How Does Inside Information Affect Sports Betting Odds

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10492829
AutoresKarl Whelan (0000-0002-4831-5269, University College Dublin Dublin Ireland, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume72
Fascículo5
Data de publicação2025-06-11
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoScottish Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0036-9292 • E-ISSN: 1467-9485
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjpe.70017
OpenAlexW4411217027
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas23

We describe how insiders with superior information about potential outcomes of sporting events affect odds set by bookmakers, using a generalized version of a model due to Hyung‐Song Shin. The model has been cited as an explanation for the pattern of favorite‐longshot bias observed in fixed‐odds betting markets. We show disagreement among those bettors without inside information causes favorite‐longshot bias. The presence of insiders reduces odds but does not necessarily exacerbate favorite‐longshot bias. For realistically calibrated beliefs, the fraction of insiders has a minimal effect on the ratio of favorite to longshot odds, and betting markets collapse if it rises above low levels

Affect (linguistics · Econometrics · Economics · Logistic regression · Odds · Statistics · Gambling Behavior and Treatments · Mathematics · Psychology · Sports Analytics and Performance