Mind

Philosophy · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology · Archaeology and Historical Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Diverse Scientific and Economic Studies · Educational Robotics and Engineering · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · German Literature and Culture Studies

• Rescuing Socialism from Equality

  Open Access•Barry Maguire•ARTICLE•2026

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  Karl Marx rejected the ideal of equality as bourgeois. And yet the most significant attempt in recent years to distinguish socialist theory from liberal egalitarian theory, G. A. Cohen’s critique of John Rawls, relies almost entirely on an egalitarian principle. Although Cohen’s critique often seems to have a great deal of intuitive force, a number of Rawls’s defenders have argued, quite convincingly, that Cohen’s critique is unsuccessful. For th…

• Aristotle on Sexual Difference

  Open Access•Sophia M Connell•ARTICLE•2025

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  Journal Article Aristotle on Sexual Difference: Metaphysics, Biology, Politics Get access Aristotle on Sexual Difference: Metaphysics, Biology, Politics, by Marguerite Deslauriers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. vii + 354. Sophia M Connell Sophia M Connell Birkbeck College, University of London, UK [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad032, https://doi.org/10.1093/m…

• Nietzsche and the Significance of Genealogy

  Open Access•Alexander Prescott‐Couch•ARTICLE•2024

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  How is Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality relevant to his revaluation of values? I consider and reject three accounts: contingency accounts, pedigree accounts, and unmasking accounts. I then propose an alternative account. On this view, Nietzsche provides a ‘deconstructive genealogy’ that indicates whether and where we should expect to find unity in our current moral practices. Moreover, Nietzsche’s history contributes to a critique of contemporar…

• Adapting

  Open Access•Susan Blake•ARTICLE•2024

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  Adapting is noteworthy not only for discussing a Chinese philosophy of action in the sense of efficacious action and freedom from constraint, but also for doing so via excavated manuscripts and lesser-known works such as military guides and divination texts as well as the familiar pre-Han masters texts. It presents a number of valuable close readings of the text, making a number of important distinctions clearly. However, it spends far too little…

• Anti-Racism and Kant Scholarship

  Open Access•Pauline Kleingeld•ARTICLE•2024

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• Listening to Reason in Plato and Aristotle

  Open Access•Sarah Broadie•ARTICLE•2023

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  When we are in a rational frame of mind we are ready to listen to reason (tautology). But if we are not in a rational frame of mind, how does reason (in this case presumably someone else’s reason or reasoning) get through to us? Should reason even try? But if reason simply gives up on us, isn’t it evading one of its great responsibilities, the responsibility to correct and to educate? If it accepts responsibility and refuses to give up, is it rat…

• Conceptual Engineering, Metasemantic Externalism and Speaker-Meaning

  Open Access•M Pinder•ARTICLE•2021

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  What is the relationship between conceptual engineering and metasemantic externalism? Sally Haslanger has argued that metasemantic externalism justifies the seemingly counterintuitive consequences of her proposed conceptual revisions. But according to Herman Cappelen, metasemantic externalism makes conceptual engineering effectively impossible in practice. After raising objections to Haslanger’s and Cappelen’s views, I argue for a very different …

• Belief, Faith, and Hope

  Open Access•Elizabeth G Jackson, Elizabeth Jackson•ARTICLE•2021

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  I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. I argue that all three attitudes play the same role in rationalizing action. First, I explain two models of rational action—the decision-theory model and the belief-desire model. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and a conative component. Then, using this framework, I show how belief, faith, and hope that p can all make it rational to accept, …

• Categories We Live by

  Open Access•Elizabeth Barnes, Matthew Andler•ARTICLE•2020

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  Meeting at our favourite local coffee shop, Local Café, to discuss this critical notice of Ásta’s remarkable contribution to social ontology and feminist philosophy, we place an order with an individual behind the counter. We begin the interaction by assessing the individual, before attributing to them various social properties, including the property of being a barista, the property of being queer, the property of being trans, and the property o…

• We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes

  Open Access•David Faraci•ARTICLE•2020

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  Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best e…

• Epistemic Trespassing

  Open Access•Nathan Ballantyne•ARTICLE•2019

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  Epistemic trespassers judge matters outside their field of expertise. Trespassing is ubiquitous in this age of interdisciplinary research and recognizing this will require us to be more intellectually modest.

• Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy

  Open Access•Kevin Dorst•ARTICLE•2019

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  The Lockean Thesis says that you must believe p iff you’re sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the ‘must’ asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, ‘sufficiently confident’ refers to a fixed threshold of credence; on others, it varies with proposition and context. Claim: the Lockean Thesis follows from epistemic utility theory—the view that rational requirements are constrained by the …

• There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes

  Open Access•Barry Maguire•ARTICLE•2018

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  A dogma of contemporary ethical theory maintains that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is the very same as the nature of normative support for actions. The prevailing view is that normative reasons provide the support across the board. I argue that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is importantly different from the nature of normative support for actions. Actions are indeed supported by reasons. Reason…

• The Unity of Grounding

  Open Access•Selim Berker•ARTICLE•2018

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  I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics (in con…

• Paternalism and our Rational Powers

  Michael Cholbi•ARTICLE•2016

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  According to rational will views of paternalism, the wrongmaking feature of paternalism is that paternalists disregard or fail to respect the rational will of the paternalized, in effect substituting their own presumably superior judgments about what ends the paternalized ought to pursue or how they ought to pursue them. Here I defend a version of the rational will view appealing to three rational powers that constitute rational agency, which I c…

• Overpowering

  Anthony Bird, Alexander Bird•ARTICLE•2016

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  Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers , and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example, causation, representation, intentionality, free will and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the afore…

• Distributive Equality

  David Mccarthy•ARTICLE•2015

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  Egalitarians think that equality in the distribution of goods somehow matters. But what exactly is egalitarianism? This article argues for a characterization based on novel principles essentially involving risk. The characterization is used to resolve disputed questions about egalitarianism, such as its compatibility with strong separability and its relation to other distributive theories. But egalitarianism is subject to a particularly severe fo…

• The Intellectual Given

  John Bengson•ARTICLE•2015

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  Intuition is sometimes derided as an abstruse or esoteric phenomenon akin to crystal-ball gazing. Such derision appears to be fuelled primarily by the suggestion, evidently endorsed by traditional rationalists such as Plato and Descartes, that intuition is a kind of direct, immediate apprehension akin to perception. This paper suggests that although the perceptual analogy has often been dismissed as encouraging a theoretically useless metaphor, a…

• Dignity and the Value of Rejecting Profitable but Insulting Offers

  E Athanasiou, Alex John London et al.•ARTICLE•2015

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  In this paper we distinguish two competing conceptions of dignity, one recognizably Hobbesian and one recognizably Kantian. We provide a formal model of how decision-makers committed to these conceptions of dignity might reason when engaged in an economic transaction that is not inherently insulting, but in which it is possible for the dignity of the agent to be called into question. This is a modified version of the ultimatum game. We then use t…

• Method and Metaphysics

  Michail Peramatzis•ARTICLE•2014

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  Journal Article Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I, by Jonathan Barnes Get access Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I, by Jonathan Barnes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xi + 621. H/b £62.50. Michail Peramatzis Michail Peramatzis University of Oxford Worcester College Walton Street Oxford, OX1 2HB [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic G…

• Plato and the Norms of Thought

  Raphael Woolf•ARTICLE•2013

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  This paper argues for the presence in Plato’s work of a conception of thinking central to which is what I call the Transparency View. According to this view, in order for a subject to think of a given object, the subject must represent that object just as it is, without inaccuracy or distortion. I examine the ways in which this conception influences Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics and explore some ramifications for contemporary views about m…

• Cohen's Critique of Rawls

  Alan Thomas•ARTICLE•2011

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  This paper assesses G. A. Cohen’s critique of Rawlsian special incentives. Two arguments are identified and criticized: an argument that the difference principle does not justify incentives because of a limitation on an agent’s prerogative to depart from a direct promotion of the interests of the worst off, and an argument that justice is limited in its scope. The first argument is evaluated and defended from the criticism that once Cohen has con…

• Not Just a Truthometer

  David Enoch•ARTICLE•2010

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  How should you update your (degrees of ) belief about a proposition when you find out that someone else — as reliable as you are in these matters — disagrees with you about its truth value? There are now several different answers to this question — the question of ‘peer disagreement’ — in the literature, but none, I think, is plausible. Even more importantly, none of the answers in the literature places the peer-disagreement debate in its natural…

• Borderline Hermaphrodites

  R Sorensen•ARTICLE•2010

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  The Pyrrhonian sceptic Favorinus of Arelata personified indeterminacy, cultivating his (or her) borderline status to undermine dogmatism. Inspired by the techniques of Favorinus, I show, by example, that ‘vague’ has borderline cases. These concrete steps lead to a more abstract argument that ‘vague’ has borderline borderline cases and borderline borderline borderline cases. My specimens are intended supplement earlier non-constructive proofs of t…

• We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties

  Michael T Nelson•ARTICLE•2010

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  In ethics, it is commonly supposed that we have both positive duties and negative duties, things we ought to do and things we ought not to do. Given the many parallels between ethics and epistemology, we might suppose that the same is true in epistemology, and that we have both positive epistemic duties and negative epistemic duties. I argue that this is false; that is, that we have negative epistemic duties, but no positive ones. There are thing…

• The Meaning of the Word ‘Truth’

  William James•ARTICLE•1908

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  THE MEANING OF THE WORD ‘TRUTH’ Get access WILLIAM JAMES WILLIAM JAMES Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XVII, Issue 3, 1908, Pages 455–456, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XVII.3.455 Published: 01 January 1908

• Vi.—critical Notices

  J Ellis McTaggart•ARTICLE•1908

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  Journal Article VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES Get access Pragmatism, a New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking; Popular Lectures on Philosophy. By WILLIAM JAMES. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. Pp. 309. J. ELLIS MCTAGGART J. ELLIS MCTAGGART Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XVII, Issue 1, 1908, Pages 104–109, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XVII.1.104 Published: 01 January 1908

• Ii.—does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake ?

  H A Prichard•ARTICLE•1912

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  II.—DOES MORAL PHILOSOPHY REST ON A MISTAKE ? Get access H. A. PRICHARD H. A. PRICHARD Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXI, Issue 81, 1912, Pages 21–37, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXI.81.21 Published: 01 January 1912

• The Philosophy of Chance

  F Y Edgeworth•ARTICLE•1922

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  THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHANCE Get access F. Y. EDGEWORTH F. Y. EDGEWORTH Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXXI, Issue 123, July 1922, Pages 257–283, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXXI.123.257 Published: 01 July 1922

• Iv.—‘representative Ideas’ in Malebranche and Arnauld

  Arthur O Lovejoy•ARTICLE•1923

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  Journal Article IV.—‘REPRESENTATIVE IDEAS’ IN MALEBRANCHE AND ARNAULD Get access A. O. LOVEJOY A. O. LOVEJOY Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXXII, Issue 128, October 1923, Pages 449–461, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXXII.128.449 Published: 01 October 1923

• Vi.—critical Notices

  F P Ramsey•ARTICLE•1923

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  Journal Article VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES Get access Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. By LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, with an Introduction by BERTRAND RUSSELL. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) London. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1922. Pp. 189. 10s. 6d. F. P. RAMSEY F. P. RAMSEY Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXXII, Issue 128, October 1923, Pages 465–478, …

• “Contemporary British Philosophy (Second Series).”

  A E Taylor•ARTICLE•1927

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  “CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY (SECOND SERIES).” Get access A. E. TAYLOR A. E. TAYLOR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXXVI, Issue 141, January 1927, Page 123, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXXVI.141.123 Published: 01 January 1927

• The Antilogism

  C F LADD-FRANKLIN•ARTICLE•1928

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  Journal Article THE ANTILOGISM C. F. LADD-FRANKLIN C. F. LADD-FRANKLIN Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXXVII, Issue 148, October 1928, Pages 532–534, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXXVII.148.532 Published: 01 October 1928

• Iv.—critical Realism and Substance

  Roy Wood Sellars•ARTICLE•1929

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  IV.—CRITICAL REALISM AND SUBSTANCE ROY WOOD SELLARS ROY WOOD SELLARS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 152, October 1929, Pages 473–488, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXXVIII.152.473 Published: 01 October 1929

• I.—mathematical Proof

  G H Hardy•ARTICLE•1929

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  I.—MATHEMATICAL PROOF Get access G. H. HARDY G. H. HARDY Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 149, January 1929, Pages 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXXVIII.149.1 Published: 01 January 1929

• I.—the Concrete Universal

  Michael Foster, MICHAEL B FOSTER•ARTICLE•1931

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  I.—THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL: COOK WILSON AND BOSANQUET Get access MICHAEL B. FOSTER MICHAEL B. FOSTER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XL, Issue 157, January 1931, Pages 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XL.157.1 Published: 01 January 1931

• Iii.—mathematics and Dialectic in the Republic Vi.—vii. (I.).

  F M Cornford•ARTICLE•1932

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  III.—MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC IN THE REPUBLIC VI.—VII. (I.). Get access F. M. CORNFORD F. M. CORNFORD Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLI, Issue 161, January 1932, Pages 37–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLI.161.37 Published: 01 January 1932

• Ii.—mathematics and Dialectic in the Republic Vi.—vii. (Ii.)

  F M Cornford•ARTICLE•1932

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  Journal Article II.—MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC IN THE REPUBLIC VI.—VII. (II.) Get access F. M. CORNFORD F. M. CORNFORD Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLI, Issue 162, April 1932, Pages 173–190, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLI.162.173 Published: 01 April 1932

• The Logical Paradoxes

  Kurt Grelling•ARTICLE•1936

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  Journal Article THE LOGICAL PARADOXES Get access KURT GRELLING KURT GRELLING Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLV, Issue 180, October 1936, Pages 481–486, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLV.180.481 Published: 01 October 1936

• I.—utilitarianism Revised

  R F Harrod, Roy Harrod•ARTICLE•1936

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  I.—UTILITARIANISM REVISED Get access R. F. HARROD R. F. HARROD Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLV, Issue 178, April 1936, Pages 137–156, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLV.178.137 Published: 01 April 1936

• Ii—the Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms

  CHARLES LESLIE STEVENSON•ARTICLE•1937

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• Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?

  J D MABROTT•ARTICLE•1937

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  Journal Article IS PLATO'S REPUBLIC UTILITARIAN? Get access J. D. MABROTT J. D. MABROTT Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLVI, Issue 184, October 1937, Pages 468–474, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLVI.184.468 Published: 01 October 1937

• “Emanation” in Plotinus

  A H Armstrong, Ann Armstrong•ARTICLE•1937

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  "EMANATION" IN PLOTINUS Get access A. H. ARMSTRONG A. H. ARMSTRONG Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLVI, Issue 181, January 1937, Pages 61–66, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLVI.181.61 Published: 01 January 1937

• A Mistake of Plato's in the Republic

  Michael Foster, M B Foster•ARTICLE•1937

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  A MISTAKE OF PLATO'S IN THE REPUBLIC Get access M. B. FOSTER M. B. FOSTER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLVI, Issue 183, July 1937, Pages 386–393, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLVI.183.386 Published: 01 July 1937

• Iii.—the “Polytheism” of Plato

  A E Taylor•ARTICLE•1938

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  III.—THE “POLYTHEISM” OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA Get access A. E. TAYLOR A. E. TAYLOR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLVII, Issue 186, April 1938, Pages 180–199, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLVII.186.180 Published: 01 April 1938

• Iii.—the “Polytheism” of Plato

  F M Cornford•ARTICLE•1938

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  Journal Article III.—THE “POLYTHEISM” OF PLATO: AN APOLOGY Get access F. M. CORNFORD F. M. CORNFORD Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLVII, Issue 187, July 1938, Pages 321–330, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLVII.187.321 Published: 01 July 1938

• Ii.—mathematics and Its Foundations

  A G D WATSON•ARTICLE•1938

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  Journal Article II.—MATHEMATICS AND ITS FOUNDATIONS Get access A. G. D. WATSON A. G. D. WATSON Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLVII, Issue 188, October 1938, Pages 440–451, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLVII.188.440 Published: 01 October 1938

• A Mistake of Plato's in the “Republic”

  Michael Foster, M B Foster•ARTICLE•1938

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  A MISTAKE OF PLATO'S IN THE “REPUBLIC”: A REJOINDER TO MR. MABBOTT Get access M. B. FOSTER M. B. FOSTER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLVII, Issue 186, April 1938, Pages 226–232, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLVII.186.226 Published: 01 April 1938

• Ii.—plato's ‘Parmenides’ (Ii.)

  Gilbert Ryle•ARTICLE•1939

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  II.—PLATO'S 'PARMENIDES' (II.) Get access GILBERT RYLE GILBERT RYLE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLVIII, Issue 191, July 1939, Pages 302–325, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLVIII.191.302 Published: 01 July 1939

• I.—plato's ‘Parmenides’

  Gilbert Ryle•ARTICLE•1939

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  Journal Article I.—PLATO'S 'PARMENIDES' Get access GILBERT RYLE GILBERT RYLE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XLVIII, Issue 190, April 1939, Pages 129–151, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XLVIII.190.129 Published: 01 April 1939