Normativity

In a tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, it has become common for contemporary philosophers to treat practical and theoretical normativity as constituting two genuinely distinct domains. Despite this, it remains unclear what it is, or would be, for practical and theoretical normativity to in fact be distinct domains. This chapter considers the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct and proposes that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood. One is by reference to final ought s: roughly, a normative domain is distinct because it has its own final ought . The other is by considering the relationship between reasons, what they are reasons for, and the sources of those reasons. The chapter explains important differences between the accounts and discusses some considerations that arise in light of those differences for more general normative theorizing

• The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons

  Ulrike Heuer•BOOK•2018

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  There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter…

• Normativity

  Conor Mchugh, Jonathan Way et al.•BOOK•2018

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  What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. This division of labour corresponds to a distinction theorists draw between practical and epistemic normativity, where normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. Philosophers have tended…

• Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity

  Conor Mchugh, Andrew Reisner et al.•BOOK•2018

  Incluir item

  In a tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, it has become common for contemporary philosophers to treat practical and theoretical normativity as constituting two genuinely distinct domains. Despite this, it remains unclear what it is, or would be, for practical and theoretical normativity to in fact be distinct domains. This chapter considers the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct and proposes that there are two differen…

• The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons

  Ulrike Heuer•BOOK•2018

  Incluir item

  There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter…

• Normativity

  Conor Mchugh, Jonathan Way et al.•BOOK•2018

  Incluir item

  What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. This division of labour corresponds to a distinction theorists draw between practical and epistemic normativity, where normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. Philosophers have tended…

• Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity

  Conor Mchugh, Andrew Reisner et al.•BOOK•2018

  Incluir item

  In a tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, it has become common for contemporary philosophers to treat practical and theoretical normativity as constituting two genuinely distinct domains. Despite this, it remains unclear what it is, or would be, for practical and theoretical normativity to in fact be distinct domains. This chapter considers the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct and proposes that there are two differen…