Do States Constrain Non-State Hackers? International Telecommunication Union Elections and Non-State Cyber Aggression

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10071592
AutoresConner B Joyce (0009-0009-2454-4874, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume69
Fascículo10
Páginas1687-1712
Data de publicação2025-02-24
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00220027251323557
OpenAlexW4407930059
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas35

Do states constrain non-state hackers? This article extends research on the role of transnational cyber aggression in international relations, showing that governments can be incentivized to mitigate non-state hacking. To test this argument, I leverage competitive elections to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which requires states to campaign on their cybersecurity record. By exploiting this variation, I demonstrate that states are responsive to incentives. Candidates reduce non-state cyber aggression to increase their likelihood of election. This finding demonstrates the potential utility of international institutions as a policy solution to transnational hacking, suggesting that structural incentives can induce states to constrain hackers operating in their territory

Aggression · Business · Computer security · Economics · Hacker · International trade · Law and economics · Political science · State (computer science · Computer Science · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology