Advance‐Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10172046
AutoresJ D Dana (0000-0002-1997-1427, autor correspondente), Jr James D Dana
Ano1998
Volume106
Fascículo2
Páginas395-422
Data de publicação1998-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
EditoraUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/250014
OpenAlexW2037923745
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas14
Referências citadas3

When both individual and aggregate consumer demand is uncertain and firms set prices before demand is known, price‐taking firms may offer advance‐purchase discounts. Consumers with relatively more certain demands and with relatively lower valuations have an incentive to buy in advance the presence of other consumers with higher valuations and more uncertain aggregate demand increases the price they expect to pay in the spot market. Advance‐purchase sales are made to low‐valuation customers, as predicted by traditional models of second‐degree price discrimination, without assuming that firms have market power

Aggregate demand · Business · Economics · Incentive · Market power · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Monopoly · Price discrimination · Valuation (finance · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Supply Chain and Inventory Management