Leibniz and the Natural World

In 1900 Bertrand Russell noted memorably that on first reading Leibniz he felt ‘that the Monadology was a kind of fantastic fairy tale, coherent perhaps, but wholly arbitrary’ (A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, p. xvii). This, indeed, is how it still comes out on the dominant interpretation in the English‐speaking world. For on this idealist reading, Leibniz is portrayed as identifying the true referents of our thoughts and perceptions as immaterial monads whose only qualities are perceptions and appetitions. On this view, when we think we are perceiving material bodies, ‘we are in fact perceiving only immaterial monads whose perceptions and appetitions correspond to ours’ (p. 153). Even though every monad has a body, these bodies are mere phenomena; they are aggregates of monads which are not in themselves material or extended, but which simply appear so to other percipients. A monad with its body is therefore simply an aggregation of immaterial monads. Again, even though every monad is a union of substantial form and matter, this matter is primary matter, and as such is incomplete. While Leibniz equates substantial form with primitive active force, and primary matter with primitive passive force, it is clear that it is the active force which is basic. Thus when Leibniz tells De Volder in 1704 that ‘there is nothing in the world but simple substances, and in them, perception and appetite’, this is read as the claim that at bottom only immaterial substances exist

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