First‐Author Conditions

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10172827
AutoresMaxim Engers (University of Virginia), Joshua S Gans (0000-0001-6567-5859, The University of Melbourne), Simon Grant (0000-0002-9543-8536, Australian National University), Stephen King (0000-0003-3386-9151, The University of Melbourne), Stephen P King
Ano1999
Volume107
Fascículo4
Páginas859-883
Data de publicação1999-08-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
EditoraUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/250082
OpenAlexW3121335404
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas17
Referências citadas6

This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the persistent use of alphabetical name ordering on academic papers in economics. In a context in which market participants are interested in evaluating the relative individual contribution of authors, it is an equilibrium for papers to use alphabetical ordering. Moreover, it is never an equilibrium for authors always to be listed in order of relative contribution. In fact, we show via an example that the alphabetical name ordering norm may be the unique equilibrium, althoug multiple equilibria are also possible. Finally, we charaterize the welfare properties of the noncooperative equilibrium and show it to produce research of lower quality than is optimal and than would be achieved if coauthors were forced to use name ordering to signal relative contribution

Context (archaeology · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Norm (philosophy · Order (exchange · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · History · Philosophy