Explaining Self‐Interested Behavior of Public‐Spirited Policy Makers
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10396377 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Eyal Zamir (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan (0000-0001-9663-8954, Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Raanan Sulitzeanu‐kenan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) |
| Ano | 2017 |
| Volume | 78 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 579-592 |
| Data de publicação | 2017-08-30 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Public Administration Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/puar.12825 |
| OpenAlex | W2751048829 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 16 |
| Referências citadas | 126 |
Public choice theory (PCT) has had a powerful influence on political science and, to a lesser extent, public administration. Based on the premise that public officials are rational maximizers of their own utility, PCT has a quite successful record of correctly predicting governmental decisions and policies. This success is puzzling in light of behavioral findings showing that officials do not necessarily seek to maximize their own utility. Drawing on recent advances in behavioral ethics, this article offers a new behavioral foundation for PCT's predictions by delineating the psychological processes that lead well‐intentioned people to violate moral and social norms. It reviews the relevant findings of behavioral ethics, analyzes their theoretical and policy implications for officials' decision making, and sets an agenda for future research
Behavioral economics · Economics · Epistemology · Foundation (evidence · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Premise · Public economics · Public policy · Public relations · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Psychology
Doing the Right Thing? The Voting Power Effect and Institutional Shareholder Voting
Are future bureaucrats more prosocial
I know better
Public sector culture does not increase honest behavior
Political determinants of government transparency
Are public officials more risk-averse than private sector employees in decision-making? Interest and accountability matter
When GenAI writes public foresight reports
Using behavioral science to improve compliance in government records management
Revisiting Public Values
Behavioral responsive regulation
Nudge citizen participation by framing mobilization information
Nudging the nudger
Reduced‐Boundary Governance
The effect of psychological bias on public officials’ attitudes towards the implementation of policy instruments
Public-Sector Honesty and Corruption
Classical Rationalism and Contemporary Realism
Behavioral Equity
The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making
Social Influence and Group Behavior
Public Choice III
The Rationalizing Voter
Managerial Dilemmas
Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of Justifications)
Justified ethicality
Why Employees Do Bad Things
Self-serving altruism? The lure of unethical actions that benefit others
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
The Dishonesty of Honest People
The nature of human altruism
Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior
Individual differences in reasoning
The collaborative roots of corruption
Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience
Promises and Partnership
Business culture and dishonesty in the banking industry
Bureaucrats and Politicians
Retracted
The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning
Bad apples, bad cases, and bad barrels
Vicarious dishonesty
Exploiting moral wiggle room
The Bias Blind Spot
‘Public service motivation’ as an argument for government provision
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Erc
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
The Calculus of Consent
An Analysis of Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein’s Nudge
Rationality and the Reflective Mind
Perspectives on Public Choice
Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of Interest
Administrative Law
Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and Intelligence
The Political Economy of New Deal Spending
Behavioral Ethics
Role‐Induced Bias in Court
Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Toward a general theory of managerial discretion
Public Choice
Behavioral Public Administration
What Causes Unethical Behavior? A Meta‐Analysis to Set an Agenda for Public Administration Research
An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy
Majority Rule Models and Legislative Elections
Who Wants to Work for the Government
Revisiting the Motivational Bases of Public Service
Incrementalism
Behavioral Insights for Better Implementation in Government
The Motivational Bases of Public Service
Testing Theories of American Politics
Managerial Values and Accountability Pressures
Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector
Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics
The Principal's Moral Hazard
Measuring Public Service Motivation
Principled Agents
Public-Service Motivation
Sector Perceptions among State-Level Public Managers
Individualized Contracts For Top Public Servants
The Effect of Salient Reputational Threats on the Pace of FDA Enforcement
The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models
The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation
Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs
Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Reflection in the Shadow of Blame
Election Timing in Majoritarian Parliaments
The costs and benefits of undoing egocentric responsibility assessments in groups
Moral hypocrisy
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
A Public Management for All Seasons
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities
Explaining Bargaining Impasse
The case for motivated reasoning
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action
Moral Responsibility of Public Officials
Ethical Fading
Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest
Egocentric Ethics
| Obras citantes distintas | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,78 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 16 |