Innovation and Reputation
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10177261 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Robert A Miller (0000-0002-8158-0291, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1988 |
| Volume | 96 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 741-765 |
| Data de publicação | 1988-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Editora | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/261561 |
| OpenAlex | W2108943765 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 1 |
| Referências citadas | 12 |
This paper analyzes a monopolist that markets successive generations of new and improving nondurable products. Prices, research intensity, and product innovations are derived as sequential equilibrium outcomes to a dynamic game with incomplete information. Asymmetric information is an important feature of the model. The monopolist is fully aware of the current product's quality, as are consumers who have tried it. However, the beliefs of other people are characterized by a probability distribution that depends on the monopolist's marketing strategy and the product's popularity. The analysis illustrates a new context in which price signaling might serve as a mechanism for ensuring that only high- quality products are marketed. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press
Business · Complete information · Context (archaeology · Economics · Game theory · Industrial organization · Information asymmetry · Microeconomics · Popularity · Product (mathematics · Quality (philosophy · Repeated game · Reputation · Sequential game · Signaling game · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Marketing · Merger and Competition Analysis
Reputation and imperfect information
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
Information Costs, Duration of Search, and Turnover
Consumer Search with Uncertain Product Quality
Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Information and Consumer Behavior
Job Market Signaling
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,2 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 1 |