Effects of Defensive and Proactive Measures on Competition Between Terrorist Groups
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10071730 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Subhayu Bandyopadhyay (0000-0003-1626-6543, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915, School of Economic, Political & Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2022 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Fascículo | 10 |
| Páginas | 1797-1825 |
| Data de publicação | 2022-06-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editora | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027221108432 |
| OpenAlex | W4283209991 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 30 |
A two-stage game investigates how counterterrorism measures affect within-country competition between two rival terrorist groups. Although such competition is commonplace (e.g., al-Nusra Front and Free Syria Army; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army; and al-Fatah and Hamas), there is no theoretical treatment of how proactive and defensive measures influence this interaction. Previous studies on rival terrorist groups are solely empirical concerning group survival, outbidding, and terrorism level, while ignoring the role that government countermeasures exert on the rival groups’ terrorism. In a theoretical framework, alternative counterterrorism actions have diverse impacts on the level of terrorism depending on relative group sizes and government-targeting decisions. In the two-stage game, optimal counterterrorism policy rules are displayed in terms of how governments target symmetric and asymmetric terrorist groups. Comparative statics show how parameter changes affect Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes
Affect (linguistics · Comparative statics · Competition (biology · Economics · Game theory · Government (linguistics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Subgame perfect equilibrium · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11
How do the factors determining terrorist groups’ longevity differ from those affecting their success
How Terrorist Groups End
How al-Qaida Ends
An empirical analysis of alternative ways that terrorist groups end
The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures
The Nature of the Beast
Competition, Differentiation, and the Severity of Terrorist Attacks
Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity
Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organizations
Transnational Terrorism
Allying to Kill
The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations
Too Much of a Good Thing
Are Lives a Substitute for Livelihoods? Terrorism, Security, and US Bilateral Imports
On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorist Organizations
Terrorists versus the Government
Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada
Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow
Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity
A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups
Palestinian Suicide Bombing
More Combatant Groups, More Terror
What Is a Terrorist Group? Conceptual Issues and Empirical Implications
The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |