No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10690851
AutoresGil Hersch (0000-0003-0992-0164, Virginia Tech, autor correspondente)
Ano2020
Volume70
Fascículo278
Páginas43-64
Data de publicação2020-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqz029
OpenAlexW2951978086
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas23

Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either (a) be an account of well-being, (b) provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or (c) avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which well-being is constituted by endorsed veridical experiences. This account refers back to theories of well-being but does so as agnostically as possible. An intermediate account of well-being is meant as a policy guiding compromise between the different theories of well-being that make claims regarding what constitutes well-being. An intermediate account does as well as can be hoped for in providing a basis for well-being policy

Compromise · Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Positive economics · Well-being · Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Law · Psychological Well-being and Life Satisfaction