Sellars vs. the Given

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10345924
AutoresDaniel Bonevac (0000-0001-8666-1771, The University of Texas at Austin, autor correspondente)
Ano2002
Volume64
Fascículo1
Páginas1-30
Data de publicação2002-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00140.x
OpenAlexW2086911875
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas14

John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument—the “inconsistent triad” argument—addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty

Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Mythology · Nothing · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science