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Edmund Malesky

Dados Biográficos

ID987243
NOMEEdmund Malesky
PRENOMESEdmund
SOBRENOMEMalesky
ASSINATURAMALESKY E
AFILIAÇÕESDuke University
VERIFICADONão
TOTAL DE OBRAS21
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES545
TOTAL COMO AUTOR21
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO2009
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2026
ÍNDICE H10
  • "Unpacking Compliance and "Leakages'' in International Regimes

    Lorenzo Crippa, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2026

    States and non-state organizations often only partially comply with international legal regimes. This behavior can have severe counterproductive effects when differences in compliance levels encourage "leakage," defined as actions that contradict the desired impact of the regime. In this paper, we explore this problem in the international regime devoted to anticorruption, centered on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC), which led to the crimin…

  • Civic Education and Voting under Authoritarianism

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2025•Referências: 25

  • Disaggregated defense spending

    Open Access•Jordan Becker, Seth Benson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Peace Research•2025•Citada por: 3•Referências: 26

    Theoretical and empirical research on causes and consequences of defense spending is plentiful. Most of this research uses 'top line' defense spending data, either as a share of GDP or as a raw monetary figure. Empirical research has been limited, however, by the 'blunt' nature of this data, which does not help to explain what countries are spending on. We introduce a dataset that provides information on disaggregated defense spending from 35 NAT…

  • A Field of Her Own

    Alexander Fertig, Alexandra C Hartman et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2024•Referências: 12

    Can financial incentives lead households to register land in women's names, thereby providing them with formal property rights? Can formal property ownership improve women's economic outcomes and change decision-making dynamics within the household? To investigate these questions, we take advantage of a bank lending policy in Myanmar that motivated households with land holdings above ten acres to title the surplus land in their wives' names. We s…

  • Facilitating Development

    Dean Dulay, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2023•Referências: 16

    Despite strong theoretical foundations, randomized evaluations demonstrate that subnational performance assessments have a mixed record in improving governance. We suggest that a key factor influencing this disappointing result has been the omission of facilitation—working with bureaucrats on how to use subnational performance assessments (SPAs) effectively and encouraging collaboration across government agencies. The argument is tested on a nati…

  • Fish or steel? New evidence on the environment-economy trade-off in developing Vietnam

    Open Access•Quynh Nguyen, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2021•Citada por: 4•Referências: 13

  • Participation, Government Legitimacy, and Regulatory Compliance in Emerging Economies

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2019•Citada por: 8•Referências: 72

    This paper employs a field experiment in single-party-ruled Vietnam to test whether providing a broad-based representative sample of firms the opportunity to comment on draft regulations increases their subsequent compliance. We find three main outcomes of this treatment. First, treated firms exhibited greater improvement in their views of government's regulatory authority. Second, these firms were more likely to allow government-affiliated audit…

  • Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Southeast Asia

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky•ARTICLE•Bulletin of Indonesian Economic…•2017•Referências: 8

  • The Continent or the “Grand Large”? Strategic Culture and Operational Burden-Sharing in Nato

    Jordan Becker, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•International Studies Quarterly•2017•Citada por: 33•Referências: 43

    We argue that NATO allies exhibiting more "Atlanticist" strategic cultures allocate a greater share of their defense resources to Alliance priorities than those exhibiting "Europeanist" strategic cultures. Our analysis builds on policy discussions regarding imbalances in burden-sharing in transatlantic security. Scholarship in the fields of international security and political economy offers plausible explanations for these imbalances, but does n…

  • Vietnam in 2014

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Asian Survey•2015

    The May 2014 entry of a Chinese deep-water oil rig into Vietnamese waters deeply shocked Vietnam. This yearend article chronicles the impact of the controversial action on (1) power struggles among elite politicians, (2) alterations in foreign policy orientation, and (3) popular opinion regarding economic reforms and emerging inequality

  • Vietnam in 2013

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky•ARTICLE•Asian Survey•2014•Citada por: 1

    This essay reviews Vietnamese politics in 2013 through the lens of the constitutional drafting process and the unprecedented confidence vote in the National Assembly. Both events were framed by the country’s ongoing economic struggles, elite political contestation, international integration, and a more informed public, fueled by an increasingly active blogosphere. The events foreshadow how future Vietnamese leaders can no longer rely on deep rese…

  • Pass the Bucks

    Open Access•Nathan M Jensen, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•International Studies Quarterly•2014•Citada por: 22•Referências: 48

    Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead that the "competition" for capital can be politically…

  • The Political Economy of Development in China and Vietnam

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Political Science•2014•Citada por: 35•Referências: 97

    Two theories predominate in discussions of why China and Vietnam have, over the past three decades, achieved such rapid economic growth. The first argues that their startling performance can be explained by economic factors associated with late industrialization. The second proposes that China and Vietnam represent novel models of political economic organization that need to be better studied and understood. In this essay we review the voluminous…

  • Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk

    Open Access•Nathan M Jensen, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•British Journal of Political…•2014•Citada por: 35•Referências: 69

    A strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that authoritarian legislatures constrain executive decisions and reduce the threat of expropriation. Although the empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic evidence that authoritarian parliaments are able to restrain the actions of state leaders, reverse activities they disagree wi…

  • Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies

    Open Access•Melani Cammett, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2012•Citada por: 39•Referências: 56

    Which components of power sharing contribute to the duration of peace and what explains the linkages between institutional design and stability? The authors argue that certain types of political power sharing are associated with more durable peace than others, primarily through their positive effects on governance and public service delivery. In particular, closed-list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems stand out among power-shari…

  • The Adverse Effects of Sunshine

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2012•Citada por: 58•Referências: 36

    An influential literature has demonstrated that legislative transparency can improve the performance of parliamentarians in democracies. In a democracy, the incentive for improved performance is created by voters' responses to newly available information. Building on this work, donor projects have begun to export transparency interventions to authoritarian regimes under the assumption that nongovernmental organizations and the media can substitut…

  • Vietnam in 2010

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Southeast Asian affairs•2011

    Founded in 1974, Southeast Asian Affairs provides, without fear or favour, informed and in-depth annual analyses of this vibrant region and its component countries. It is the only publication which does this and is in its own class without peers. It is a mandatory reference and read for those seriously interested in knowing Southeast Asia."- Professor A.B. Shamsul, Founding DirectorInstitute of Ethnic Studies, Universiti Bebangsaan Malaysia"Now i…

  • The Single‐Party Dictator's Dilemma

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2011•Citada por: 65•Referências: 38

    The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using elections in this way, however, authoritarians face a trade‐off between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. In this article, we explore how single‐party regimes manage this trade‐off and the particular types of information available to them. Using candidate‐level data fr…

  • Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Comparative Politics•2011•Citada por: 47•Referências: 19

    Despite the fact that China and Vietnam have been the world’s two fastest growing economies over the past two decades, their income inequality patterns are very different. In this paper, we take a deep look at political institutions in the two countries, demonstrating that profound differences between these polities influence distributional choices. In particular, we find that elite institutions in Vietnam encourage the construction of broader po…

  • Nodding or Needling

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2010•Citada por: 171•Referências: 33

    Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the tran…

  • Gerrymandering—Vietnamese Style

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2009•Citada por: 24•Referências: 31

    Hellman’s (1998) depiction of the Partial Reform Equilibrium (PRE) presented a prophecy of despair for many transition economies. Because winners from initial economic reforms could use their newfound power to block further reform initiatives that might undermine their lucrative positions, escaping the PRE trap required the simultaneous resolution of two conundrums. Policymakers interested in furthering transition needed to both overcome oppositi…

  • Nodding or Needling

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2010•Citada por: 171•Referências: 33

    Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the tran…

  • The Single‐Party Dictator's Dilemma

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2011•Citada por: 65•Referências: 38

    The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using elections in this way, however, authoritarians face a trade‐off between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. In this article, we explore how single‐party regimes manage this trade‐off and the particular types of information available to them. Using candidate‐level data fr…

  • The Adverse Effects of Sunshine

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2012•Citada por: 58•Referências: 36

    An influential literature has demonstrated that legislative transparency can improve the performance of parliamentarians in democracies. In a democracy, the incentive for improved performance is created by voters' responses to newly available information. Building on this work, donor projects have begun to export transparency interventions to authoritarian regimes under the assumption that nongovernmental organizations and the media can substitut…

  • Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Comparative Politics•2011•Citada por: 47•Referências: 19

    Despite the fact that China and Vietnam have been the world’s two fastest growing economies over the past two decades, their income inequality patterns are very different. In this paper, we take a deep look at political institutions in the two countries, demonstrating that profound differences between these polities influence distributional choices. In particular, we find that elite institutions in Vietnam encourage the construction of broader po…

  • Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies

    Open Access•Melani Cammett, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2012•Citada por: 39•Referências: 56

    Which components of power sharing contribute to the duration of peace and what explains the linkages between institutional design and stability? The authors argue that certain types of political power sharing are associated with more durable peace than others, primarily through their positive effects on governance and public service delivery. In particular, closed-list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems stand out among power-shari…

  • The Political Economy of Development in China and Vietnam

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Political Science•2014•Citada por: 35•Referências: 97

    Two theories predominate in discussions of why China and Vietnam have, over the past three decades, achieved such rapid economic growth. The first argues that their startling performance can be explained by economic factors associated with late industrialization. The second proposes that China and Vietnam represent novel models of political economic organization that need to be better studied and understood. In this essay we review the voluminous…

  • Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk

    Open Access•Nathan M Jensen, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•British Journal of Political…•2014•Citada por: 35•Referências: 69

    A strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that authoritarian legislatures constrain executive decisions and reduce the threat of expropriation. Although the empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic evidence that authoritarian parliaments are able to restrain the actions of state leaders, reverse activities they disagree wi…

  • The Continent or the “Grand Large”? Strategic Culture and Operational Burden-Sharing in Nato

    Jordan Becker, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•International Studies Quarterly•2017•Citada por: 33•Referências: 43

    We argue that NATO allies exhibiting more "Atlanticist" strategic cultures allocate a greater share of their defense resources to Alliance priorities than those exhibiting "Europeanist" strategic cultures. Our analysis builds on policy discussions regarding imbalances in burden-sharing in transatlantic security. Scholarship in the fields of international security and political economy offers plausible explanations for these imbalances, but does n…

  • Gerrymandering—Vietnamese Style

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2009•Citada por: 24•Referências: 31

    Hellman’s (1998) depiction of the Partial Reform Equilibrium (PRE) presented a prophecy of despair for many transition economies. Because winners from initial economic reforms could use their newfound power to block further reform initiatives that might undermine their lucrative positions, escaping the PRE trap required the simultaneous resolution of two conundrums. Policymakers interested in furthering transition needed to both overcome oppositi…

  • Pass the Bucks

    Open Access•Nathan M Jensen, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•International Studies Quarterly•2014•Citada por: 22•Referências: 48

    Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead that the "competition" for capital can be politically…

  • Participation, Government Legitimacy, and Regulatory Compliance in Emerging Economies

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2019•Citada por: 8•Referências: 72

    This paper employs a field experiment in single-party-ruled Vietnam to test whether providing a broad-based representative sample of firms the opportunity to comment on draft regulations increases their subsequent compliance. We find three main outcomes of this treatment. First, treated firms exhibited greater improvement in their views of government's regulatory authority. Second, these firms were more likely to allow government-affiliated audit…

  • Fish or steel? New evidence on the environment-economy trade-off in developing Vietnam

    Open Access•Quynh Nguyen, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2021•Citada por: 4•Referências: 13

  • Disaggregated defense spending

    Open Access•Jordan Becker, Seth Benson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Peace Research•2025•Citada por: 3•Referências: 26

    Theoretical and empirical research on causes and consequences of defense spending is plentiful. Most of this research uses 'top line' defense spending data, either as a share of GDP or as a raw monetary figure. Empirical research has been limited, however, by the 'blunt' nature of this data, which does not help to explain what countries are spending on. We introduce a dataset that provides information on disaggregated defense spending from 35 NAT…

  • Vietnam in 2013

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky•ARTICLE•Asian Survey•2014•Citada por: 1

    This essay reviews Vietnamese politics in 2013 through the lens of the constitutional drafting process and the unprecedented confidence vote in the National Assembly. Both events were framed by the country’s ongoing economic struggles, elite political contestation, international integration, and a more informed public, fueled by an increasingly active blogosphere. The events foreshadow how future Vietnamese leaders can no longer rely on deep rese…

  • Gerrymandering—Vietnamese Style

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2009•Citada por: 24•Referências: 31

    Hellman’s (1998) depiction of the Partial Reform Equilibrium (PRE) presented a prophecy of despair for many transition economies. Because winners from initial economic reforms could use their newfound power to block further reform initiatives that might undermine their lucrative positions, escaping the PRE trap required the simultaneous resolution of two conundrums. Policymakers interested in furthering transition needed to both overcome oppositi…

  • Nodding or Needling

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2010•Citada por: 171•Referências: 33

    Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the tran…

  • Vietnam in 2010

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Southeast Asian affairs•2011

    Founded in 1974, Southeast Asian Affairs provides, without fear or favour, informed and in-depth annual analyses of this vibrant region and its component countries. It is the only publication which does this and is in its own class without peers. It is a mandatory reference and read for those seriously interested in knowing Southeast Asia."- Professor A.B. Shamsul, Founding DirectorInstitute of Ethnic Studies, Universiti Bebangsaan Malaysia"Now i…

  • The Single‐Party Dictator's Dilemma

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2011•Citada por: 65•Referências: 38

    The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using elections in this way, however, authoritarians face a trade‐off between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. In this article, we explore how single‐party regimes manage this trade‐off and the particular types of information available to them. Using candidate‐level data fr…

  • Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Comparative Politics•2011•Citada por: 47•Referências: 19

    Despite the fact that China and Vietnam have been the world’s two fastest growing economies over the past two decades, their income inequality patterns are very different. In this paper, we take a deep look at political institutions in the two countries, demonstrating that profound differences between these polities influence distributional choices. In particular, we find that elite institutions in Vietnam encourage the construction of broader po…

  • Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies

    Open Access•Melani Cammett, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2012•Citada por: 39•Referências: 56

    Which components of power sharing contribute to the duration of peace and what explains the linkages between institutional design and stability? The authors argue that certain types of political power sharing are associated with more durable peace than others, primarily through their positive effects on governance and public service delivery. In particular, closed-list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems stand out among power-shari…

  • The Adverse Effects of Sunshine

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2012•Citada por: 58•Referências: 36

    An influential literature has demonstrated that legislative transparency can improve the performance of parliamentarians in democracies. In a democracy, the incentive for improved performance is created by voters' responses to newly available information. Building on this work, donor projects have begun to export transparency interventions to authoritarian regimes under the assumption that nongovernmental organizations and the media can substitut…

  • Vietnam in 2013

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky•ARTICLE•Asian Survey•2014•Citada por: 1

    This essay reviews Vietnamese politics in 2013 through the lens of the constitutional drafting process and the unprecedented confidence vote in the National Assembly. Both events were framed by the country’s ongoing economic struggles, elite political contestation, international integration, and a more informed public, fueled by an increasingly active blogosphere. The events foreshadow how future Vietnamese leaders can no longer rely on deep rese…

  • Pass the Bucks

    Open Access•Nathan M Jensen, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•International Studies Quarterly•2014•Citada por: 22•Referências: 48

    Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead that the "competition" for capital can be politically…

  • The Political Economy of Development in China and Vietnam

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Political Science•2014•Citada por: 35•Referências: 97

    Two theories predominate in discussions of why China and Vietnam have, over the past three decades, achieved such rapid economic growth. The first argues that their startling performance can be explained by economic factors associated with late industrialization. The second proposes that China and Vietnam represent novel models of political economic organization that need to be better studied and understood. In this essay we review the voluminous…

  • Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk

    Open Access•Nathan M Jensen, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•British Journal of Political…•2014•Citada por: 35•Referências: 69

    A strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that authoritarian legislatures constrain executive decisions and reduce the threat of expropriation. Although the empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic evidence that authoritarian parliaments are able to restrain the actions of state leaders, reverse activities they disagree wi…

  • Vietnam in 2014

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•Asian Survey•2015

    The May 2014 entry of a Chinese deep-water oil rig into Vietnamese waters deeply shocked Vietnam. This yearend article chronicles the impact of the controversial action on (1) power struggles among elite politicians, (2) alterations in foreign policy orientation, and (3) popular opinion regarding economic reforms and emerging inequality

  • Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Southeast Asia

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky•ARTICLE•Bulletin of Indonesian Economic…•2017•Referências: 8

  • The Continent or the “Grand Large”? Strategic Culture and Operational Burden-Sharing in Nato

    Jordan Becker, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•International Studies Quarterly•2017•Citada por: 33•Referências: 43

    We argue that NATO allies exhibiting more "Atlanticist" strategic cultures allocate a greater share of their defense resources to Alliance priorities than those exhibiting "Europeanist" strategic cultures. Our analysis builds on policy discussions regarding imbalances in burden-sharing in transatlantic security. Scholarship in the fields of international security and political economy offers plausible explanations for these imbalances, but does n…

  • Participation, Government Legitimacy, and Regulatory Compliance in Emerging Economies

    Open Access•Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2019•Citada por: 8•Referências: 72

    This paper employs a field experiment in single-party-ruled Vietnam to test whether providing a broad-based representative sample of firms the opportunity to comment on draft regulations increases their subsequent compliance. We find three main outcomes of this treatment. First, treated firms exhibited greater improvement in their views of government's regulatory authority. Second, these firms were more likely to allow government-affiliated audit…

  • Fish or steel? New evidence on the environment-economy trade-off in developing Vietnam

    Open Access•Quynh Nguyen, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2021•Citada por: 4•Referências: 13

  • Facilitating Development

    Dean Dulay, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2023•Referências: 16

    Despite strong theoretical foundations, randomized evaluations demonstrate that subnational performance assessments have a mixed record in improving governance. We suggest that a key factor influencing this disappointing result has been the omission of facilitation—working with bureaucrats on how to use subnational performance assessments (SPAs) effectively and encouraging collaboration across government agencies. The argument is tested on a nati…

  • A Field of Her Own

    Alexander Fertig, Alexandra C Hartman et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2024•Referências: 12

    Can financial incentives lead households to register land in women's names, thereby providing them with formal property rights? Can formal property ownership improve women's economic outcomes and change decision-making dynamics within the household? To investigate these questions, we take advantage of a bank lending policy in Myanmar that motivated households with land holdings above ten acres to title the surplus land in their wives' names. We s…

  • Civic Education and Voting under Authoritarianism

    Edmund Malesky, Edmund J Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2025•Referências: 25

  • Disaggregated defense spending

    Open Access•Jordan Becker, Seth Benson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Peace Research•2025•Citada por: 3•Referências: 26

    Theoretical and empirical research on causes and consequences of defense spending is plentiful. Most of this research uses 'top line' defense spending data, either as a share of GDP or as a raw monetary figure. Empirical research has been limited, however, by the 'blunt' nature of this data, which does not help to explain what countries are spending on. We introduce a dataset that provides information on disaggregated defense spending from 35 NAT…

  • "Unpacking Compliance and "Leakages'' in International Regimes

    Lorenzo Crippa, Edmund Malesky et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2026

    States and non-state organizations often only partially comply with international legal regimes. This behavior can have severe counterproductive effects when differences in compliance levels encourage "leakage," defined as actions that contradict the desired impact of the regime. In this paper, we explore this problem in the international regime devoted to anticorruption, centered on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC), which led to the crimin…

Political science (19 obras) · Economics (13 obras) · Law (13 obras) · Politics (13 obras) · Law (12 obras) · Political economy (9 obras) · Business (8 obras) · Development economics (5 obras) · Authoritarianism (4 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras)

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