Contingent A Priori Knowledge

I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary

A priori and a posteriori · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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  Open Access•Yuan Yuan, Min-Sun Kim et al.•Review of Philosophy and Psychology•2023

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• Suspending belief in credal accounts

  Open Access•Ángel Del Río•Noûs•2024

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• Contingent a priori truths and performatives

  Open Access•Mauro Ruffino•Synthese•2021

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• Is justification easy or impossible? Getting acquainted with a middle road

  Open Access•Samuel A Taylor•Synthese•2015

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• A different kind of dream-based skepticism

  Open Access•Michael Veber•Synthese•2021

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• A new anti-expertise dilemma

  Open Access•T Raleigh•Synthese•2021

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• Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori

  Open Access•Brian Cutter•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2019

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• Epistemic Luck

  Duncan Pritchard•EPISTEMIC LUCK.•2005

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• Ernest Sosa and His Critics

  Open Access•John Greco•Ernest Sosa and His Critics•2004

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• Warrant and Proper Function

  Alvin Plantinga•Warrant and proper function•1993

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• Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

  Alvin I Goldman•The Journal of Philosophy•1976

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• Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

  Edmund L Gettier•Analysis•1963

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• Virtue, Luck and the Pyrrhonian Problematic

  Open Access•John Greco•Philosophical Studies•2006

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• A Virtue Epistemology

  Ernest Sosa•A virtue epistemology•2007

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• How to be a Fallibilist

  Stewart Cohen•Philosophical Perspectives•1988

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• Assertion, Knowledge, and Context

  Keith Derose•The Philosophical Review•2002

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• Must We Know What We Say

  Matthew Weiner•The Philosophical Review•2005

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• A Priori Knowledge

  Philip Kitcher•The Philosophical Review•1980

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• Reference and Definite Descriptions

  Keith S Donnellan•The Philosophical Review•1966

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• The Reliability of Sense Perception

  A E Pitson, William Alston•The Philosophical Quarterly•1994

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• Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge

  Albert Casullo•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1988

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• Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism

  Open Access•Michael Huemer•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2007

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• Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge

  Open Access•Stewart Cohen•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002

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• Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge

  Open Access•John Hawthorne•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002

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• Epistemic Circularity

  Open Access•Michael Bergmann•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2004

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