that, according to Pritchard, ‘would represent the holy grail of epistemology’ if true (p. 1). The view is roughly this: In paradigm cases of visual knowledge, one's basis for knowing is both objectively related to the truth and reflectively accessible. The view would be ‘the holy grail’ in that it gives both internalists and externalists…
Powers and Capacities in Philosophy
A (Different) Virtue Epistemology
Section 1 articulates a genus‐species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus‐species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That q…
Achieving Knowledge
When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its…
The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism
The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism features twenty-six newly commissioned articles by top figures in the field of skepticism. In the history of philosophical thought, few themes loom as large as skepticism. Skepticism has been the most visible and important part of debates about knowledge. Skepticism, at its most basic, questions our cognitive achievements, challenges our ability to obtain reliable knowledge. It casts doubt on our attempts to seek…
Ernest Sosa and His Critics
Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief
Ernest Sosa
What's Wrong With Contextualism
This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject‐matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interest‐dependent theories in general rather than at contextualism …
Worries about Pritchard’s safety
Rationality and the Good
For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. This volume features thirteen chapters by renowned scholars plus new writings by Audi. Each chapter presents both a position of its author and a critical treatment of related ideas of Audi's, and he responds to eac…
A (Different) Virtue Epistemology
Section 1 articulates a genus‐species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus‐species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That q…
What's Wrong With Contextualism
This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject‐matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interest‐dependent theories in general rather than at contextualism …
Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue
Linda Zagzebski argues that knowledge should be understood in terms of intellectual virtue. The kind of she has in mind is on the model of Aristotle's account of moral virtue: A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end. (137) Examples of such virtues are open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellect…
Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief
Worries about Pritchard’s safety
Rationality and the Good
For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. This volume features thirteen chapters by renowned scholars plus new writings by Audi. Each chapter presents both a position of its author and a critical treatment of related ideas of Audi's, and he responds to eac…
External World Skepticism
Recent literature in epistemology has focused on the following argument for skepticism (SA): I know that I have two hands only if I know that I am not a handless brain in a vat. But I don't know I am not a handless brain in a vat. Therefore, I don't know that I have two hands. Part I of this article reviews two responses to skepticism that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s: sensitivity theories and attributor contextualism. Part II considers the mor…
Internalism and epistemically responsible belief
Hinge epistemology and the prospects for a unified theory of knowledge
Safety in Sosa
Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism
How to Reid Moore
Journal Article How to Reid Moore Get access John Greco John Greco Fordham University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 52, Issue 209, October 2002, Pages 544–563, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00285 Published: 07 January 2003
Reid's Critique of Berkeley and Hume
Thomas Reid thought that the linchpin of his response to Berkeley and Hume was his rejection of the common theory of ideas. On this point his commentators have generally taken him at his word, so much so that it is difficult to find one who explicitly disagrees.' In this paper I will argue that Reid's assessment of his own work is incorrect. Specifically, I will argue that there are two main arguments for skepticism in Berkeley and Hume, although…
The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind
Skepticism, virtue and transmission in the theory of knowledge
Recognition of Early Proximal Caries X‐ray Versus Clinical Procedures
Internalism and epistemically responsible belief
Sense and Certainty
The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind
Reid's Critique of Berkeley and Hume
Thomas Reid thought that the linchpin of his response to Berkeley and Hume was his rejection of the common theory of ideas. On this point his commentators have generally taken him at his word, so much so that it is difficult to find one who explicitly disagrees.' In this paper I will argue that Reid's assessment of his own work is incorrect. Specifically, I will argue that there are two main arguments for skepticism in Berkeley and Hume, although…
Putting Skeptics in their Place
This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and …
Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue
Linda Zagzebski argues that knowledge should be understood in terms of intellectual virtue. The kind of she has in mind is on the model of Aristotle's account of moral virtue: A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end. (137) Examples of such virtues are open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellect…
Warranted Christian Belief
Putting Skeptics in Their Place
How to Reid Moore
Journal Article How to Reid Moore Get access John Greco John Greco Fordham University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 52, Issue 209, October 2002, Pages 544–563, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00285 Published: 07 January 2003
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief
This chapter argues that by attending to the illocutionary force of knowledge attributions — specifically, that they serve to give credit to the believer for getting things right — fallibilists can assuage two problems plaguing their concept of knowledge: namely, the lottery problem and the Gettier problem. Borrowing work from Joel Fienberg on blaming, an account of credit attribution is developed that stresses the relationship between causal sal…
Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism
Précis of Putting Skeptics in Their Place
Virtue, Luck and the Pyrrhonian Problematic
How to be a Pragmatist
Worries about Pritchard’s safety
Rationality and the Good
For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. This volume features thirteen chapters by renowned scholars plus new writings by Audi. Each chapter presents both a position of its author and a critical treatment of related ideas of Audi's, and he responds to eac…
External World Skepticism
Recent literature in epistemology has focused on the following argument for skepticism (SA): I know that I have two hands only if I know that I am not a handless brain in a vat. But I don't know I am not a handless brain in a vat. Therefore, I don't know that I have two hands. Part I of this article reviews two responses to skepticism that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s: sensitivity theories and attributor contextualism. Part II considers the mor…
The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism
The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism features twenty-six newly commissioned articles by top figures in the field of skepticism. In the history of philosophical thought, few themes loom as large as skepticism. Skepticism has been the most visible and important part of debates about knowledge. Skepticism, at its most basic, questions our cognitive achievements, challenges our ability to obtain reliable knowledge. It casts doubt on our attempts to seek…
Ernest Sosa and His Critics
Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief
Ernest Sosa
What's Wrong With Contextualism
This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject‐matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interest‐dependent theories in general rather than at contextualism …
Achieving Knowledge
When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its…
A (Different) Virtue Epistemology
Section 1 articulates a genus‐species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus‐species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That q…
Epistemology (35 obras) · Philosophy (35 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (29 obras) · Computer Science (16 obras) · Philosophy (12 obras) · Skepticism (12 obras) · Metaphysics (10 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (9 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 obras) · Philosophy of language (7 obras)