Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10347482
AutoresManuel Pérez Otero (0000-0002-0922-169X, Universitat de Barcelona, autor correspondente)
Ano2012
Volume89
Fascículo1
Páginas159-181
Data de publicação2012-07-25
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00613.x
OpenAlexW1541659950
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas22

I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to our inferential rationality (to use his term). According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. In that sense, insofar as Boghossian’s scenario is relevant to the debate externalism/internalism, it can be seen (against Boghossian’s original intention) as providing additional evidence for content externalism

Argument (complex analysis · Contemporary philosophy · Content (measure theory · Epistemology · Externalism · Inference · Internalism and externalism · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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