Local Property and State Income Taxes

The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition and Collusion

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10176579
AutoresThomas J Nechyba (0000-0002-0247-3528, autor correspondente)
Ano1997
Volume105
Fascículo2
Páginas351-384
Data de publicação1997-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
EditoraUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/262076
OpenAlexW2892126693
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas11

This paper addresses two long-standing positive questions in public finance: why is the property tax, despite widespread popular complaints against its fairness, the almost exclusive tax instrument used by local governments and why do we consistently observe higher levels of governments (states) undermining local property tax systems through income tax-funded grants and state-imposed caps on local property tax rates? Results indicate that setting local income tax rates to zero is a dominant strategy for communities that face competition from neighboring governments and that only through higher government intervention can local income taxes be introduced. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago

Ad valorem tax · Direct tax · Double taxation · Economics · Gross income · Income tax · Indirect tax · International taxation · Jurisdiction · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Political science · Property tax · Public economics · State income tax · Tax competition · Tax rate · Tax reform · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy