Blameworthiness and Dependence

Some recent accounts of blameworthiness present this property as response-dependent: an agent is blameworthy, they say, if and only if, and (if so) in virtue of the fact that, it is fitting to respond to her with a certain blaming emotion. Given the explanatory aim of these views, the selected emotion cannot be said simply to appraise its object as blameworthy. We argue that articulation of the appraisal in other terms suggested by proponents yields a failure of the coextension required by the accounts. We then address the promise to explain why the conditions that render one blameworthy are as they are. According to proponents, these conditions render one blameworthy because they render fitting the selected emotion. But why do just these conditions do the latter? We find no good answer to this question from proponents of the accounts. While we do not contend that blameworthiness is response-independent, we are unconvinced that it is response-dependent

Articulation (sociology) · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Linguistics · Object (grammar) · Political science · Property (philosophy) · Virtue · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

• Conversation and Responsibility

  Michael Mckenna•Conversation & responsibility•2012

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• Responsibility from the Margins

  David Shoemaker•Responsibility from the Margins•2015

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• Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame

  David Shoemaker•The Philosophical Review•2017

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