Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Dados do Periódico
| Tipo | JOURNAL |
|---|---|
| Editora | Oxford University Press (GB) |
| ISSN | 0309-7013 / 1467-8349 |
| Wikidata | Q29043739 |
| OpenAlex | S194395252 |
| Site | https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp |
| Total de publicações | 76 |
| Período coberto | 1926 - 2023 |
| País | GB |
| Idioma | EN |
| Fator de impacto | 4.4 |
This journal publishes supplementary volumes for the Aristotelian Society, indicating a focus on philosophy. Philosophy, while foundational to some social theory, is not directly related to social anthropology or its cognate fields
American Constitutional Law and Politics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Economic Theory and Institutions · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Free Will and Agency · Historical Philosophy and Science · History and Theory of Mathematics
Moral Gaslighting
Philosophers have turned their attention to gaslighting only recently, and have made considerable progress in analysing its characteristic aims and harms. I am less convinced, however, that we have fully understood its nature. I will argue in this paper that philosophers and others interested in the phenomenon have largely overlooked a phenomenon I call moral gaslighting, in which someone is made to feel morally defective—for example, cruelly unf…
Culpability, Blame, and the Moral Dynamics of Social Power
Decolonizing Anglo-American Political Philosophy
International migration is increasing not only in absolute terms but also as a percentage of the global population. In 2019, international migrants made up 3.5 per cent of the global population, compared to 2.8 per cent in the year 2000. Over the past two decades, a philosophical literature has emerged to investigate what justice requires with respect to these vast migrant flows. My article criticizes much of this philosophical work. Building on …
Appropriate Normative Powers
A normative power is a power to alter rights and duties directly. This paper explores what it means to alter rights and duties directly. In the light of that, it examines the kind of argument that might support the existence of normative powers. Both simple and complex instrumentalist accounts of such powers are rejected, as is an approach to normative powers that is based on the existence of normative interests. An alternative is sketched, where…
If This Isn’t Racism, What Is? The Politics of the Philosophy of Immigration
Alison Jaggar (2020) recommends a radical break with a dominant approach to the philosophy of immigration shared by both liberal cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists. This paper is intended as an exploration of Jaggar’s conclusions and as an attempt to carry them further. Building on her critique, I argue that the characteristic questions asked by both cosmopolitans and nationalists appear inappropriate when seen against the political reality o…
I—Hallvard Lillehammer
According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much …
II—Gopal Sreenivasan
This paper offers four arguments against a moral human right to health, two denying that the right exists and two denying that it would be very useful (even if it did exist). One of my sceptical arguments is familiar, while the other is not. The unfamiliar argument is an argument from the nature of health. Given a realistic view of health production, a dilemma arises for the human right to health. Either a state's moral duty to preserve the healt…
I—Elizabeth Anderson
Many problems of inequality in developing countries resist treatment by formal egalitarian policies. To deal with these problems, we must shift from a distributive to a relational conception of equality, founded on opposition to social hierarchy. Yet the production of many goods requires the coordination of wills by means of commands. In these cases, egalitarians must seek to tame rather than abolish hierarchy. I argue that bureaucracy offers imp…
I—Ursula Coope
Journal Article I—Ursula Coope: Aristotle on Action Get access Ursula Coope Ursula Coope Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 2007, Pages 109–138, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2007.00153.x Published: 11 August 2015
I — Sally Haslanger
In debates over the existence and nature of social kinds such as ‘race’ and ‘gender’, philosophers often rely heavily on our intuitions about the nature of the kind. Following this strategy, philosophers often reject social constructionist analyses, suggesting that they change rather than capture the meaning of the kind terms. However, given that social constructionists are often trying to debunk our ordinary (and ideology-ridden?) understandings…
I — Ken Gemes
I—Ken Gemes Get access Ken Gemes Ken Gemes Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 80, Issue 1, 1 June 2006, Pages 321–338, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2006.00146.x Published: 11 August 2015
‘Conceptual Truth’
Journal Article 'Conceptual Truth' Get access Timothy Williamson Timothy Williamson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 80, Issue 1, 1 June 2006, Pages 1–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2006.00136.x Published: 11 August 2015
I—Samuel Scheffler
Journal Article I—Samuel Scheffler: Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral Pluralism Get access Samuel Scheffler Samuel Scheffler Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 July 2005, Pages 229–253, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2005.00134.x Published: 11 August 2015
I—Crispin Wright
My life consists in my being content to accept many things (Wittgenstein On Certainty x344) Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. ‘Entitlement’, as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counter-exempli.es that identi.cation. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds …
II — Michael Otsuka
Journal Article II—Michael Otsuka Get access Michael Otsuka Michael Otsuka Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 July 2004, Pages 151–166, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00120.x Published: 13 August 2015
I — Andrew Williams
It is difficult for prioritarians to explain the degree to which justice requires redress for misfortune in a way that avoids imposing unreasonably high costs on more advantaged individuals whilst also economising on intuitionist appeals to judgment. An appeal to hypothetical insurance may be able to solve the problems of cost and judgment more successfully, and can also be defended from critics who claim that resource egalitarianism is best unde…
II — Ernest Sosa
I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars's Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his earlier critique of givenist mythology. In response to Michael Williams, it is argued that these issues are importantly independent of philosophy of language or mind, and that my own take on them does not commit me to any abs…
I — Paul Boghossian
I—Paul Boghossian Get access Paul Boghossian Paul Boghossian Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 July 2003, Pages 225–248, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00110 Published: 13 August 2015
I—Axel Honneth
Axel Honneth; I—Axel Honneth: Invisibility: On the Epistemology of ‘Recognition’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 July 2001, Pa
II—Avishai Margalit
Journal Article II—Avishai Margalit: Recognizing the Brother and the Other Get access Avishai Margalit Avishai Margalit Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 July 2001, Pages 127–139, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00082 Published: 13 August 2015
I — Susan Hurley
I argue that the aim to neutralize the influence of luck on distribution cannot provide a basis for egalitarianism: it can neither specify nor justify an egalitarian distribution. Luck and responsibility can play a role in determining what justice requires to be redistributed, but from this we cannot derive how to distribute: we cannot derive a pattern of distribution from the ‘currency’ of distributive justice. I argue that the contrary view fac…
II — Richard J. Arneson
Journal Article II—Richard J. Arneson Get access Richard J. Arneson Richard J. Arneson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 July 2001, Pages 73–90, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00079 Published: 13 August 2015
II – Peter Hylton
Section I of this essay discusses Quine's views about reference,, contrasting them with those of Russell. For the latter, our language and thought succeed in being about the world because of our acquaintance with objects; the relation of reference—roughly, the relation between a name and its bearer—is thus fundamental. For Quine, by contrast, the fundamental relation by which our language comes to be about the world, and to have empirical content…
II – David Wiggins
Evans was not wrong (i maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans’s ‘Julius’ is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as ‘Vulcan does not really exist’, that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or…
II – Dominic Scott
In Nicomachean Ethics X 7-8, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of eudaimonia, primary and secondary. The first corresponds to contemplation, the second to activity in accordance with moral virtue and practical reason. My task in this paper is to elucidate this distinction. Like Charles, I interpret it as one between paradigm and derivative cases; unlike him, I explain it in terms of similarity, not analogy. Furthermore, once the underlying nature…
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Symposium
G. A. Paul, H. M. Smith, A. R. M. Murray; Symposium: Is there a Problem about Sense-Data?, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 15, Issue 1, 5
“Clarity is Not Enough”
“Clarity is Not Enough” Get access H. H. Price H. H. Price Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 19, Issue 1, 15 July 1945, Pages 1–31, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/19.1.1 Published: 30 July 2015
Symposium
J. Wisdom, J. L. Austen, A. J. Ayer; Symposium: Other Minds, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 20, Issue 1, 7 July 1946, Pages 122–197, htt
Some Methods of Speculative Philosophy
Some Methods of Speculative Philosophy Get access C. D. Broad C. D. Broad Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 21, Issue 1, 6 July 1947, Pages 1–32, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/21.1.1 Published: 30 July 2015
What can Logic do for Philosophy?
K. R. Popper, W. C. Kneale, A. J. Ayer; What can Logic do for Philosophy?, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 22, Issue 1, 11 July 1948, Pag
Truth
J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, D. R. Cousin; Truth, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 24, Issue 1, 9 July 1950, Pages 111–172, https://doi.o
Symposium
A. J. Ayer, R. Rhees; Symposium: “Can There Be A Private Language?”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 28, Issue 1, 11 July 1954, Pages 63
Symposium
Margaret MacDonald, M. Scriven; Symposium: The Language of Fiction, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 28, Issue 1, 11 July 1954, Pages 165
Symposium
R. W. Hepburn, Iris Murdoch; Symposium: Vision and Choice in Morality, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 30, Issue 1, 8 July 1956, Pages 14
Symposium
C. Lewy, J. Watling, P. T. Geach; Symposium: Entailment, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 32, Issue 1, 13 July 1958, Pages 123–172, https
Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis
Charles Taylor, A. J. Ayer; Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 33, Issue 1, 12 July 1959, Pages 93–12
Is There Only One Correct System of Modal Logic?
E. J. Lemmon, G. P. Henderson; Is There Only One Correct System of Modal Logic?, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 33, Issue 1, 12 July 195
How Can One Person Represent Another?
A. Phillips Griffiths, Richard Wollheim; How Can One Person Represent Another?, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 34, Issue 1, 10 July 1960
Goodness and Choice
Philippa Foot, Alan Montefiore; Goodness and Choice, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 35, Issue 1, 9 July 1961, Pages 45–80, https://doi.o
Negative Utilitarianism
H. B. Acton, J. W. N. Watkins; Negative Utilitarianism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 37, Issue 1, 14 July 1963, Pages 83–114, https://
Causality Ancient and Modern
Journal Article Causality Ancient and Modern Get access D. J. Allan D. J. Allan Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 39, Issue 1, 11 July 1965, Pages 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/39.1.1 Published: 30 July 2015
Ethical Consistency
B. A. O. Williams, W. F. Atkinson; Ethical Consistency, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 39, Issue 1, 11 July 1965, Pages 103–138, https:/
The Idea of a Social Science
Alasdair MacIntyre, D. R. Bell; The Idea of a Social Science, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 41, Issue 1, 9 July 1967, Pages 95–132, htt
Oughts and Wants
Journal Article Oughts and Wants Get access Neil Cooper, Neil Cooper Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar John Benson John Benson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 42, Issue 1, 14 July 1968, Pages 143–172, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/42.1.143 Published: 30 July 2015
Transcendental Arguments
A. Phillips Griffiths, J. J. MacIntosh; Transcendental Arguments, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 43, Issue 1, 13 July 1969, Pages 165–19
Reasons for Action and Desires
Michael Woods, Philippa Foot; Reasons for Action and Desires, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 46, Issue 1, 9 July 1972, Pages 189–210, ht
Particularity, Art and Evaluation
Particularity, Art and Evaluation F. N. Sibley F. N. Sibley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 48, Issue 1, 14 July 1974, Pages 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/48.1.1 Published: 30 July 2015
Relativism
Steven Lukes, W. G. Runciman; Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 48, Issue 1, 14 July 1974, Pages 165–208
T and Sympathy
Journal Article T and Sympathy Get access Ronald J. Butler Ronald J. Butler Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 49, Issue 1, 20 July 1975, Pages 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/49.1.1 Published: 30 July 2015
How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?
Colin Radford, Michael Weston; How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 49, Issue 1, 20 July 19