Tacit Bargaining in International Relations

A Game Model and a Case Study

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10071818
AutoresCatherine C Langlois (Georgetown University), Jean-Pierre P Langlois (San Francisco State University)
Ano1996
Volume40
Fascículo4
Páginas569-596
Data de publicação1996-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0022002796040004003
OpenAlexW2094772993
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas26

The authors develop a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in discounted repeated games that highlights a class of strategies called countervailing. When using countervailing strategies, the players focus on manipulating the other side's payoff to induce his cooperation. These strategies do not require one player to entertain specific expectations about the strategic choice of the other. For this reason, countervailing strategies are promising vehicles for tacit bargaining. The authors test their relevance using a case of international trade—Japan's penetration of the U.S. automobile market in the early 1980s. The empirical section provides evidence of the tacit bargaining behavior that the model predicts

Bargaining power · Economics · Game theory · Knowledge management · Microeconomics · Political science · Relevance (law · Stochastic game · Subgame perfect equilibrium · Tacit collusion · Tacit knowledge · Test (biology · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Merger and Competition Analysis