Careful what you promise
Executive constraints and conflict recurrence
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10150765 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Sverke R Saxegaard (0009-0002-9757-2461, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway; and MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society, Oslo, Norway, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2025 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Fascículo | 6 |
| Páginas | 1765-1782 |
| Data de publicação | 2025-10-23 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Editora | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00223433251345392 |
| OpenAlex | W4415493663 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 32 |
A substantial fraction of all intrastate conflict onsets are recurrences of previously active conflicts. Recent studies suggest that constitutional arrangements that constrain executive power limit the risk of conflict recurrence. This effect is theorized to be driven by minority and individual-rights protection, in which formal executive constraints act as promises to protect these rights. These promises increase the mobilization costs for any challenger to the regime. However, the promises may no longer be credible at very high levels of formal executive constraints, as excessive promises are often seen as ‘too good to be true’. Consequently, one might expect a curvilinear relationship between executive constraints and conflict recurrence, in which high levels of constraints increase the risk of conflict recurrence. Empirical analysis of post-conflict regimes between 1975 and 2019 shows evidence of such a curvilinear relationship. The effect is further illustrated by a case study of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where the rebel group M23 emerged in the aftermath of unfulfilled government promises of minority and individual-rights protection. This nuances the established relationship between executive constraints and conflict recurrence, provides a cautionary note to designers of constitutional arrangements, and lends support to the theory that mobilization costs drive this relationship
Democracy · Empirical evidence · Executive branch · Executive power · Government (linguistics · Power (physics · Separation of powers · Political Conflict and Governance
Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War
How Consumers Evaluate eWOM (Electronic Word-of-Mouth) Messages
Do They Fight for Us?” Mixed Discourses of Conflict and the M23 Rebellion Among Congolese Rwandophone Refugees in Rwanda
When Civil Wars Recur
Preventing Civil War Recurrence
Sustaining the Peace
Democracy under the Gun Understanding Postconflict Economic Recovery
Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace
The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction
Accessing the state
Time to Kill
Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War
Governance and Conflict Relapse
Identifying Pathways to Peace
Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others
Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict
Executive Constraint, Political Stability, and Economic Growth
Power Sharing
Institutionalizing Peace
Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint
The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace
The volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse
Saving liberal peacebuilding
TheMouvement du 23 Marsand the dynamics of a failed insurgency in the Democratic Republic of Congo
De jure powersharing 1975-2019
The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96
How and when armed conflicts end
Armed Conflict 1946-2001
Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992
The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993
| Altamente citado | Não |
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