Moral Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Free Will

In The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 373–81, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt‐type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt‐type examples: moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities. I contend that van Inwagen's principles — the principle of possible prevention and the no‐matter‐what principle — are invalid, and I suggest that their plausibility comes from thinking about a proper subset of the relevant cases

Compatibilism · Epistemology · Free will · Metaphysics · Moral responsibility · Notice · Political science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

• Fischer on Moral Responsibility

  Peter Van Inwagen, Peter Inwagen•The Philosophical Quarterly•1997

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