Dharmakīrtian Inference

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10127511
AutoresSzymon Bogacz (0000-0003-2371-1131, Australian National University, autor correspondente), Koji Tanaka (0000-0002-0281-9816, Australian National University)
Ano2023
Volume51
Fascículo5
Páginas591-609
Data de publicação2023-07-20
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Indian Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-1791 • E-ISSN: 1573-0395
EditoraSpringer Nature (PUBLISHER • SG)
DOI10.1007/s10781-023-09546-4
OpenAlexW4384927787
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas28

Dharmakīrti argues that there is no pramāṇa (valid means of cognition or source of knowledge) for a thesis that is a self-contradiction ( svavacanavirodha ). That is, self-contradictions such as ‘everything said is false’ and ‘my mother is barren’ cannot be known to be true or false. The contemporary scholar Tillemans challenges Dharmakīrti by arguing that we can know that self-contradictions are false by means of a formal logical inference. The aims of the paper are to answer Tillemans’ challenge from what we take to be Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian (someone who is like Dharmakīrti) perspective and to demonstrate the unique features of Dharmakīrti’s view of inference. By so doing, we show that the epistemology in relation to the formal conception of logic that underlies Tillemans’ challenge is problematic from Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian perspective. The paper, thus, presents Dharmakīrti’s view of inference and logical reasoning as well as a Dharmakīrtian challenge to the formal conception of logic that is the dominant contemporary conception

Contradiction · Epistemology · Inference · Perspective (graphical · Philosophy of religion · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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