Christoph Kelp
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 984955 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Christoph Kelp |
| PRENOMES | Christoph |
| SOBRENOME | Kelp |
| ASSINATURA | KELP C |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Glasgow |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7735-2109 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 25 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 83 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2009 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Understanding, justification and the agglomeration of risks of error
A common motivation for denying the closure of justification under conjunction introduction is that it leads to paradox. In this paper, we argue that any adequate account of understanding involves rejecting the idea that agglomeration of justification across conjunctions is limited in the way critics of closure think it is, and we explore some of the epistemological implications of this insight
Brown on group evidence, group justification, and group responsibility
Jessica Brown’s excellent new book (2024) is highly ambitious: it develops a unified account of group doxastic, epistemic, and responsibility phenomena. Importantly for our purposes here, Brown dev
Closure and the structure of justification
Abstact This paper considers two recent views on the structure of justification and closure of knowledge by Ernest Sosa. It provides reason to believe that neither view is ultimately viable and sketches a better alternative
What is trustworthiness
This paper develops a novel, bifocal account of trustworthiness according to which both trustworthiness simpliciter (as in ‘Ann is trustworthy’) and trustworthiness to phi (as in ‘Ann is trustworthy when it comes to keeping your secrets’) are analysed in terms of dispositions to fulfil one's obligations. We also offer a systematic account of the relation between the two types of trustworthiness, an account of degrees of trustworthiness and compar…
Linguistic innovation for gender terms
This paper explores the political prospects of linguistic innovation for gender terms. It develops and defends a model that leaves the concept of woman in place but replaces the term with a novel one that lacks the problematic social and political connotations. It is shown that linguistic innovation reaps all the political benefits of competing proposals in conceptual ethics, without any of the downsides
How to be a capacitist
Capacitism is the view that capacities come first in epistemological theorising: they are explanatorily basic and key epistemic phenomena are to be analysed in terms of capacities. This paper develops a problem for capacitism and outlines a motivated way of solving it
How to be an infallibilist
Inquiry, knowledge and understanding
This paper connects two important debates in epistemology—to wit, on the goal of inquiry and on the nature of understanding—and offers a unified knowledge-based account of both
Moral Assertion
In this paper, I introduce a puzzle about moral assertion and defend a solution that centrally features the claim that the normativity of moral assertion centrally features moral understanding
Hoops and Barns
This paper critically assesses Sosa’s normative framework for performances as well as its application to epistemology. We first develop a problem for one of Sosa’s central theses in the general theory of performance normativity according to which performances attain fully desirable status if and only if they are fully apt. More specifically, we argue that given Sosa’s account of full aptness according to which a performance is fully apt only if s…
The epistemology of Ernest Sosa
How to be an anti-reductionist
The C account of assertion
According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature
Theory of inquiry
works on a proof and submits the results at t2.There are no problems with her proof.In fact, it is perfectly sound.Who should get the reward for settling that THEOREM?It is intuitively clear that the answer is: the second mathematician.Since the first mathematician's work contained an error, he did not settle that THEOREM.Crucially, between the three live candidates in the literature, only K-AIM can secure this result.To see why, note that the ca…
Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge
No abstract available
Lotteries and justification
Commodious knowledge
How To Be A Reliabilist
In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justified belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabil…
Justified Belief
Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (2005, 2007), Littlejohn (Forthcoming a, b), Williamson (2000, 2010), a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar (2010) and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (2007). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology an…
Understanding phenomena
Proper bootstrapping
According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some r…
How and How not to Take on Brueckner's Sceptic
No abstract available
In defence of virtue epistemology
Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics
This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics…
Learning from Words
In Learning from Words Jennifer Lackey professes to revolutionize the epistemology of testimony in at least two crucial ways. First, she claims to show that the widely held thesis that testimony can only transmit knowledge/warrant is false, because in fact knowledge/warrant can be generated by testimony. Secondly, she denies that reductionism and non‐reductionism exhaust the theoretical options for the epistemology of testimony (another assumptio…
Theory of inquiry
works on a proof and submits the results at t2.There are no problems with her proof.In fact, it is perfectly sound.Who should get the reward for settling that THEOREM?It is intuitively clear that the answer is: the second mathematician.Since the first mathematician's work contained an error, he did not settle that THEOREM.Crucially, between the three live candidates in the literature, only K-AIM can secure this result.To see why, note that the ca…
Understanding phenomena
Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics
This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics…
How to be an anti-reductionist
Inquiry, knowledge and understanding
This paper connects two important debates in epistemology—to wit, on the goal of inquiry and on the nature of understanding—and offers a unified knowledge-based account of both
Lotteries and justification
How To Be A Reliabilist
In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justified belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabil…
Proper bootstrapping
According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some r…
The C account of assertion
According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature
Justified Belief
Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (2005, 2007), Littlejohn (Forthcoming a, b), Williamson (2000, 2010), a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar (2010) and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (2007). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology an…
In defence of virtue epistemology
Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge
No abstract available
Commodious knowledge
Learning from Words
In Learning from Words Jennifer Lackey professes to revolutionize the epistemology of testimony in at least two crucial ways. First, she claims to show that the widely held thesis that testimony can only transmit knowledge/warrant is false, because in fact knowledge/warrant can be generated by testimony. Secondly, she denies that reductionism and non‐reductionism exhaust the theoretical options for the epistemology of testimony (another assumptio…
Learning from Words
In Learning from Words Jennifer Lackey professes to revolutionize the epistemology of testimony in at least two crucial ways. First, she claims to show that the widely held thesis that testimony can only transmit knowledge/warrant is false, because in fact knowledge/warrant can be generated by testimony. Secondly, she denies that reductionism and non‐reductionism exhaust the theoretical options for the epistemology of testimony (another assumptio…
In defence of virtue epistemology
Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics
This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics…
How and How not to Take on Brueckner's Sceptic
No abstract available
Proper bootstrapping
According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some r…
Understanding phenomena
Justified Belief
Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (2005, 2007), Littlejohn (Forthcoming a, b), Williamson (2000, 2010), a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar (2010) and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (2007). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology an…
Lotteries and justification
Commodious knowledge
How To Be A Reliabilist
In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justified belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabil…
Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge
No abstract available
Moral Assertion
In this paper, I introduce a puzzle about moral assertion and defend a solution that centrally features the claim that the normativity of moral assertion centrally features moral understanding
Hoops and Barns
This paper critically assesses Sosa’s normative framework for performances as well as its application to epistemology. We first develop a problem for one of Sosa’s central theses in the general theory of performance normativity according to which performances attain fully desirable status if and only if they are fully apt. More specifically, we argue that given Sosa’s account of full aptness according to which a performance is fully apt only if s…
The epistemology of Ernest Sosa
How to be an anti-reductionist
The C account of assertion
According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature
Theory of inquiry
works on a proof and submits the results at t2.There are no problems with her proof.In fact, it is perfectly sound.Who should get the reward for settling that THEOREM?It is intuitively clear that the answer is: the second mathematician.Since the first mathematician's work contained an error, he did not settle that THEOREM.Crucially, between the three live candidates in the literature, only K-AIM can secure this result.To see why, note that the ca…
Inquiry, knowledge and understanding
This paper connects two important debates in epistemology—to wit, on the goal of inquiry and on the nature of understanding—and offers a unified knowledge-based account of both
How to be an infallibilist
What is trustworthiness
This paper develops a novel, bifocal account of trustworthiness according to which both trustworthiness simpliciter (as in ‘Ann is trustworthy’) and trustworthiness to phi (as in ‘Ann is trustworthy when it comes to keeping your secrets’) are analysed in terms of dispositions to fulfil one's obligations. We also offer a systematic account of the relation between the two types of trustworthiness, an account of degrees of trustworthiness and compar…
Linguistic innovation for gender terms
This paper explores the political prospects of linguistic innovation for gender terms. It develops and defends a model that leaves the concept of woman in place but replaces the term with a novel one that lacks the problematic social and political connotations. It is shown that linguistic innovation reaps all the political benefits of competing proposals in conceptual ethics, without any of the downsides
How to be a capacitist
Capacitism is the view that capacities come first in epistemological theorising: they are explanatorily basic and key epistemic phenomena are to be analysed in terms of capacities. This paper develops a problem for capacitism and outlines a motivated way of solving it
Closure and the structure of justification
Abstact This paper considers two recent views on the structure of justification and closure of knowledge by Ernest Sosa. It provides reason to believe that neither view is ultimately viable and sketches a better alternative
Understanding, justification and the agglomeration of risks of error
A common motivation for denying the closure of justification under conjunction introduction is that it leads to paradox. In this paper, we argue that any adequate account of understanding involves rejecting the idea that agglomeration of justification across conjunctions is limited in the way critics of closure think it is, and we explore some of the epistemological implications of this insight
Brown on group evidence, group justification, and group responsibility
Jessica Brown’s excellent new book (2024) is highly ambitious: it develops a unified account of group doxastic, epistemic, and responsibility phenomena. Importantly for our purposes here, Brown dev
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (21 obras) · Epistemology (20 obras) · Philosophy (20 obras) · Computer Science (14 obras) · Metaphysics (14 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (14 obras) · Philosophy of language (14 obras) · Philosophy of science (11 obras) · Free Will and Agency (9 obras) · Psychology (7 obras)